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Cultural artifacts, such as language, survive and replicate by passing from mind
to mind. Cultural evolution always proceeds by an inductive process, where be-
haviors are never directly copied, but reverse engineered by the cognitive mecha-
nisms involved in learning and production. I will refer to this type of evolutionary
change as inductive evolution and explain how this represents a broader class of
evolutionary processes that can include both neutral and selective evolution.
This thesis takes a mechanistic approach to understanding the forces of evo-
lution underlying change in culture over time, where the mechanisms of change
are sought within human cognition. I define culture as anything that replicates
by passing through a cognitive system and take language as a premier example of
culture, because of the wealth of knowledge about linguistic behaviors (external
language) and its cognitive processing mechanisms (internal language). Main-
stream cultural evolution theories related to social learning and social transmis-
sion of information define culture ideationally, as the subset of socially-acquired
information in cognition that affects behaviors. Their goal is to explain behaviors
with culture and avoid circularity by defining behaviors as markedly not part of
culture. I take a reductionistic approach and argue that all there is to culture
is brain states and behaviors, and further, that a complete explanation of the
forces of cultural change can not be explained by a subset of cognition related
to social learning, but necessarily involves domain-general mechanisms, because
cognition is an integrated system. Such an approach should decompose culture
into its constituent parts and explore 1) how brains states effect behavior, 2) how
behavior effects brain states, and 3) how brain states and behaviors change over
time when they are linked up in a process of cultural transmission, where one
person’s behavior is the input to another.
I conduct several psychological experiments on frequency learning with adult
learners and describe the behavioral biases that alter the frequencies of linguistic
variants over time. I also fit probabilistic models of cognition to participant data
to understand the inductive biases at play during linguistic frequency learning.
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Using these inductive and behavioral biases, I infer a Markov model over my em-
pirical data to extrapolate participants’ behavior forward in cultural evolutionary
time and determine equivalences (and divergences) between inductive evolution
and standard models from population genetics. As a key divergence point, I in-
troduce the concept of non-binomial cultural drift, argue that this is a rampant
form of neutral evolution in culture, and empirically demonstrate that probability
matching is one such inductive mechanism that results in non-binomial cultural
drift. I argue further that all inductive problems involving representativeness are
potential drivers of neutral evolution unique to cultural systems. I also explore
deviations from probability matching and describe non-neutral evolution due to
inductive regularization biases in a linguistic and non-linguistic domain. Here,
I offer a new take on an old debate about the domain-specificity vs -generality
of the cognitive mechanisms involved in language processing, and show that the
evolution of regularity in language cannot be predicted in isolation from the gen-
eral cognitive mechanisms involved in frequency learning. Using my empirical
data on regularization vs probability matching, I demonstrate how the use of ap-
propriate non-binomial null hypotheses offers us greater precision in determining
the strength of selective forces in cultural evolution.
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Cultural evolution is inductive
evolution
1.1 Introduction
Cultural artifacts, such as language, music, and technology, survive and replicate
by passing from one mind to another. In the absence of cognition, which can
perceive, learn, and produce behaviors for others to see, culture would not exist.
This thesis is concerned with the type of cultural variation found in the world
and how it got there. The term cultural variation provokes images of the diverse
cuisines and clothing found around the world, the different types of homes people
build for themselves and live in, the various political systems and forms of gover-
nance that structure societies, and the thousands of languages that humankind
uses to communicate with one another. These things vary between societies,
within societies, and even within individuals and constitute synchronic variation:
the variation we see in one snapshot, at a particular moment in time. We also
know very well that culture changes over time. You don’t wear the exact same
type of clothing that your great grandparents wore, the slang you use today is
(hopefully) different than the slang you used a decade ago, and your computer
probably doesn’t weigh 20 kilos anymore. These changes over time constitute
diachronic variation and are closely intertwined with synchronic variation, which
fuels the possibilities of change at any given moment.
To understand how and why culture changes, we need to understand what
happens at the locus of cultural change. But what is the locus of cultural change?
Where do manuscripts accumulate typos, where do stone tools develop smaller,
finer blades, and where do objects get new names? The answer to this question
is cognition. Cultural variants are never directly copied, but reproduced through
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a cycle of perception, processing, and production. For a stone tool to be copied,
it needs someone to observe its properties, infer how those properties came to be,
and then implement them in another piece of stone. This is a process of reverse
engineering (Kirby, 2013). Cultural variants can either be reverse engineered
without error, leading to perfect transmission fidelity, or with error, leading to
change. And these errors can either introduce new variants, or turn a variant
into another existing variant.
Some things are easier to learn or produce than others, and those that are
difficult to replicate with high fidelity will fall out of the pool of cultural variation
over time. Variants that are easier to reproduce with high fidelity, or are the
product of a type of error that is consistently made, will increase in number over
time. It seems likely that most of the errors humans make are not truly random.
Cognitive systems contain biases and the errors that we make while trying to
copy or learn things are often structured in interesting ways due to a variety of
interesting reasons. Distributions of variants are shaped by these biases over time
and therefore, can be explained in terms of these biases. When we understand
how these shaping forces operate, then we understand how the variants came to
be distributed as they are, and why one particular distribution exists, rather than
some other distribution.
This thesis aims to explore how cognitive biases shape cultural evolution at
a very basic level, by looking at the biases we employ when learning about the
frequencies of events and objects in our environment, because distortions to these
frequencies directly affect the distribution of cultural variants over time. I will
focus on a particular type of culturally transmitted entity, language, and detail
some of the main cognitive biases that affect the learning and production of word
frequencies and how these biases combine to drive the gradual change of linguis-
tic systems over time. Along the way, I will ask, what types of evolutionary
change do cognitive biases lead to? Can human frequency learning mechanisms
support cultural drift as well as selection? What is special about cultural evo-
lutionary processes that might not have parallels in genetic evolution? And how
much information do cognitive biases, and the behavior of individual learners,




If we want to be explicit about the forces of change that shape culture, we need
to be explicit about what we mean by culture. Therefore, the first task at hand is
to lay out a workable definition of culture conducive to an evolutionary research
agenda.
The vast majority of existing definitions of culture are ideational (Kroeber and
Kluckhohn, 1952; Keesing, 1974), meaning that they define culture exclusively in
terms of ideas. In a comprehensive review, Keesing (1974) grouped definitions
of culture into four broad classes: one materialistic view and three ideational
views. The first (materialistic) class encompasses adaptationist theories of cul-
ture. These definitions treat culture as the material ways of being and behaving
that allow individuals a better fit to their environment, above and beyond the
adaptations that genes are capable of providing. In these views, the diversity
of cultures are often seen as the result of fine-tuned adaptations to the different
ecologies and geographies that human populations inhabit. For example:
Culture is all those means whose forms are not under direct genetic
control ... which serve to adjust individuals and groups within their
ecological communities (Binford, 1968, p. 323).
Keesing’s three ideational classes discuss culture as cognitive systems (in which
cultures are systems of knowledge), structural systems (in which cultures are
world views with arbitrary, as opposed to natural, order), and symbolic systems
(in which cultures are systems of shared symbols and meanings). In these def-
initions, culture is all about knowledge, ideas, beliefs, and values that people
individually or collectively hold.
Since Keesing’s review, there have been sweeping developments in the study
of cultural evolution, extending beyond the field of anthropology. Some of these
approaches, which Keesing would likely classify under this adaptationist cate-
gory, fall largely under the field of sociobiology and approach culture in terms
of niche construction (e.g. Odling-Smee et al., 2003), gene-culture coevolution
(e.g. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1973; Hinton and Nowlan, 1987; Feldman and
Laland, 1996; Chater et al., 2009), and concepts of an extended phenotype (e.g.
Dawkins, 1999). These approaches treat culture as a set of phenotypic traits,
subject to natural selection on genomes, that increase an individual’s adaptive
fit with their environment, and may or may not alter the selection pressures on
genomes.
Other new lines of research in social learning (e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 1985)
and iterated learning (e.g. Kirby, 2001) are also adaptational in nature, but view
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culture as an evolving system in its own right, without recourse to natural selec-
tion on genes to explain cultural change. These approaches treat adaptation the
other way around: not how culture increases individuals’ adaptive fit to their en-
vironment, but rather, how culture itself evolves to fit humans well, by adapting
to human minds and social systems.
I will review these new evolutionary approaches more thoroughly in the next
section, but what I want to point out here is that all of these approaches to culture,
despite being adaptationist in some sense, are largely dominated by ideational
definitions of culture. For example:
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ phenotypes
which they acquire from other conspecifics by teaching or imitation.
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985, p. 33)
Culture is information that is acquired from other individuals via so-
cial transmission mechanisms such as imitation, teaching, or language.
(Mesoudi, 2011, p. 2)
These definitions attribute to culture only socially-acquired information, but
not behaviors. Social learning theorists explicitly exclude behaviors and behav-
ioral artifacts from their definition of culture because they want to use culture
as a concept for explaining behavior (Mesoudi, 2011). Including behavior in the
definition of culture would 1) make this explanation circular and 2) obscure a
direct investigation of culture because there are other causes of behavior besides
culture (Cronk, 1999). Mesoudi (2011) states that there are two forms of informa-
tion, in addition to culture, which affect behavior: information that is acquired
genetically and information that is acquired by individual learning.
In cultural evolution research, the adaptational aspect of culture is necessarily
embraced. However, the materialistic definition that traditionally accompanies it
has been rejected. The preference for ideational definitions among cultural evo-
lution researchers may be due to the rise of the gene-selectionist perspective in
evolutionary biology that took hold in the late 1970’s, in the work of Bill Hamil-
ton, John Maynard-Smith, Robert Trivers and George Williams, and crystallized
in Richard Dawkins’ book The Selfish Gene (1976). This viewpoint privileges
genetic information as the most important aspect of an evolving system, as a
sort of instructional code that ultimately determines an organism’s phenotype.
Mesoudi (2011) makes this parallel clear:
Whereas genetic information is stored in sequences of DNA base pairs,
culturally transmitted information is stored in the brain as patterns of
neural connections ... And whereas genetic information is expressed
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as proteins and ultimately physical structures such as limbs and eyes,
culturally acquired information is expressed in the form of behavior,
speech, artifacts, and institutions. (p. 3)
Culture, as patterns of neural connections, does carry information about be-
haviors, but behaviors also carry information about culture. Patterns of neural
connections can never be directly transmitted between individuals: the cultural
information that they encode can only be inferred from the behaviors of other
individuals. If behaviors did not carry information about culture, cultural in-
formation could not be acquired by others. Likewise, behaviors can never be
directly transmitted either: they will only be culturally inherited if they are per-
ceived, processed, and produced by others. Therefore culture, in a broader sense,
seems to have two distinct phases in its life cycle; as information that resides in
cognition and information that resides in behaviors and concrete artifacts.
This two-phase cycle is recognized by Hurford (2003) in relation to language,
which is perhaps the most prominent subset of human culture. “Because language
emerges from the interaction of minds and data, linguistics must concern itself
with both phases in this life-cycle” (Hurford, 2003, p. 51). In light of this view,
Hurford defines language as neither its internal form (I-Language) or external
form (E-Language)1 , but as “their dynamic interaction” and states that “Defin-
ing a language in this way is hardly elegant, but (a) it recognizes the essential
interdependence of the two phases of language, I-Language and E-Language, and
(b) it avoids an arbitrary privileging of one phase over another.” (Hurford, 2002)
In line with Hurford, and the general sentiment of researchers in language
evolution, I think that a definition of culture should embrace “the spiraling inter-
action of the two phases” (Hurford, 2003, p. 51), privilege neither its cognitive nor
behavioral information content, and be sufficiently broad to include the concept
of culture as an emergent phenomenon, while also including culture as cognitive
and behavioral information specifically. This brings me to my first stab at defin-
ing culture, and will be the definition that I will operationalize throughout this
thesis:
Culture is anything that replicates by passing through cognition.
This definition probably leaves much to be desired, but in its application,
much can be learned. First, according to this definition, both behaviors and
brain states constitute culture, and this may be argued to reinstate the circular
reasoning that a purely ideational, or purely materialistic, definition of culture
1See Chomsky (1965) for the origin of this terminology.
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avoids. However, if we don two lenses, one of reductionism and one of a cognitive
scientist, we can break the system of cultural evolution into three constituent
parts: 1) how brain states affect behaviors, 2) how behaviors affect brain states,
and 3) how cultural transmission links brain states and behaviors into an inheri-
tance cycle that makes cultural evolution possible. These three areas of inquiry
outline a framework for cultural evolution research and avoid circularity in expla-
nation by focusing on the processes that underpin cultural evolution, rather than
culture itself. Secondly, and importantly, this view does not privilege a particular
form or source of information that may affect brain states or behaviors. In par-
ticular, it does not make a distinction between culturally-acquired information,
individually-acquired information, or innate information. All of these sources
of information affect behaviors and a complete description of how a culturally-
transmitted behavior, like language, changes over time requires an understanding
of all of these sources of constraints. This point will be made concrete in the
next chapter, when we see how domain-specific and domain-general biases affect
frequency learning in language, and again in Chapter 6 when we see how neither
one of these biases can, on its own, predict the ultimate form that a distribution
of linguistic variants takes after several generations of learners.
1.3 Cultural transmission
Two predominant frameworks for understanding cultural transmission in the cul-
tural evolution literature are iterated learning and social learning. Kirby et al.
(2014) provide a definition for the first framework:
Iterated learning is the process by which a behaviour arises in one
individual through induction on the basis of observations of behaviour
in another individual who acquired that behaviour in the same way.
Iterated learning originally took foot in the form of agent-based simulations of
language evolution as a way to understand the dual contributions that both bi-
ological and cultural evolution could have in explaining the structure of human
language (Hurford, 1989). This sparked interest in the non-biological forces that
shape communication systems, such as interaction and negotiation (Steels, 1999,
2003; Vogt, 2005) and learning biases (Oliphant, 1999; Smith, 2002), and con-
straints in the transmission process itself, such as the learning bottleneck (Kirby,
2001, 2000, 2002; Brighton, 2002; Zuidema, 2003). A potentially infinite amount
of unique utterances are possible from the grammar of human languages, how-
ever these grammars are acquired from only a finite amount of linguistic input
6
(Chomsky, 1965). The learning bottleneck defines the size of that finite data
set and iterated learning research showed it to be the driving force behind the
emergence of compositional languages. Assuming an initial language that is un-
structured (i.e. a long list of idiosyncratic utterances that do not reuse parts
of other utterances), when the learning bottleneck is wide and agents observe
nearly all possible utterances, they learn the language holistically and the lan-
guage remains unstructured. However, when the learning bottleneck is small and
they see a sufficiently small subset of the utterances, generalizations are formed,
subcomponents get re-used, and the language gradually becomes structured over
several generations of learners. This constitutes an adaptive process of the lan-
guage itself to the learning algorithms that process and transmit it. In this sense,
cognition provides a transformative copying process that can produce directional
change (from unstructured to structured) in a language over time.
On the mathematical modeling front, Nowak and colleagues showed that it-
erated learning could be recast in terms of the replicator dynamics models of
biological evolution (Nowak and Komarova, 2001; Nowak et al., 2001; Komarova
et al., 2001; Nowak et al., 2002) and explored the joint contribution of biological
fitness and cultural transmission on composition of a population in terms of how
many end up speaking the same language. Subsequently, (Griffiths and Kalish,
2007) developed the first mathematical characterization of iterated learning as a
purely cultural phenomenon, without recourse to natural selection or the biolog-
ical fitness of culturally-acquired traits. They made the learning biases explicit
by using Bayesian agents, which have clear, quantifiable prior biases. The main
result here was that the the population’s composition of language types, after
many generations of learners, will come to mirror the prior probability that each
agent assigns to each language type. This means that the cultural transmission
mechanism eventually leads languages to mirror the minds of those who learn
them and is known as convergence to the prior. Follow-up work by Kirby et al.
(2007) identified different Bayesian models in which this convergence result did
not hold, and cultural transmission itself seemed to add something to the story.
More recently, the iterated learning research paradigm has taken a decidedly
experimental turn. These experiments take the form of traditional psychology
experiments where participants are trained on input data of a particular type and
then tested on it, however this testing data is then used as the training data for the
next participant, and so on. This simulates cultural transmission in the same way
as the earlier agent-based models do, but implemented in a population of human
learners (with the added benefit of not needing to program a learning algorithm).
These experiments have been used in two broad ways. First, they have been used
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to confirm the simulation results and show that culturally-transmitted behaviors
adapt to human learning biases (Kalish et al., 2007; Griffiths et al., 2008). Second,
they have been used as a method for revealing what the biases of human learners
are in contexts where these are unknown (Mesoudi et al., 2006a; Lewandowsky
et al., 2009). In the language learning literature, they have provided a rich new
avenue for understanding the role of learning biases (Galantucci, 2005; Kirby
et al., 2008; Reali and Griffiths, 2009; Smith and Wonnacott, 2010; Galantucci
et al., 2010; Verhoef, 2012; Xu et al., 2013; Silvey et al., 2014) and population
structure and interaction among learners (Garrod et al., 2007; Fay et al., 2008,
2010; Garrod et al., 2010; Caldwell and Smith, 2012; Fay and Ellison, 2013) in
the structure of human language (also see (Scott-Phillips and Kirby, 2010) for a
review).
The social learning framework also takes an experimental approach to un-
derstanding why individuals copy the behaviors of others, in adult learners (e.g.
Barrett and Nyhof, 2001; Mesoudi and Whiten, 2004; Schotter and Sopher, 2003;
Kameda and Nakanishi, 2002; Efferson et al., 2008; Mesoudi and O’Brien, 2008),
children (Horner et al., 2006; McEwen et al., 2007; Flynn and Whiten, 2008;
Flynn, 2008), and non-human primates and other animals (Menzel, 1973; Curio
et al., 1978; Sumita et al., 1985; Laland and Plotkin, 1993; Langen, 1996; Laland
and Williams, 1997; Cloutier et al., 2002; Gajdon et al., 2004; Horner et al., 2006)
(and see Whiten and Mesoudi (2008) for a review). Laland (2004) divides the
social learning theorists’ research agenda into four main questions about the cul-
tural transmission process: 1) what kind of information is transmitted? 2) who
is this information acquired from? 3) when do individuals decide to or end up
copying others? and 4) how do individuals copy: via imitation, emulation, or by
mediated by linguistic communication?
For example, Mesoudi and O’Brien (2008) investigates the social learning
strategy of copying the most successful individual in the group (addressing the
who question of social learning). Individuals designed virtual arrow heads in
a group and received pay-offs on the basis of their design. Participants were
observed to improve designs by individual, trial-and-error learning, but also by
copying the designs of individuals who received higher payoffs. Trial-and-error
improvements introduced new variants into the pool of arrowhead designs (i.e.
the cultural variants which could be copied). However, when participants copied
successful individuals, this resulted in more uniform arrowhead designs that con-
verged upon that of the most successful participant. In addition to experiments,
social learning is also rooted in a rich body of models (Campbell, 1974; Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Plotkin, 1994; Mesoudi
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et al., 2004; Richerson and Boyd, 2005) that formalize the principles of cultural
evolution in a Darwinian framework. (The work of Boyd and Richerson (1985)
will be discussed further in Section 1.6.2.)
In summary, both of these frameworks approach cultural transmission with
a special focus on learning. In the iterated learning literature, this focus is
cognition-centric and views the replication of culturally-transmitted behaviors as
a transformative process in which individual learning biases and the interaction
and negotiation among learners is a central shaping force. The social learning lit-
erature approaches behaviors as more static replicators and conceptualizes learn-
ing as a direct copying process. The interesting dynamics of cultural transmission
here result from different learning rules, such as “copy the majority” or “copy
the most successful”. In this framework, new behavioral variants are introduced
when learners innovate a solution by oneself, without recourse to socially-acquired
information. In this thesis, I will be adopting a more cognition-centric view of
cultural evolution and argue that learning is a transformative process that both
introduces variation and copies behaviors with high fidelity. Furthermore, cogni-
tion is an integrated system which, in humans, is heavily shaped by our constant
social interaction with others. In this sense, any learning that humans do will
be affected, in some way, by socially-mediated information in our heads. Sep-
arating individual learning from the kind of learning that happens in a social
context draws an artificial line through the complexity of cognition, which may
not necessarily aid progress in understanding cultural evolution.
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1.4 Evolutionary theory
In 1859, Darwin revolutionized humankind’s understanding of life on Earth and
what it means to be human with the publication of his greatest work, On the
Origin of Species. This book gave birth to the idea of evolution and explained
two important things: the diversity of organisms in the world and the good fit
of organisms to their environment. The diversity of organisms was explained by
descent with modification and the goodness of fit was explained by adaptation
via natural selection. Darwin described his book as “one long argument” which
embodied three principles, or necessary preconditions, for evolution by natural
selection (Lewontin, 1970):
1. Variation. Different individuals in a population must have different mor-
phologies, physiologies, and behaviors (i.e. phenotypes).
2. Competition. Different phenotypes must have different rates of survival and
reproduction in different environments (i.e. fitness).
3. Inheritance. There must be a correlation between parents and offspring
such that fitness is heritable.
It is important to remember that Darwin developed the theory of evolution
by natural selection without knowledge of the mechanism of inheritance. Genetic
inheritance was first discovered by Mendel (1866), but did not enter scientific
knowledge until its independent re-discovery by three botanists: Hugo DeVries,
Carl Correns and Erich von Tschermak (Rieseberg, 1997). Evolution is a general
theory that can apply to any system that satisfies the three preconditions, no
matter how the mechanisms behind variation, competition, and inheritance are
instantiated. Lewontin (1970) states:
The generality of the principles of natural selection means that any
entities in nature that have variation, reproduction, and heritability
may evolve. ...the principles can be applied equally to genes, organ-
isms, populations, species, and at opposite ends of the scale, prebiotic
molecules and ecosystems. (p. 1-2)
Expanding further upon the types of replicators that can be subject to evolu-
tion, Szathmary and Maynard Smith (2004) describe eight “major evolutionary
transitions” since the origin of life on Earth, where each one resulted in a higher-
level replicator, subject to the forces of evolution. They state that primate and
human culture represent the latest major transition to date. Therefore, human
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cultural transmission is a good candidate system that may be subject to the
forces of evolution. In his book, “Cultural Evolution”, Mesoudi (2011) walks
through Darwin’s three preconditions and shows that human culture contains
variation, competition, and inheritance, and advocates the use of general evolu-
tionary framework for the explanation of cultural change over time. Even at the
advent of evolutionary theory, its extension to cultural change and language was
recognized. Darwin (1874) states “The formation of different languages and of
distinct species, and the proofs that both have been developed through a gradual
process, are curiously parallel. ...there is a limit to the powers of the memory,
single words, like whole language, gradually become extinct. ... The survival
or preservation of certain favored words in the struggle for existence is natural
selection.” Darwin (1874) also quotes Müller (1870, p. 257): “A struggle of life is
constantly going on amongst the words and grammatical forms in each language.
The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantly gaining the upper hand,
and they owe their success to their own inherent virtue.”
Since the discovery of the genetic mechanism of inheritance, evolutionary
theory quickly developed and the bulk of the conceptual refinements to the theory
were specialized to the way evolution operates that the molecular level. In the
1930’s, the modern evolutionary synthesis took place, in which the new field of
population genetics bridges micro- and macro- evolutionary theory through a
variety of rigorous, formal models and mathematical proofs.
One of the central principles of the evolutionary synthesis of the 1930s
was that large-scale macroevolutionary patterns of change are the
result of small-scale microevolutionary changes in gene frequencies
within populations. (Mayr, 1982).
Researchers in cultural evolution are currently in a similar position to the
molecular biologists and paleontologists of the 1930s. Some researchers in cultural
evolution focus on the cognitive underpinnings and neural substrates that shape
culture, loosely similar to the molecular level of biology, and other researchers
focus on the large-scale trends. I will touch on this topic throughout this chapter
and present a more thorough description of the equivalences between different
fields in biological and cultural evolution in Section 1.8. Then in Chapter 6,
I suggest that the problem of cultural micro- and macro-evolution synthesis is
currently formulated (in the language evolution literature) as the problem of
linkage (Kirby, 1999) and I provide some concrete examples of the micro-macro
bridge with the data sets collected in the upcoming experiments.
Any attempt to bridge these two levels and refine the general theory of evolu-
tion for use as an explanatory tool in cultural evolution research requires a good
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way of conceptualizing evolution as a general theory, which is equally applicable
to molecular and cultural evolution. One such framework is provided by Sober
(1984), where he describes evolutionary theory as a theory of forces, such as drift,
selection, and mutation. A theory of forces, he says, must begin by describing
the zero-force state, which characterizes the system when no forces are at play.
The next step is to describe how each force acts in isolation, and then one can
proceed to describe how forces act in pairs, triplets, and so on. However, it is
not a priori obvious what constitutes a zero-force state for any given system and
the theoretical matter of what constitutes change and no change is up to the
researchers in a particular field to decide. Lloyd (1968) gives an example from
two different paradigms in physics: in Newtonian theory, no change means no
change in velocity, as objects remain at rest or in uniform motion when no forces
impinge, but in Aristotelian theory no change means no change in location, and
objects would remain at the center of the Earth when no forces impinge. As
for the biological case regarding allele frequencies in a diploid population, the
zero-force state is the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, where the proportion of the
three possible diploid genotypes (AA, aa, Aa) do not change over time, despite
the complicated processes involved in recombination during sexual reproduction
in diploid organisms. A good question to ask ourselves here is, in the case of
cultural evolution, what is the appropriate concept of a zero-force state? What
are all of the conditions that would lead a language, for example, not to change?
And what are all of the reasons why languages do change? It is up to researchers
within a specific field to discover, for their own subject matter, what forces act
and how they interact.
Now, I will move on to a brief introduction of the two prominent evolutionary
forces: drift and selection. I will walk through these forces’ formulation in the
standard Wright-Fisher of population genetics and give examples of how the
concept of each of these forces has been operationalized for cultural evolution.
1.5 Neutral evolution
Neutral evolution is the force that changes the frequencies of variants in a pop-
ulation over time due to iterated sampling error. All that is needed to study
the force of neutral evolution is to relax the assumption of infinite population
sizes and the frequencies of variants in a population will drift. Because all real
populations are finite, neutral evolution will always be at play, to some extent.
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1.5.1 Genetic drift
The first model of neutral evolution was independently proposed by two of the
pioneers in population genetics, Sewall Wright (1931) and R.A. Fisher (1930).
This model, now called the Wright-Fisher model of genetic drift, is the most basic
model of neutral evolution and is widely applied in evolutionary biology, albeit
in a great many versions with several modifications. However, all Wright-Fisher
models are characterized by 1) discrete (non-overlapping) generations, 2) a fixed
population size, and 3) random mating between individuals in the population
(Jobling et al., 2013, section 5.3). The main concept motivating the formulation
of genetic drift is finite population size:
There remains one factor of the greatest importance in understanding
the evolution of a Mendelian system. This is the size of the popula-
tion. The constancy of gene frequencies in the absence of selection,
mutation or migration cannot for example be expected to be absolute
in populations of limited size. Merely by chance one or the other of
the allelomorphs may be expected to increase its frequency in a given
generation and in time the proportions may drift a long way from the
original values. (Wright, 1931, p.106)
To introduce the Wright-Fisher model, let’s work through an example of ran-
dom mating in a finite population of hypothetical tree frogs. Suppose there exists
a species of tree frogs that reproduce seasonally and have the life span of one year
(satisfying the discrete generations assumption) and that each generation is com-
posed of 10 individuals (satisfying the fixed population size assumption). Suppose
also that these hypothetical frogs are haploid, with each individual carrying one
of two possible alleles that determine their skin color: blue or orange. What
we’re interested in is how the relative frequencies of the two alleles will change
over time, due only to the evolutionary force of drift. Figure 1.1 illustrates how
drift can change this population in one timestep. Panel a) shows an example
parent population of blue and orange alleles, where x is the frequency of the
blue alleles and N − x is the frequency of the orange alleles. If these individuals
reproduce randomly, the population of alleles in the next generation t will be a
random sample of alleles from the previous generation (t − 1). Panel b) shows
one possible random sample from the parent generation. The outcome of this
random sample happens to be 6 blues and 4 oranges. In this fixed population of
10 frogs, there are 11 possible outcomes in generation (t), given by the following
ratios of blue to orange frogs: 0:10, 1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:2, 9:1, and




















Figure 1.1: The mathematics of random sampling follows a binomial distribution,
for a population of two alleles. a) The parent population of orange and blue
alleles. b) A random sample of 10 alleles from the parent population. c) A
binomial distribution showing the probability of getting x′ blue alleles in the next
generation, given a 50/50 mix of blue and orange alleles in the previous generation
and a sample size of 10. The probability of getting the random sample shown in
b) is 0.21.
being randomly drawn from the parent population. Panel c) gives this probabil-
ity distribution over each possible outcome, plotted in terms of x′ (the frequency
of the blue allele in generation t). The dashed line shows the frequency of blue
alleles in generation t − 1. If we re-ran this experiment an infinite number of
times, re-sampling generation t each time, we would expect to get a population
of 10 blue frogs and no orange frogs 0.1% of the time, 9 blue and 1 orange 1%
of the time, 8 blue and 2 orange 4% of the time, 7 blue and 3 orange 12% of the
time, and so on.
The mathematical relationship between the frequency of variants (x andN−x)









This equation returns the probability of observing x′ draws of the blue allele
given a population of size N and a certain proportion θ. Looking back at Figure
1.1, we see that θ is the proportion of blue alleles in generation t− 1, so θ = x
N
.
2Neither Wright nor Fisher express their model in terms of a binomial equation. Moran
(1958) is the earliest paper I have seen to do so when describing the Wright-Fisher model.
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Figure 1.2: The binomial distributions that define drift for a finite population size
of 10. x is the frequency of variant x in generation t− 1 and x′ is the frequency
of variant x in generation t. Bar heights show the probability of observing each
outcome frequency x′ under drift.
Likewise, 1 − θ is the proportion of orange alleles in generation t − 1. We can
use Equation 1.1 to calculate the probability of obtaining the outcome shown in
Figure 1.1b from the parent population in Figure 1.1a. Here, x′ = 6, θ = x
N
= 0.5,
and N = 10. Plugging in these values yields P (x′|θ,N) = 0.21. The probability
distribution in Figure 1.1c is obtained by solving this equation for each value of
x′.
Figure 1.2 shows some more binomial distributions for different values of x
in a population of size N = 10. Let’s abstract away from the color now and
say that x could be the blue or the orange allele. Now, x is just the count of
whichever allele we decide to track in the population. Each panel in Figure 1.2
shows the binomial distribution when x = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. (The distributions
for x = 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0 are not shown because they are just mirror images of the
distributions for x = 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, respectively.)
A couple of things stand out here. First, the most probable outcome, re-
gardless of the relative frequency of alleles in generation t − 1, is no change: a
population of 7 blue and 3 orange frogs is most likely to parent 7 blue and 3
orange frogs. So, drift is a process that outputs the same input frequency, with
error defined by binomial variance3. Second, there is an absorbing state (a point
of no return): when x = 10 there is zero probability of moving to any other value
of x′ besides 10. Also, all values of x can lead to x′ = 10 and when this tran-
sition occurs, that means one allele is lost from the population. In the absence
of a process that creates variation, such as mutation, the lost allele can never be
reintroduced to the population (Ewens, 2004).
3The variance of a binomial distribution = Nθ(1 − θ). The mean, mode, and median all
coincide when Nθ is an integer (Kaas and Buhrman, 1980), as will be the case in all of the
examples and data sets presented in this thesis.
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Equation 1.1 describes the mathematical reality of random sampling error in
one generation of our frogs. But when each sample becomes the parent generation
to a new generation, then this sampling error becomes iterated, and causes the
frequencies of alleles to drift in the population over time. This creates an evo-
lutionary trajectory through the space of all possible frequencies a variant can
take in a population. Each trajectory is a timecourse sequence of transitions from
x → x′. All possible trajectories can, in fact, be achieved by drift (or any other
evolutionary force for that matter), but it is the likelihood of each of these trajec-
tories that differ under different forces of evolution. The most likely trajectory
under drift is the one where our blue frogs stay at their initial frequency in the
population, which is 5. However, all drifting populations will eventually end up
in an absorbing state. In our example of coloration alleles, there are two absorb-
ing states: all blue or all orange frogs. When a trajectory reaches an absorbing
state, this is known as fixation (Ewens, 2004). If the population ends up with all
blue frogs, then we can say that the blue allele has fixed in the population. A
population can leave this absorbing state only through the introduction of new
variation, via mutation or migration, for example. The fixation probability of
any variant is proportional to its initial frequency in the population (Neal, 2004,
p. 120). For example, if variant x has an initial proportion θ = 0.9 and variant
y has an initial proportion θ = 0.1, the probability that variant x becomes fixed
is nine times higher than variant y becoming fixed.
The rate at which a population goes to fixation depends on its size. Smaller
populations have a faster average fixation rate than larger populations and will
lose variation faster. The average generation at which fixation will occur (ĝ) is
given by Equation 1.2 as a function of population size (N) and the proportion of
variant x (p) (Ewens, 2004).4
ĝ = −2N
(
p log(p) + (1− p) log(1− p)
)
(1.2)
For example, the average generation at which fixation will occur if p = 0.5
and N = 10 is 13.86 generations. For a smaller population (N = 5) fixation
would occur faster at 6.93 generations, and for a larger population (N = 100) it
would occur slower at 138.6 generations. The probability of fixation at any given
generation can be calculated numerically by simulating several drift trajectories,
according to the probabilities of going from x→ x′. Figure 1.3 shows this proba-
4In the literature I review, there are two notations for the proportion of variant x in the
population. These are p and θ. These terms will always have identical meanings when used in
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Figure 1.3: Probability of fixation per generation for drift where N = 10 and the
initial proportion of variant x is p = 0.5. Mean fixation time is 13.86 generations.
bility distribution for population size N = 10, with an initial frequency of variant
x at p = 0.5, for binomial drift as specified by the probabilities in Figure 1.2.
100,000 trajectories were simulated, each with an initial frequency of p = 0.5.
Figure 1.3 plots the proportion of trajectories that fixed at each generation. This
proportion is an estimate of the veridical fixation probability per generation. The
mean of this distribution is 13.7, and is close to the analytical solution ĝ = 13.86.
1.5.2 Cultural drift
In the previous section, we saw how neutral change in allele frequencies occurs
over time due to sampling error. Although Wright and Fisher developed their
models of drift to describe change in allelic frequencies, this model is sufficiently
broad to describe neutral evolution in any system where variants are sampled
from old populations to create new populations. In the genetic case, actual
physical entities in the world are sampled: a gene (however we decide to draw
its boundaries) is physically copied from a parent to a child. In the case of
unicellular organisms that replicate by fission, cells are formed by budding off
of other cells. In these cases, it is intuitive that the mathematics of random
sampling should apply. In the case of culture, however, cultural artifacts in the
world all lose their discreteness when they enter the cognitive phase of their life
cycle and it is less obvious here that the mathematics of random sampling (from
physical pools of variants with replacement) will always describe neutral change
in culture. Therefore, I propose that the specifics of sampling error in cultural
drift is an open, empirical question, which will be taken up in detail in section
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2.1, Experiment 1. The most comprehensive volume on cultural evolution to date,
Boyd and Richerson (1985), only dealt with deterministic models, relegating their
comments on drift to half of p.69:
When cultural transmission is linear, the individuals who make up
the next generation can be thought of as a random sample of size
N of the previous generation. Thus the frequency of [variant] c af-
ter transmission, p′, is a random variable with mean p and variance
(1/N)p(1−p). This means that if we started out with a large number
of such populations, in some of them p′ would be larger than p, and
in others it would be smaller, but the average p′ of all the population
would equal p. This process we will call “cultural drift” (because it is
closely analogous to genetic drift).
Here, they define drift as conforming to the binomial sampling error set forth
by the Wright-Fisher model of genetic drift, in terms of binomial mean, p, and
binomial variance, (1/N)p(1 − p). Neutral evolution, by definition should be a
random sampling process that does not lead to a bias in favor of one variant over
another. Therefore, as Boyd and Richerson state, the average p′ of many drifting
populations will equal p. If p′ were consistently higher or lower than p, this would
be evidence of a sampling bias and thus, non-neutral evolution. However, any
kind of variance could occur and leave the necessary condition for neutral drift,
p̄′ = p, unaltered.
Two other contemporaries of Boyd and Richerson, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
(1973, 1981) and Lumsden and Wilson (1981), do incorporate drift into their
models and also assume cultural drift to be binomial in nature. More recent
work by Neiman (1995) and Hahn and Bentley (2003); Bentley and Shennan
(2003); Herzog et al. (2004); Bentley et al. (2004); Bentley (2008) have applied
the binomial drift model to cultural data sets and shown that a variety of cultural
change conforms to this type of drift. Bentley and colleagues investigated a wide
variety of data sets: first names, pottery motifs, patent citations, lexical items
in academic publications, and dog owners’ choice of breed. They analyze data
at a macro level, plotting the frequency of cultural variants against their rank,
and assess whether or not this distribution conforms to a power law. Random
sampling processes produce power law distributions when data is formatted in this
way. Bentley et al. (2004) demonstrate this fact algorithmically, by simulating
the random sampling of cultural variants from a population (Figure 1.4).
The left-hand side of Figure 1.4 gives a schematic representation of their
random copying algorithm. Each row is a population of people (A through O)
in generation t and each person can have one cultural variant (of type 1 through
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Figure 1.4: Diagram of Bentley et al. (2004)’s simulation of the random copying




first names pottery motifs
Figure 1.5: a) The power law distributions resulting from the simulation in Figure
1.4 for 6 values of µ = 0.128, 0.064, 0.032, 0.016, 0.008, 0.004 (going left to right
across the tails), 1000 generations, and population size of 250. Each line is the
average of 5 separate runs. b) US census first name data. b) Neolithic pottery
motif data. Reproduced from Bentley et al. (2004, p. 1445, 1446, & 1447).
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infinity). Subsequent generations are formed by randomly sampling a variant
from the previous generation (each copying event is shown by a connecting line) or
innovating a new variant with probability µ, which for this example is 3 mutations
per generation (µ = 3/15 = 0.2). The simulation is run for many generations
and a cumulative tally of each variant’s frequency is logged. The logged tallies
for the four generations in the schema are shown to the right. The results of this
simulation are shown in Figure 1.5a. The x-axis shows the number of copies of
each variant on a log scale and the y-axis shows the number of variants that had
each frequency. Most variants in the simulation (about 10−0.5 = 5%) only existed
in one copy (100). And only a couple of variants are highly frequent (in the
103 to 105 range). Six lines are plotted for different mutation rates and higher
mutation rates lead to distributions with tails that drop off more in the lower
frequency ranges. This is because the mutations convert many would-be copies
of the high-frequency variant into new variants that have a frequency of 1, culling
the numbers of higher-frequency variants. Figure 1.5b and c show two example
data sets which are well-fit by straight lines on a log-log plot, indicating a power
law distribution (cf. Clauset et al., 2009).
Although Bentley interprets these results as examples of neutral cultural
evolution, plausible alternative hypotheses should be tested and ruled out to
strengthen this claim. However, the existing literature provides few clear alterna-
tives in which non-neutral copying mechanisms produce power-law distributions,
so this is an open area for investigation. A few positive examples exist in the
natural language processing (NLP) literature (Goldwater et al., 2005, 2011) and
the iterated learning literature (Tullo and Hurford, 2003). (Goldwater et al.,
2005, 2011) develop two models in response to the failure of standard statisti-
cal NLP models to capture the power-law distributions of word token frequen-
cies, which is a robust property of natural languages (Estoup, 1916; Zipf, 1935,
1949). These are computational-level stochastic models of cognitive processes
that entail non-neutral, frequency-dependent copying of variants. Additionally,
Tullo and Hurford (2003) developed a “discourse-triggered meaning choice” model
in which interacting, communicating agents make frequency-dependent choices
of words from past conversational topics. Mesoudi and Lycett (2009) also re-
implement Bentley’s model with two frequency-dependent copying strategies (at
a non-cognitive, social learning level), however these fail to produce power law
distributions and will be further described in Section 1.6.2. They do state, how-
ever, that it is theoretically possible for opposing forces of non-neutral copying to
cancel one another out and produce macro-level evolution that appears identical
to drift at the macro level.
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Before leaving this section, I would like to mention, for the purpose of dis-
ambiguation, that the term drift as used in the historical linguistics and soci-
olinguistics literature does not refer to a neutral copying process, but “stochastic
directional change”, and was borrowed into these fields from the concept of “con-
tinental drift”, coined by Wegener (1912). Sapir (1921) refers to many drifts in
historical language change, offering explanations for all of them. One example
is the drift toward invariable word order (p. 186), which he explains is due to
the gradual loss of case marking across the world’s languages. These are clearly
directional, biased sampling processes. However, when drift exclusively refers to
neutral evolution, it can only have one explanation: sampling error.
A passage from Vennemann (1975), entitled “An explanation of drift” provides
a clear characterization of the historical/sociolinguistic usage of drift:
If all individual deviation from a linguistic norm were of equal sta-
tus, equally probable to be accepted by the speech community and to
become a new norm, they would cancel each other out so that a lin-
guistic norm would not change or would only vacillate insignificantly
in a way that reflects the variation among individual speakers. Since
linguistic norms neither remain unchanged nor change back and forth
but change in certain directions, and fairly rapidly so, it cannot be
the case that individual deviation from the norm have equal status.
Rather, certain deviation, or certain types of deviations, must be fa-
vored over others, must be more readily produced and must definitely
be more readily accepted. Since such cumulative favorization occurs,
at least for the most part, without conscious awareness on the side
of the language users, it must be rooted in general psychological ten-
dencies. If we can identify these tendencies, we can predict the future
course of a language, the direction of its “drift”. We can “prophesy”.
(p. 271)
Drift is an attractive term for historical and sociolinguists who want to em-
phasize the stochastic aspects of evolutionary change and move away from de-
terministic explanations for the drivers of historical language change. However, I
think that researchers in cultural evolution should strive for a consistent terminol-
ogy and maintain a concept of drift that purely refers to neutral evolution. This
provides an appropriate baseline, or null hypothesis for cultural change, that we
can use as a tool for identifying the intricate dynamics of all forms of directional
and biased sampling that occur in culture for diverse reasons.
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1.6 Selective evolution
In this section we take up a force behind evolutionary change that can create
adaptation of organisms to their environment. This is the force of selection,
which constitutes a form of biased sampling error that can lead to directional
change over time.
1.6.1 Genetic selection
Wright (1931) and Fisher (1930) also described how selection would act in finite
populations. Selection is a process that favors or disfavors particular variants
on the basis of some criteria, such as coloration, causing differential survival
or reproduction among variants. We can talk about selection as being positive
or negative: positive selection favors a particular variant and negative selection
disfavors it. In the example of our hypothetical tree frogs, a selective pressure
such as a predator that is better at picking out the orange frogs against the
jungle foliage, will tend to increase the relative proportion of blue to orange
frogs in every generation. This selection pressure can be formulated as negative
selection against the bright color of orange frogs, or as positive selection for the
good camouflage of blue frogs.
We can also talk about selection in terms of the absolute and relative fitness
of variants. Absolute fitness is quantified by the average number of offspring an
organism with the favored allele leaves and is equivalent to the multiplication
rate of the variant in question. Say for example, our population of frogs is at
40 blues and 60 oranges in generation 1, and then 80 blues and 90 oranges in
generation 2. Here, the absolute fitness of the blue frogs is 2 (because each frog
leaves an average of 2 progeny) and the absolute fitness of the orange frogs is 1.5.
Because natural selection is about the differential reproduction and survival of
variants, most population genetics models deal with measures of relative fitness,
rather than absolute fitness (Neal, 2004, p. 147). To translate the absolute
fitness measure into a relative fitness measure, one variant must be chosen as
the reference variant. Conventionally, the variant with the higher growth rate is
designated as the reference variant and thus, all other variants are discussed in
terms of negative selection (Neal, 2004, p. 147). Table 1.1 lays out the relationship
between absolute fitness, relative fitness, and the selection coefficient, in terms of
positive selection for the blue frogs (left) and negative selection against the orange
frogs (right). After determining the average growth rate of each variant (2 for
blue frogs and 1.5 for orange frogs), relative fitness is derived by dividing the
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positive selection on blue negative selection on orange
(orange is reference) (blue is reference)
variant blue orange total blue orange total
initial frequency 40 60 100 40 60 100
next generation frequency 80 90 170 80 90 170
absolute fitness (λ) 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5






















Table 1.1: Example calculations showing the relationship between growth rate,
absolute fitness, relative fitness, and the selection coefficient. The choice of refer-
ence variant determines whether or not the selection coefficient represents positive
or negative selection. When working with negative selection coefficients, s must
be made negative before plugging it into Equation 1.3.
growth rate of the variant in question by the growth rate of the reference variant.
The selection coefficient is simply 1 minus the relative fitness (s = 1−W ).
The value of the selection coefficient will differ whether we are talking about
positive selection on one variant or negative selection on the other. In Table
1.1, the negative selection coefficient on the orange frogs tells us that the orange
frogs are one fourth worse off than the blue frogs, whereas the positive selection
coefficient on the blue frogs tells us that the blue frogs are one third better
off than the orange frogs. Negative selection coefficients are bounded by 0 (no
selection) and -1 (complete lethality). Positive selection coefficients are bounded
by 0 (no selection) and infinity, because growth rates do not have an upper bound
in theory5. Because the -1 to 0 bounds are easier to work with, the negative
representation of the selection coefficient is more commonly used.
These measures of fitness and selection are all deterministic: an infinitely large
population would be composed of exactly one third more blue frogs than orange
frogs. To understand how selection might operate in a finite population, the
selection coefficient can be added into the Wright Fisher model as a weight on θ
in the binomial sampling equation (Equation 1.1). Here, the selection coefficient
is proportionalized into x(1+s)












x(1 + s) + (N − x)
))N−x′
(1.3)
5whereas death rates do have an upper bound, in theory and in practice. (All further






















Figure 1.6: Biased sampling error due to selection in a finite population of two
alleles. a) The parent population of orange and blue alleles. b) A random sample
of 10 alleles from the parent population, mediated by selection (represented above
center as an alteration to the probability that each allele type will be sampled).
c) A binomial distribution showing the probability of getting x′ blue alleles in
the next generation due to selection and sampling error for a population of size
10. The probability of getting the sample shown in b) is 0.27. The mean of this
distribution equals θ′ ·N .
Given its formulation in Equation 1.3, it is clear that the selection coefficient alters
the probability of sampling variant x from the veridical proportion of variants in
generation t − 1. This sampling process will be biased in a particular direction
(depending on whether s is positive or negative) and with a particular strength
(depending on the magnitude of s). One way to think about this process is as if
population t were not sampled from the veridical t − 1 population, but instead
from some imaginary t−1 population, where the frequency of variant x is adjusted
by s. This conceptual framing is depicted in Figure 1.6. Panel a) shows the parent
population of blue and orange alleles, where x is the frequency of the blue alleles
and N − x is the frequency of the orange alleles, and panel b) shows a random
sample from the parent population, mediated by a selection pressure that favors
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Figure 1.7: Wright-Fisher with negative selection (s = −0.5) against variant x. x
is the frequency of variant x in generation t−1 and x′ is the frequency of variant
x in generation t. Each y-axis ranges from x′ = 0 to 10. Bar heights show the
probability of observing each outcome frequency x′ under this type of selection.
to a new value, θ′ = 0.8. Each of the 11 possible outcomes in generation t has
a particular probability of being randomly sampled from θ′. Panel c) gives the
probability distribution over each possible outcome, plotted in terms of x′ (the
frequency of the blue allele in generation t). If we re-ran this experiment an
infinite number of times, re-sampling generation t each time, we would expect to
get a population of 10 blue frogs and no orange frogs 11% of the time, 9 blue
and 1 orange 27% of the time, 8 blue and 2 orange 30% of the time, 7 blue and
3 orange 20% of the time, and so on. The dashed line shows the mean of this
distribution, which is dictated by θ′. Here, θ′ · N is the expected frequency of
variant x in the next generation and θ′ is the expected proportion.
Figure 1.7 shows the distributions of x′ from the Wright Fisher model with
selection, for negative selection of s = −0.5 against variant x, and a population
size of 10. Each distribution shows the probability of each outcome of x′ given
one value of x. Unlike drift (refer back to Figure 1.2), the expected frequency of
variant x is not equal to its frequency in the previous generation. Instead, it is
shifted toward the variant that is being selected for (variant y in this case). In
the middle panel, for example, the input frequency of variant x was 5 and the
most likely frequency of variant x in the next generation is x′ = 3. This shift
in expected frequency is due to the sampling bias that selection imposes on the
population each generation.
Selection defines a mapping between each veridical proportion (θ) and the
expected proportion (θ′) and this mapping is known as a selection function. Fig-
ure 1.8 plots the selection functions for some example selection coefficient values.
Panel a) plots the selection function for the coefficient used in Figure 1.7 where
s = −0.5. Here we see more clearly how the negative selection against variant
x lowers its expected proportion (θ′) relative to its proportion in the previous
generation (θ). For example, when the proportion in the previous generation is
0.5, then the expected value in the next generation will be 0.3. Panel b) plots a
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Figure 1.8: Some example selection functions, which define the relationship be-
tween the expected proportion of variant x (θ′) and its proportion in the previous
generation (θ). The dotted line marks the points where θ = θ′. a) Negative se-
lection where s = −0.5. b) No selection where s = 0. c) Positive selection where
s = 3.
selection coefficient of s = 0 where there is no selection. Here, θ = θ′ and this
system is identical to that described by drift. Panel c) plots a selection coefficient
of s = 3, which yields strong positive selection for variant x. For example, if
variant x constitutes 50% of the population in generation t− 1, it is expected to
constitute 80% of the population in generation t.
Because the plots in Figure 1.8 map these changes in terms of proportions,
they apply to any population size. Increasing the population size will decrease the
sampling error around the expected frequency, but it will not change the expected
frequency. When the population size is infinite, there will be no sampling error.
Therefore, these plots model the actual, deterministic behavior of the system if
the population size were infinite. The models of cultural selection that will be
presented in the next section take the form of deterministic models for populations
of infinite size. However, the stochasticity of these models can be recovered by
specifying the sampling error for a given population size.
The selection functions depicted in Figure 1.8 assign constant fitness values to
variants on the basis of their color. However, many more selection functions can
be formulated when fitness is determined by a variant’s relative frequency in the
population. This is known as frequency-dependent selection and is defined by any
selection function that allows the selection coefficient to vary as a function of the
allele’s frequency. Returning to our populations of frogs, examples of frequency-
dependent selection pressure might be a predatory bird that prefers to eat frogs of
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Figure 1.9: Some examples of frequency-dependent selection functions, which
define the relationship between the expected proportion of variant x (θ′) and its
proportion in the previous generation (θ). The dotted line marks the points where
θ = θ′. a) Frequency-dependent selection against the rare variant where s = −1
and f = −0.5. All proportions under 0.5 will be slightly under-represented in the
next generation and all proportions over 0.5 will be slightly over-represented. b)
The neutral case where no selection is acting: s = 0 and f = 0. c) Frequency-
dependent selection that favors rare variant where s = 1 and f = 0.5. All
proportions under 0.5 will be slightly over-represented in the next generation and
all proportions over 0.5 will be slightly under-represented.
the rare color, or a preference among the frogs for mating with frogs of the more
common color. In both of these cases, the rare allele will quickly be eliminated
from the population. On the other hand, if the predatory bird prefers the more
common color, or the frogs prefer to mate with the rare color, then the common
allele will decrease in the population, and if it becomes rare it’s frequency will
start to go up again.
An example model of frequency-dependent selection for the rare allele is given
by Felsenstein (2005), p.113, which I have revised in terms of θ and θ′:
θ′ =
θ(1 + f − sθ)
1 + (f − sθ)θ (1.4)
The sign of the selection coefficient (s) determines whether there is positive or
negative selection for the rare allele and f modifies the shape of the selection
function. Figure 1.9 shows example selection functions given by Equation 1.4.
These models of selection all have absorbing states: when x = 0 or 10 there is
zero probability of moving to any other value of x′ besides 0 or 10, respectively.
Both drift and selection will eventually lead to the loss of one variant, but a cru-
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Figure 1.10: Probability of fixation per generation for four types of selection,
where N = 10 and the initial proportion of variant x is p = 0.5. a) Selection
where s = 0.5, mean fixation time is 6.59 generations. b) Selection where s = 1,
mean = 4.34. c) Frequency-dependent selection against the rare allele, where
s = −1 and t = −0.5 (same model as shown in Figure 1.9a). d) Frequency-
dependent selection in favor of the rare allele, where s = −1 and t = −0.5 (same
model as shown in Figure 1.9c).
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faster than drift. Figure 1.10 shows the fixation distributions for four different
models of selection. Comparing panels a) and b) we see that stronger selection
leads to the faster elimination of a variant. Likewise, both of these models elim-
inate variation faster than expected under drift, where mean fixation time was
13.86 generations (refer back to Figure 1.3). Panels c) and d) show two types
of frequency-dependent selection. In the case of selection against the rare allele,
fixation also occurs faster than expected under drift, nearly always by eliminat-
ing the rare allele. However, when selection favors the rare allele, variation is
maintained in the population much longer than would be expected under drift.
This type of selection is one of the main mechanisms behind balancing selection,
which will be discussed again in Chapter 6.
Before moving on, I would like to reiterate one point. If we step back for a
more general view on these basic population genetics models, we see that there
are two clear components: a deterministic one that encompasses sampling bias
and a stochastic one encompassing the sampling error. By definition, neutral
evolution is change due only to the stochastic component, and selective evolution
is due to the presence of a sampling bias, however small or large it may be.
1.6.2 Cultural selection
Given the formulation of selection as sampling bias, any cultural transmission
or copying process that over- or under-represents particular variants can be un-
derstood as a form of selection. Boyd and Richerson (1985) provide the most
comprehensive catalogue, to date, of the range of forces behind cultural evolu-
tionary change. They sketch five broad classes of “conceivable processes that
could change culture through time” (p. 9):
1. Random variation. Errors in the neurological machinery of the mind, analo-
gous to mutation, that provide an unbiased source of new cultural variants.
This is likely to be much higher than the rate of genetic mutation.
2. An analog of genetic drift. Chance variations in which cultural variants
are observed and remembered, which may cause substantial changes in the
frequency of variants over time, especially when population sizes are small
(i.e. when the number of cultural variants is small).
3. The force of guided variation. Individuals’ adjustment of their own cultural
variants via learning, such as trial-and-error learning, and rational calcula-
tion. In contrast to random variation, innovations that result from learning
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and rational calculation are not randomly generated. This leads to a type of
Lamarckian inheritance that increases the frequency of the cultural variants
that are more likely to be generated.
4. Biased transmission. When the cultural transmission process itself favors
some cultural variants over others. This is similar to guided variation be-
cause both forces arise from the same capacities for learning and rational
calculation. However, the forces of biased transmission are more complex
because they are affected by their own output (creating strong feedback
cycles) more than guided variation is.
5. Natural selection can operate on culture. If the set of cultural variants
one possesses can differentially affect their reproduction and survival, then
these cultural variants can be the target of natural selection and those that
positively effect survival and reproduction will increase in frequency relative
to others.
A large body of work exists on the fifth class: the role of natural selection
on cultural traits, as an aspect of an organism’s phenotype (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman, 1973; Wilson, 1975; Symons, 1979; Alexander, 1980; Hinton and
Nowlan, 1987; Feldman and Laland, 1996; Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Chater et al.,
2009; Davies et al., 2012). However, I am going to leave this class of forces behind
and focus throughout the remainder of this thesis on the evolutionary forces that
originate from types of sampling bias and sampling error that cognition exerts
on culturally transmitted behavior (classes 1 through 4). Although cognitive
architecture and processes certainly have a genetic basis, this may not be the
most illuminating level of explanation for why distributions of cultural traits
regarding, for example, cuisine, clothing, music, language, and technologies are
the way they are and how they change over time. The data sets I will be dealing
with in this thesis contain cultural evolutionary changes that happen within the
lifetime of an individual and therefore, cognition is the appropriate level at which
explanations of these, and perhaps most, forms of cultural evolution should be
addressed (cf. Scott-Phillips et al., 2011).
So, focusing now on classes 1 through 4, Boyd and Richerson only define
guided variation and biased transmission as a source of sampling bias. The other
two are described as random sources of variation, akin to random mutation. How-
ever, to a cognitive scientist, the examples Boyd and Richerson give for random
cultural variation (errors in the neurological machinery of the mind) and cultural
drift (errors in how cultural variants are observed and remembered) define clear
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sources of sampling bias. Furthermore, the distinction between their two sources
of sampling bias, guided variation and biased transmission, which both result
from the “same capacities for learning and calculation” (p. 10), only exists be-
cause a line has been drawn between cultural information that is acquired via
individual learning and cultural information acquired via social learning.
Because only biased transmission deals exclusively with socially-acquired in-
formation, it is of primary interest to the study of cultural evolution from the
social learning perspective. First, Boyd and Richerson describe cultural transmis-
sion as the copying of cultural variants by näıve individuals. If näıve individuals
copied variants at random, transmission would be unbiased. However, if indi-
viduals discriminate between variants and copy them for particular reasons, then
biased transmission occurs. They identify three classes of biased transmission:
1. Direct bias. This occurs when individuals discriminantly copy variants on
the basis of some intrinsic property of the variant, because they prefer it for
some reason. Individuals need not have the same preferences, but so long
as individuals are copying on the basis of their own preferences, direct bias
occurs.
2. Frequency-dependent bias. This occurs when individuals copy a variant on
the basis of its frequency. Any conceivable function that maps frequencies
to copying probabilities would fall under this category, although they focus
on two: conformity copying, in which individuals copy the most frequent
variant(s), and anti-conformity copying, in which individuals copy the least
frequent variant(s).
3. Indirect bias. This occurs when individuals copy a variant on the basis of
some factor that is correlated with the variant, such as the social prestige
of the individuals who exhibit that variant.
These forms of biased transmission can be understood as forms of selection
pressures on a pool of cultural variants. I will explain the first two forms in more
detail. Direct bias operates similarly to selection, as described in the previous
section, because it leads to an over-production of a variant on the basis of an
intrinsic property. Just as our hypothetical frogs may have been selected for on
the basis of their color, cultural variants can be selectively copied on the basis
on an intristic property of that variant, such as the choice to wear an orange or
a blue wig on Queen’s Day in the Netherlands6.
6or whether or not to paint your toddler in blackface on Sinterklaas Day.
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Figure 1.11: Some examples of direct bias selection functions, which define the
relationship between the expected proportion of variant x (θ′) and its proportion
in the previous generation (θ). The dotted line marks the points where θ = θ′.
a) Direct bias in favor of variant y, where s = −0.5. b) Unbiased copying, where
s = 0. c) Direct bias in favor of variant x, where s = 1.
Boyd and Richerson (1985, p.138) formalize direct bias in the following equa-
tion, which I have revised in terms of θ and θ′:
θ′ = θ +Bθ(1− θ) (1.5)
where θ is the proportion of variant x in generation t − 1, θ′ is the proportion
of variant x in generation t, and B is a parameter determining the strength and
direction of the direct bias. When B is positive, variant x is selected for, and
when B is negative, variant x is selected against. Figure 1.11 shows some example
selection functions as determined by direct bias in Equation 1.5.
Also, frequency-dependent bias can be understood as frequency-dependent
selection, because it leads to an over-production of a variant on the basis of that
variant’s frequency in the population. Boyd and Richerson (1985, p.208) give the
following equation for frequency-dependent bias, revised in terms of θ and θ′:
θ′ = θ +Dθ(1− θ)(2− θ − 1) (1.6)
where D is a parameter that determines the strength and direction of bias for
the more common cultural variant. When D is negative, there is a bias in fa-
vor of the rare variant and this constitutes anti-conformity copying. When D
is positive, the common variant is favored and conformity copying occurs. Fig-
ure 1.12 shows some example selection functions as determined by frequency-
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Figure 1.12: Some examples of frequency-dependent bias selection functions,
which define the relationship between the expected proportion of variant x (θ′)
and its proportion in the previous generation (θ). The dotted line marks the
points where θ = θ′. a) Frequency-dependent bias in favor of the rare variant
where D = −1. All proportions under 0.5 will be slightly over-represented in the
next generation and all proportions over 0.5 will be slightly under-represented.
b) Unbiased copying, where D = 0. c) Frequency-dependent bias in favor of the
common variant where D = 1. All proportions under 0.5 will be slightly under-
represented in the next generation and all proportions over 0.5 will be slightly
over-represented.
dependent bias in Equation 1.6. Although the shapes of these curves differ from
the frequency-dependent selection model described in Section 1.6.1, both of these
models constitute frequency-dependent selection because they selectively favor
variants on the basis of their frequency in the population. Additionally, these are
just two of an infinite number of frequency-dependent selection functions that
mathematically exist (e.g. Lachmann-Tarkhanov and Sarkar, 1994).
Boyd and Richerson (1985) only describe the forces of cultural evolution with
deterministic models (as depicted in Figures 1.11 and 1.12), but they do state
that finite, culturally evolving populations would also be subject to drift, and that
this force of drift would be in the form of binomial / multinomial sampling error
(refer back to their quote on this in Section 1.5.2). Although they do not conduct
any analyses of cultural evolution in finite populations, this form of sampling
error can be added to their models by substituting θ in the Wright-Fisher model
(Equation 1.1) with θ′ from any model of interest.
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All the forms of cultural selection discussed thus far address cultural evolution
at the micro level: in terms of individuals’ propensities to copy certain cultural
variants on the basis of certain criteria. I will now discuss some macro-level effects
of cultural selection and contrast this to the macro-level cultural drift literature
described in Section 1.5.2.
Mesoudi and Lycett (2009) implement Boyd and Richerson’s two frequency-
dependent copying strategies (conformity and anti-conformity copying) as modi-
fications to the cultural drift model of Bentley et al. (2004) and show how these
two forces of cultural evolution differ from drift. Figure 1.13 shows my own imple-
mentation of the Bentley et al. (2004) model with conformity and anti-conformity
transmission biases. Both copying strategies are implemented by raising the
veridical distribution of cultural variants at each generation to a power, given by
the parameter r, and sampling the next generation of variants from the result-
ing distribution. When r > 1 this implements conformist copying and results
in the higher-frequency variants being copied disproportionately more. When
r < 1 this implements anti-conformist copying, where lower-frequency variants
are copied disproportionately more. These results replicate those of Mesoudi
and Lycett (2009), though the implementation of the copying biases is slightly
different.
In Figure 1.13, we see that conformist copying lowers the number of variants
that exist with few copies compared to drift. In the cultural drift plot, there
are ≈ 10,000 (104 on the y-axis) variants that exist in only one copy (100 on
the x-axis). Whereas in the conformist copying plot there are ≈ 1000 variants
that exist in only one copy. Also, conformist copying creates a long tail to the
power law in which a handful of variants exist in extraordinarily high proportions
in the population. This is a form of winner-take-all dynamic. Anti-conformity
copying also lowers the number of variants that exist in one copy by an order
of magnitude (for these parameter settings). Although individuals are selection
low-frequency variants, low-frequency variants quickly rise in numbers and then
become undesirable to copy. The population-level effect of this copying strategy
is that most variants exist in a the mid-ranged number of copies.
Mesoudi and Lycett (2009) call attention to the fact that macro-level states,
such as power law distributions, are multiply realizable: different individual copy-
ing strategies may give rise to the same macro-level phenomena. They present
a further type of frequency-dependent copying model, in which individuals never
copy rare traits, and show that this also yields a distribution that appears to
be a power law. They also state that opposing selection pressures could lead
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Figure 1.13: Replication of Bentley et al. (2004)’s random copying model (left).
Implementation of Boyd and Richerson (1985)’s conformist copying model (mid-
dle) and anti-conformist copying model (right), which replicate Mesoudi and
Lycett (2009). Each simulation uses population size 250, 1000 generations, and
mutation rate µ = 0.128. The conformist model uses r = 2 and the anti-
conformist model uses r = −2.
















Figure 1.14: Novel implementations with populations of mixed learners. Left:
50/50 mix of conformist and anti-conformist copiers. Middle: 10% conformist
copiers in a population of random copiers. Right: 10% anti-conformist copiers in
a population of random copiers. Each simulation uses population size 250, 1000
generations, and mutation rate µ = 0.128. The conformist model uses r = 2 and
the anti-conformist model uses r = −2.
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1.13 that conformity and anti-conformity copying do not appear to be opposing
forces (despite their neatly juxtaposed names), I was interested to see what the
additive effect of having these two copying strategies in the same population may
be. Figure 1.14 shows an implementation of mixed populations of conformist
and anti-conformist copiers (left), random and conformist copiers (middle), and
random and anti-conformist copiers (right). In the left plot, the aspects of each
copying strategy are clearly visible: conformity copiers contribute to the long
tail and anti-conformity copiers contribute to high numbers of mid-proportioned
variants. The remaining two plots show that having a small proportion of non-
random copiers in a population also produces distributions similar to power laws
in the lower range of the x-axis. It is possible that empirical data sets of this type
may be interpreted as power laws, especially since many techniques in analyzing
power laws discard the “noisy” tails (cf. Clauset et al., 2009). However, the tail
still remains diagnostic here. Even a small number of conformity copiers are still
capable of producing the characteristic long tail composed of a couple remarkably
common variants. Although the characteristic hump of mid-frequency variants
is not so apparent when only a few anti-conformity copiers are present. These
simulations suggest that conformity copiers may be easier to identify in small
numbers than anti-conformity copiers.
I will turn now from the social learning perspective on biased cultural trans-
mission purely in terms of behavior copying, and further develop the perspective
of cognition-based forces of cultural evolution.
1.7 Inductive evolution
As mentioned earlier, cognition is the locus of cultural change, where cultural
variants replicate through a process of reverse engineering. This process is best
captured by the concept of inductive inference. In 1739, David Hume first de-
scribed inductive inference in A Treatise of Human Nature, in which he surveyed
the essence of being human with the aim of developing an empirical science of
human nature. The first book of this treatise, “Of the Understanding”, is devoted
entirely to human cognition and the types of reasoning that humans naturally
engage in. In section III, “Of Knowledge and Probability” he lays out the main
form of inference that humans engage in: probabilistic reasoning about cause and
effect. He calls this type of reasoning causal inference and only in the twentieth
century was his concept connected to the modern terminology inductive infer-
ence by Keynes (1921). Hume describes causal inference as a form of reasoning
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in which the relationship among observations (seen or remembered) is imagined
or hypothesized:
...in all probable reasonings there [must] be something present to the
mind, either seen or remember’d; and that from this we infer some-
thing connected with it, which is not seen nor remember’d. (Section
I.III.VI)
And this is done on the basis of people’s past experience:
Probability ... must in some respects be founded on the impressions of
our memory and senses, and in some respects on our ideas. (Section
I.III.VI)
Critically, the solutions to inductive problems can be wrong, they cannot be
verified by standard logic, and are only supported by various degrees of corrobora-
tion from other evidence (Vickers, 2014). Take the following example of inductive
inference from Vickers (2014):
All observed F s have also been Gs,
a is an F,
This does not imply “a is a G”. Instead, it implies:
It is probable that, a, not yet observed, is also a G.
Induction can only yield a conclusion with a certain probability and is not an
inference process that guarantees a correct inference (Vickers, 2014). In the ex-
ample above, a is not guaranteed to be G. Because of this, inductive inference
lacks proper status as a logic and this shortcoming is discussed by many philoso-
phers as “the problem of induction” (e.g. Popper, 1959; Goodman, 1954; Williams,
1963). However, it is precisely this lack of guarantee in finding the veridical so-
lution that makes induction interesting in a cultural evolutionary perspective.
Let me return to the reverse engineering example from the start of this chapter.
For a stone tool to be copied, it needs someone to observe its properties, infer
how those properties came to be, and then implement them in another piece of
stone. A variety of methods can lead to the production of nearly identical stone
tools. To copy a particular model one may wonder, were the pieces chipped off
with another piece of stone, or with an antler? Was this tool supported against
the ground or one’s knee while fashioning it? In what order were the different
surfaces of the stone chipped? And what is the motor program that should be
executed to even chip a stone? If all of the veridical processes that lead to the
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creation of the model are correctly inferred, then a very similar copy with result.
However, if some are incorrectly inferred, some variations on the model may arise,
and these variants will serve as the models for future copying events. Therefore,
it is precisely this potential for incorrect inferences that creates the possibility of
evolution by induction.
I would like to be able to refer to this source of evolutionary change, so ram-
pant in cultural evolution, not by the concepts of selection or directed mutation,
but by the particular biases that cognition imposes on cultural data sets dur-
ing inductive inference. This brings me to the following definition of inductive
evolution:
Inductive evolution is the change over time of entities that replicate
via a cognitive process of reverse engineering.
How does inductive evolution relate to other cultural copying mechanisms,
such as teaching, emulation, imitation, and overimitation? Reverse-engineering
is also central to each of these mechanisms. Let us first look at teaching, which is
an event that guides a learner’s inductive process. Taking the example of learn-
ing to play a viola, a good teacher is able to 1) provide a model of viola playing
that maximizes correct inferences in the learner and 2) explicitly correct learner
behaviors that will feed into incorrect inferences down the road. However, the
bulk of the copying act falls on the learner, where the teacher provides an addi-
tional, high-quality source of data to use during inductive inference. Emulation
describes the copying of goals actions, without necessarily copying the same ac-
tions used to obtain that goal. By definition, reverse-engineering is the successful
copying of outcomes, or goals, no matter the route taken to produce the copy.
Therefore, emulation describes the subset of reverse-engineering episodes in which
new routes (i.e. “incorrect” inferences) are discovered to achieve a certain out-
come. Imitation, on the other hand, occurs when both the goal and the actions
which lead to the goal are copied, and therefore refers to reverse-engineering via
“correct” inferences. And overimitation occurs when actions that have no causal
bearing on the goal are copied as well. This might enter into a reverse-engineering
process when the goal is not completely understood and the learner is attempting
to reverse engineer sub-goals that they can understand.
As for the evolution aspect of inductive evolution, we saw previously that the
coarse-grained anatomy of selection and drift processes consist of sampling bias
and sampling error. This is also the case for induction and this same coarse-
graining applies to probabilistic models of cognition, such as Bayesian models
of inductive inference. Bayesian models are stochastic models of cognition that
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make inductive inferences by combining prior knowledge about the likelihood of
different causal processes in the world, with the likelihood that each of these
causes generates certain outcomes, to infer the probability that an observed out-
come was generated by each possible cause (Bayes, 1763), but see Jaynes (2003)
and Gelman et al. (2013) for the modern formulation of Bayes’ rule.
Hume states that the probabilities used during inference rest in our minds,
in the form of experience we had with the world and the associations we made
between these experiences. These are the probabilities that guide our inductions:
they are the knowledge that we bring to a particular problem and constitute
everything that goes into making an inductive inference, when faced with a par-
ticular data set upon which an inference needs to be made. In Bayesian terms,
this prior knowledge is coded as a prior probability over all possible hypotheses
(i.e. causes), and can be the result of innate and/or acquired cognitive biases.
In Chapter 5, I will describe a particular Bayesian model of frequency learning
in thorough detail, with three sub-types, and discuss its two coarse-grained com-
ponents: sampling bias and sampling error. Furthermore, one of these sub-types
has been shown to be equivalent to Wright-Fisher drift with mutation (Reali and
Griffiths, 2010). This equivalence clearly highlights the isomorphism between
population genetics models and probabilistic models of cognition, in terms of
sampling bias and sampling error, and shows that models of inductive inference
can support cultural change in a truly evolutionary sense. Even more interest-
ingly, as will be discussed later, models of inductive inference can also support
dynamics in cultural evolution that are not equivalent to Wright-Fisher mod-
els, and may even define types of evolution that are outside the class of those
achievable by molecular evolution.
But for now, I will leave you with a schematic version of induction, which
highlights the potential in overlap with models of selective and neutral evolution
(Figure 1.15). In this model, an individual may observe a particular distribution
over cultural variants (panel a) and produce these variants on ten occasions (panel
b). Here, cognition is the source of sampling error and sampling bias and the
careful observation of data (panel c) affords estimates of the error and bias that
occurs during a particular type of transmission or copying event. In terms of
genetic evolution, both selection and mutation (random or directed) are forces of
evolutionary change that alter the sampling bias. When a distribution over alleles
is observed that seems to be the result of a bias, then the source of that bias is
an open empirical question. Likewise, when a distribution over cultural variants
appears to be biased in some way, the specific cognitive processes that lead to this


























Figure 1.15: This thesis experimentally provides the answer to this schema.
productions from observations, and all of the cognitive mechanisms that allow
for the perception, processing, and production of cultural variants, are candidate
causes of inductive biases. Although cultural evolution may have isomorphisms to
genetic selection, or directed mutation, cultural evolution is driven by inductive
biases and these can be understood on their own ground as the driving forces of
cultural evolution.
1.8 Borrowing tools for cultural evolution with-
out buying the farm
A general theory of evolution should encompass all forms of evolution that exist.
However, our current rich knowledge base of evolutionary theory is very much
embedded in its implementations in molecular evolution, population genetics,
and the macro-evolutionary processes specific to biological species and ecosys-
tems. Along with these specific implementations, come assumptions which may
be inappropriate for cultural evolution. At Darwin’s inception of the theory of
evolution by natural selection, similar ideas pertaining to cultural evolution were
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already in the air (Müller, 1870). But despite similar time depths on scientific
recognition of both biological and cultural evolution, a general theory of cultural
evolution has not gelled in the social sciences. Mesoudi et al. (2006b, p.330)
argue that this is because social scientists are more reluctant than biologists to
make simplifying assumptions that abstract away from the complexities of hu-
man culture. This reluctance to develop tractable, general models, impedes the
accumulation of transferable knowledge within the field, preventing a unifying
synthesis among subfields. Mesoudi explains that the evolutionary framework
established in the field of biology “brings with it a set of proven methods that
have rich potential within the study of culture.” Researchers in cultural evolution
should make use of established evolutionary theory and borrow from its toolkit to
gain insight wherever possible, but at the same time be prepared to push the en-
velope on biological models, break them to learn what assumptions do not apply
to culture, and improve upon these models for their own purposes.
Figure 1.16: The correspondence of the major subdivisions in the fields of evo-
lutionary biology (left) and cultural evolution (right), reproduced from Mesoudi
et al. (2006b). The left-hand side of this schema is originally from Futuyma
(1998). The interface between experimental psychology and tools from experi-
mental population genetics is where the majority of work in this thesis lies.
Mesoudi et al. (2006b) maps out the subfields regarding cultural and biological
evolution, showing correspondences to highlight promising research strategies and
potentially fruitful methodological transfer points. For example, Mesoudi places
the work of Hahn and Bentley (2003); Bentley and Shennan (2003); Herzog et al.
(2004); Bentley et al. (2004), and Bentley (2008), discussed in Section 1.5.2, at
the macro-level interface of paleobiology and evolutionary archaeology. Common
research goals at this interface include identifying (prehistoric) artifacts, recon-
structing their lineages, and determining the evolutionary relationships between
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these lineages. Although many of the cultural data sets at this interface are
prehistoric and archeological, such as the ≈ 10,000-year-old Paleo-Indian stone
projectile points studied by O’Brien et al. (2001), or the 400-year-old West Ger-
man pottery shards studied by Bentley and Shennan (2003), the fast timescales
of cultural evolution also bring recent historical data under this framework. This
includes the twentieth-century patent citations, lexical items in academic publi-
cations since 1994, and 1990 US census data on first names studied by Bentley
et al. (2004) and Bentley (2008), which focus on determining whether these data
sets conform to drift or selection at the macro level.
Many examples of cultural macro-evolutionary change that conform to drift
are provided by Bentley’s research program and he and colleagues conclude that
cultural evolution is largely neutral. Although macro-level neutrality does not ne-
cessitate that the micro-level copying mechanism is itself neutral (random) copy-
ing, it does provide strong evidence for this hypothesis. This takes us to another
important interface identified by Mesoudi et al. (2006b): the interface between
experimental population genetics and experimental psychology. Research at this
level is concerned with the specifics of the copying mechanism, intergenerational
change on a short scale, and the dynamics of the transmission process: whether
or not certain cultural variants are favored, and why.
Goldstone and Gureckis (2009) argue that “cognitive scientists can leverage
our understanding of the limited learning, memory, and decision-making capac-
ities of individuals in order to understand aggregate outcomes” (i.e. the macro
level), and they apply a cognitive, micro-level approach to Bentley’s baby naming
data in a follow-up paper, Gureckis and Goldstone (2009). Here, they model psy-
chological assumptions about frequency information encoding and novelty pref-
erences to provide a closer view of the dynamics on name choices in Bentley’s
data set. They find that the copying mechanism itself is not likely to be random
copying, but a momentum based copying strategy where people seem to track
the rate of change in names and choose those which are growing in popularity,
relative to others.
A micro-level approach is necessary to state, with certainty, what evolution-
ary forces underly a particular change that is observed in a data set. And in
understanding the forces of cultural evolution, psychological experimentation is
a powerful tool because it addresses culture at its locus of change: cognition.
Mesoudi et al. (2006b) states:
Although laboratory-based experiments are an established approach
to the study of biological evolution, relatively little experimental work
exists in psychology or economics that has studied the dynamics of cul-
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tural transmission. Such studies are essential for a full understanding
of cultural evolution. Psychological studies of cultural transmission
would benefit from explicitly drawing on the methods of experimen-
tal population genetics, both in the design of experiments and in the
analysis of data. (p. 339)
This thesis represents a comprehensive attempt to understand the forces of
cultural evolution via psychological experiments that were designed to exploit
the interface with population genetics models of evolution. In doing so, it adds
to the small, but rapidly growing body of experimental cultural transmission
research (reviewed in Section 1.3). As recognized in much of this literature, the
reverse-engineering process characteristic of induction puts a necessarily cognitive
gloss on any attempt to understand the forces, dynamics, and causes of cultural
change. Therefore, I will approach this interface with two decidedly cognitive
considerations.
First, I will exploit the formal similarity between probabilistic models in pop-
ulation genetics and probabilistic models of cognition to understand the over-
lap and differences between the forces of biological and cultural evolution. The
Wright-Fisher model with and without selection, explained earlier in this chapter,
is a probabilistic model with two main components: sampling bias and sampling
error. And the Bayesian models mentioned in the previous section (and described
in depth in Chapter 5) also define a sampling bias and sampling error on inductive
processes.
Second, I will cut close to the operationalization of population genetics models,
as the evolution of frequency distributions over variants in a population, and focus
directly on cognitive constraints on frequency learning and production. Although
Boyd and Richerson (1985) have described the dynamics of frequency-dependent
learning, this was done with deterministic models that do not employ sampling
error. Given the prominence of neutral change as an explanation for macro-level
cultural evolution (e.g. Bentley et al., 2004), we need to understand how neutral
change could occur via the inductive task of frequency learning and reproduction.
All of the experimental work presented in this thesis is aimed at describing
the sampling bias and sampling error involved in frequency learning for one of hu-
mankind’s most remarkable culturally-transmitted data sets: language. A great
deal of literature exists on the tracking, processing, and production of language
on the basis of its frequency information (e.g. Jescheniak and Levelt, 1994; Red-
ington and Chater, 1996; Elman, 1998; Saffran, 2003; Lieberman et al., 2007;
Hudson Kam and Newport, 2009). In Experiment 1, I begin by exploring hu-
man sampling error during a basic inductive task of frequency learning and ask
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if human inductive inference can support cultural drift. Then, in a further 4
experiments, I will extend this basic frequency learning experiment with condi-
tions that engage different cognitive biases in frequency learning. The particular
class of biases I will focus on is regularization: how people eliminate variation in
language. Then, in Chapter 5, I fit a Bayesian model of frequency learning and
production to the data sets from each experiment to provide a window on the
inductive biases operating within participants’ heads as they produce the biased
behavior that they do. In essence, what each of these experiments and models
do it provide a solution to Figure 1.15, in its own way. Last, in Chapter 6, I
analyze the cultural evolution of these frequency distributions by extrapolating
the experimental data forward over several generations of learners. This provides




A cognitive basis for cultural
drift
2.1 Experiment 1:
probability matching in frequency learning
At the macro level, cultural evolution often seems to conform to drift (Bentley
et al., 2004). Because cultural variants are never directly copied, but reverse en-
gineered via a processes of inductive inference, we need to know what cognitive
mechanisms can support cultural drift. Such a mechanism would need to repro-
duce the relative frequencies of all the observed variants with a form of error
that is not biased toward any one of those variants. If the relative frequencies
were reproduced veridically, without error, then this would preclude the cultural
evolution of this data set because the distribution over cultural variants would
never change. If the error were biased toward any particular variant, that variant
would be more likely to replicate than the others, and this would not be a true
drift process (i.e. constitute neutral evolution).
This experiment was designed to explore probability matching behavior as
a possible basis for drift in cultural evolution. Probability matching is a well-
studied human decision making strategy and basic frequency learning behavior
that leads humans to replicate the relative proportions of events that they observe
with high fidelity, but some amount of error. Most studies in probability matching
are interested in how the majority of participants behave (i.e. the mode and mean
of participant responses) and thus, not much is documented about the particular
variance on error associated with probability matching.
People are very good at tracking the frequencies of events in their environment
and can use this information to make predictions about future events (e.g. Hasher
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and Zacks, 1979; Gelman, 1998). Much work in the field of psychoeconomics has
described probability matching as a sub-optimal decision-making strategy that
people tend to employ when using past frequency information to predict future
events (see Vulkan (2000) for a review of 22 such experiments). However, this
sub-optimality isn’t necessarily because people aren’t rational, it is because they
do not fully understand the nature of random events (Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar,
1991) and seem to be hypothesizing rules that govern the sequence of events
(Wolford et al., 2004; Gaissmaier and Schooler, 2008; Unturbe and Corominas,
2007). The rational strategy for making predictions about truly random events
is maximizing: choosing the most frequent item all of the time. Say, for example
two events (a, b) occur with the probabilities (0.3, 0.7). In this case, a maximizer
will bet on event b all of the time and be correct 70% of the time (0.3 ·0+0.7 ·1 =
0.7), but a probability matcher would only be correct 58% of the time, because
they are expected to choose each event with the probability of its occurrence
(0.3 · 0.3 + 0.7 · 0.7 = 0.58).
When probability matching behavior is obtained in artificial language learn-
ing experiments, it also seems to be the result of a pattern search. Perfors (in
preparation) shows that modulating the extent to which participants believe that
observed linguistic variation is meaningful modulates their reproduction of that
variation. In one condition, adult learners participated in a typical artificial
language learning task and probability matched by reproducing the linguistic
variants in the same frequencies they observed them. In a second condition, par-
ticipants learned the same artificial language, but were made to believe that the
variation is the result of errors made by other learners of the artificial language.
In this condition, their behavior moved more toward maximization: they tended
to produce the most frequent variant with a higher frequency than they observed
it. (This is known as regularization in the language learning literature and is
similar to maximization. The formal overlap of regularization and maximization
is explained in Chapter 4.)
Research on probability matching is split in terms of how it defines this behav-
ior. Some work on the subject visually inspects the mode or mean of participant
responses for behaviors that were nearly identical to the input frequency, or in
time course studies, oscillated about the mean. (Edwards, 1961; Kirk and Bitter-
man, 1965; Herrnstein, 1970; Miller and Valsangkar-Smyth, 2005). Other exper-
iments that define probability matching behavior more rigorously, look for mean
participant behavior that is not significantly different from the input frequency
(Wolford et al., 2000; Shanks et al., 2002; Hudson Kam and Chang, 2009; Hudson
Kam and Newport, 2009; Reali and Griffiths, 2009; Smith and Wonnacott, 2010;
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Culbertson et al., 2012). However, occasionally, bimodal responses in which the
mode is not on the input frequency, can yield a mean that is not significantly
different from the input frequency. This would describe probability matching
behavior at the population level (e.g. Reali and Griffiths, 2009), but not at the
individual level, which is the level that an investigation of the inductive processes
associated with unbiased sampling is concerned with. Therefore, throughout this
thesis, I will use the following definition of probability matching behavior:
Probability matching is when the mode of participant responses
is on the input frequency and the mean is not significantly different
from the input frequency.
Additionally, there are several identifiable sub-types of probability matching be-
havior that I will refer to occasionally in the following chapters.
1. Perfect probability matching. The mode of participants’ responses is on the
input frequency and there is no error.
2. Imperfect probability matching. The mode of participants’ responses is on
the input frequency and there is some error. This error can be specified,
for example, as in binomial probability matching, in which the distribution
of participants follow a binomial distribution, gaussian probability match-
ing, in which the distribution of participants follow a truncated gaussian
distribution with a particular variance, or any other distribution that char-
acterizes the distribution of participant responses about the mean. This
error can be biased or unbiased, leading to the following two subclasses of
imperfect probability matching:
3. Biased probability matching. The mode of participants’ responses is on
the input frequency, but the veridical mean is not. For finite samples,
this process can end up under the broad definition of probability matching
when the sample shows no significant difference between participants’ mean
and the input frequency. This constitutes a biased sampling process that
may still be referred to as probability matching behavior in the empirical
literature.
4. Unbiased probability matching. The mode of participants’ responses is on
the input frequency and the veridical mean is also on the input frequency.
This type of probability matching is a form of unbiased sampling error
which, again, can be specified by any number of distributions in which the
mode equals the mean. This is the type of probability matching behavior
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that is (hopefully) confirmed when the mean of participant behavior is found
to be not significantly different from the input frequency.
To date, there has not been a study that explicitly investigates the plausibility
of human probability matching behavior as a basis for neutral cultural evolution.
This experiment consists of a basic frequency learning task in which participants
observe several blue and orange marbles being drawn from a bag and are then
asked to demonstrate some more draws that are likely to come out of that bag.
This task involves induction, in the sense that participants infer the relative
proportion of the two colors in the bag on the basis of limited data and then
arrive at a new sample of data. A variety of biases may be at play during this
inductive cycle, such as participants’ biases in the perception and production of
random sequences, their a priori expectations about the relative proportion of
marbles in bags, and any biases related to representativeness (since participants
are being taught about these marbles and in turn, have to demonstrate what
they’ve learned afterward). The goal of this experiment is to assess whether
or not the cognitive processes involved in frequency perception, processing, and




238 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing
platform and completed our experiment online. Participant location was re-
stricted to the United States of America and verified by a post-hoc check of
participant IP address location. 46 participants were excluded on the basis of the
following criteria: self-reporting the use of a pen or pencil during the task1 (11),
not reporting their sex or age (2), or having previously participated in this or
any of my experiments, as determined by their user ID with MTurk (11). More
participants were recruited than necessary with the expectation that some would
be excluded by these criteria. Once the predetermined number of participants
per condition was met, the last participants were excluded, totaling 22 partici-
pants across all conditions. All excluded participants received the full monetary
reward for the task, which was 0.10 USD. The average time taken to complete the
experiment was 3 minutes and 38 seconds, with a standard deviation of 1 minute
1In an exit questionnaire.
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and 19 seconds. Of the final 192 participants, 64% are female and the mean age
is 36.0 (min = 18, max = 68) with a standard deviation of 11.9 years.
Materials & Stimuli
The experiment was coded up as a Java applet that ran in the participant’s web
browser in a 600x800-pixel field. Coding was done with Processing2 and the
server was written in Python3. Stimuli consisted of a photograph of a pouch and
graphically generated images of marbles in 2 colors: blue and orange (Figure 2.1).
The RGB color of the blue marble is 0, 51, 204 and the orange is 255, 128, 0. This
pair of colors was chosen to be distinctive (i.e. their hues lie on approximately
opposite sides of the color wheel) and because they can also be easily distinguished
by individuals with various forms of color blindedness (Rigden, 1999).






























Figure 2.1: Schema of the observation and production phases for Experiment 1.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of an observation phase and a production phase, with
10 observation trials and 10 production trials (Figure 2.1). In each observation
trial, the pouch was displayed on its own for 1 second and then a marble was
displayed above it for 2 seconds, with no break between trials. In each production
trial, the pouch was displayed and the two marbles were displayed below it near
the bottom left and right corners of the screen. Each production trial had no
time constraint. When participants scrolled over one of the marbles, a grey




the box turned bold, the marble they selected appeared above the pouch for 2
seconds (in the same location as it had during the observation phase) and that
marble color was registered as the participant’s response for that production trial.
Production trials repeated until 10 responses were collected. Participants were
not told how many observation or production trials there would be. Complete
instructions and exit questions can be found in Appendix A.
Conditions
All possible ratios for 10 draws were tested. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of 6 observation ratios (x:y) = 5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:2, 9:1 and 10:0. Here, x
corresponds to whatever color was the majority marble during the observation
phase and y corresponds to whatever color was the minority marble during the
observation phase. Color was counterbalanced so that half of the participants in
each observation ratio saw blue as the majority marble and half saw orange as the
majority marble. From here on, whatever marble color corresponds to x will be
referred to as observed majority and whatever marble color corresponds to y will
be referred to as observed minority. The test-side presentation of marbles was
also counterbalanced so that half of the participants had their observed majority
as the right-hand test choice and half had their observed majority as the left-hand
test choice. This yields 4 counterbalance conditions:
1. observed majority is blue and on test-right
2. observed majority is blue and on test-left
3. observed majority is orange and on test-right
4. observed majority is orange and on test-left
Overall, two counterbalance manipulations and six observation ratios yields a
6x2x2 experimental design, with 8 participants in each group.
2.1.2 Results
Figure 2.2 (top row) shows the results of Experiment 1. Each column corresponds
to one of the six observation ratios, ranging from 5:5 (on the left) to 10:0 (on the
right). Each pane contains the distribution of ratios that participants produced
in response to one observation ratio. These production ratios are displayed on
the x-axis as the number of times a participant produced variant x from the
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Figure 2.2: Top: The results of Experiment 1. Bottom: The distribution of
behaviors that would be obtained in one generation of binomial drift.
the majority during the observation phase.4 All observation ratios are indicated
by a dashed line. For example, the leftmost panel gives the results for the 32
participants who observed a 5:5 ratio of marbles. Here, we see that 53% of these
participants also produced a 5:5 ratio, 25% produced a 4:6 ratio, 16% produced
a 6:4 ratio, and no participants produced only one marble color (i.e. a 10:0 or
0:10 ratio).
Participants appear to be probability matching with some error. The mode
of participant behavior is on the input frequency, however some participants
over-produced the majority marble (responses to the right of the dashed line)
and others under-produced the majority marble (responses to the left of the
dashed line). One-sample t-tests were conducted to determine if the participants’
mean production of the observed majority differed significantly from its observed
frequency. A two-tailed test was used because there was no a priori hypothesis
about the directionality of this potential difference. There was no significant
difference in observation ratio conditions 5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:4, and 9:1, however some
of these p-values are quite low: (5:5, t(31) = −1.6667, p = 0.11; 6:4, t = (31) −
1.9823, p = 0.06; 7:3, t(31) = −1.4669, p = 0.15; 8:2, t(31) = −1.8317, p = 0.08;
9:1, t(31) = −1.6253, p = 0.11). In the 10:0 condition, mean production of
the observed majority is significantly lower than its observed frequency (t(31) =
4In the 5:5 observation ratio there is no majority variant, so a random marble/color was
coded as variant x.
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Counterbalance condition: 1 2 3 4
observed majority responses 335 350 342 337
Table 2.1: The number of production trials where participants chose the observed
majority marble is similar across all counterbalance conditions.
−2.6417, p = 0.01). This significant result may be due to the extreme ceiling
effect of the x = 10 condition, because noise on participant responses can only
lower the mean. Participant behavior in this experiment falls under the definition
of probability matching behavior because the model participant responses fall on
the input frequency, and the mean of their responses are not significantly different
from the input frequency.
Given the robust probability matching profile, it seems that input proportion
is the main predictor of participant behavior in this experiment. However, there
could be an effect of the two counterbalance manipulations: color of the majority
marble and test side. And there could be an interaction between these conditions,
for example the observed majority marble might be more likely to be chosen when
it is blue and the right-hand test choice. Table 2.1 gives the raw number of trials
in which participants responded with the observed majority, per counterbalance
condition. Here, we see a near even divide: participants’ likelihood of choosing the
observed majority is similar across all counterbalance conditions. This indicates
that there is no effect of counterbalance condition of on the frequency with which
participants produce the observed majority.
To assess statistical significances in the relationship between the frequency
with which participants produced the observed majority marble and the observa-
tion ratios and counterbalance conditions, I performed a linear regression analysis
in R (R Core Team, 2013) with the lme4 (Bates et al., 2013) package. The depen-
dent variable was the production frequency of the observed majority marble. The
independent variables were 1) observation frequency of the observed majority, 2)
color of the observed majority, and 3) right vs left test side location of the observed
majority. All independent variables were entered with interaction terms. There
was a significant effect of observation frequency on the production frequency of
the majority marble (t(184) = 8.636, p < 0.001), as would be expected because
participants are probability matching and have clearly learned about the obser-
vation ratios. Neither of the counterbalance conditions significantly predicted
participants’ responses: color was not significant (t(184) = −1.107, p = 0.27) and
test side was not significant (t(184) = 0.211, p = 0.833). Likewise, there were
no significant interactions between any of the three independent variables5. This
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Figure 2.3: Comparing the probability matching data and binomial drift for
N = 10, per observation ratio (x : y) in terms of a) mean and b) variance.
means that participants showed no bias toward one of the marble colors or one
of the test sides: observation frequency alone predicts participants’ performance.
Comparison to binomial drift
How does this probability matching profile compare to binomial drift? Figure
2.2 (bottom row) shows the distribution of behaviors that would be obtained
in one generation of binomial drift (refer back to Section 1.5.2). These binomi-
als are the distributions we would expect participants to produce if they were
doing something isomorphic to randomly sampling their production trials, with
replacement, from their observation trials. Through visual inspection, the results
of Experiment 1 look similar to the binomial distributions, maintaining the mode
on the input proportion. However, the means appear to be slightly biased toward
the minority variant and the variance appears restricted. First, let’s discuss the
means. In these binomials, the mean falls on the observation frequency, x. Be-
cause of this, the t-tests also tell us that there is no significant difference between
mean participant behavior and binomial means for the 5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:4, and 9:1
observation ratios. This is important because it tells us that this probability
matching behavior might support neutral evolution, because this is a necessary
condition for neutral change: neither variant should be privileged. Figure 2.3a
plots the binomial mean against the empirical mean for each of the six obser-
t(184) = 0.075, p = 0.94, color and test side: t(184) = 0.248, p = 0.81, observation ratio, color
and test side: t(184) = −0.529, p = 0.60.
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vation ratio conditions. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals indicating
where the true mean of participant responses lies. Here we see that all of the data
means seem to be on the low side. Although these values are not significantly
lower than the binomial means, it is possible that a larger participant pool may
reveal a consistent bias toward the observed minority variant.
The variance, on the other hand is significantly different between participant
behavior and binomial drift, and this confirms that cultural drift via probability
matching behavior is not equivalent to binomial drift. Figure 2.3b plots the stan-
dard deviation6 of participant responses against the standard deviation of the
matched binomials from Figure 2.2b. To determine whether the standard devi-
ation of participant responses is significantly different from that of its matched
binomial, we need to find out how likely it is that binomial sampling could gen-
erate a standard deviation that is at least as extreme as the one generated by
participants. For each observation ratio condition, I ran a Monte Carlo analysis
that sampled 32 data points from the matched binomial, computed the standard
deviation of these data points, and repeated this 1024 times7. The resulting 1024
standard deviations were ranked and these 95% confidence interval and p-value
of the empirical standard was determined on the basis of this ranking.8 The error
bars in Figure 2.3b show the 95% confidence intervals. The standard deviations in
conditions 5:5, 6:4, and 7:3 were all significantly lower than that of the binomial
(5:5, p = 0.006, 6:4, p = 0.012, 7: 3, p = 0.04). For 8:2, the standard deviation
is close to significance (p = 0.051). Standard deviations were significantly higher
in conditions 9:1 and 10:0 (9:1, p = 0; 10:0, p = 0)9.
How does this difference in variance affect the dynamics of drift? Neutral
copying with low variance maintains variation in the population longer. This was
discussed at the end of Section 1.5.1 in relation to population size: larger pop-
ulation sizes produce binomial drift distributions with lower variance and thus,
variation loss (i.e. fixation) takes a longer time on average to occur. The nu-
merical calculation of average fixation time for binomial drift (Figure 1.3) was
repeated for probability matching using the raw data in Figure 2.2 as the transi-
6which is the square root of the variance
7Singh and Xie (2008) recommend a total number of re-runs equalling the square of the
number of participants (322 = 1024).
8Here, the 25th lowest value is the lower bound on the 95% confidence interval and the 947th
lowest value is the upper bound. This is a two-tailed test. The p-value is determined by finding
the rank of empirical value, dividing it by the total number of ranked items, and multiplying
by two to get a two-tailed p-value. For example, if the empirical value corresponds to the 30th
lowest item, its p-value will be 301024 = 0.059.
9These p-values are zero because there were no instances of the model producing a standard
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Figure 2.4: Fixation time probability distributions. a) Binomial drift where
N = 10, mean fixation time is 13.86 generations. b) The raw probability matching
data obtained in Experiment 2 (also N = 10), mean fixation time is 24.17 genera-
tions. These were numerically calculated from 100,000 independent evolutionary
trajectories initialized at p = 0.5.
tion probabilities x→ x′. Figure 2.4a re-plots the fixation probability distribution
for binomial drift where N = 10 and Figure 2.4b plots the distribution for the
probability matching data, where N = 10 because this equals the population size
of cultural variants (blue and orange marbles) that participants can observe and
produce in the experiment. The average generation at fixation for the probability
matching data is 24.17 generations. This is much longer than N = 10 binomial
drift, which has an analytical solution of 13.86 generations. In fact, the bino-
mial model that comes closest to the probability matching data result is a larger
population size, N = 17 with average fixation at 23.57 generations.
2.1.3 Discussion
The results of this experiment show that human probability matching capabilities
are a plausible basis for cultural drift. Three types of sampling bias could be at
play in this task, however no evidence was found to support them: 1) Participants
did not possess a direct bias for a variant on the basis of its color. 2) Participants
did not possess a production bias on the basis of test side location. 3) Participants
did not demonstrate a significant frequency-dependent bias that would lead them
to over-produce the majority or minority variant. This means that the probability
matching behavior obtained in this task constitutes an unbiased, neutral sampling
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process, which would necesarily lead to the neutral evolution of marble frequencies
over time. However, probability matching behavior in this task was not identical
to binomial drift because the variance in output frequencies was significantly
lower. The fact that participants’ output frequencies displayed a significantly
lower variance than that of binomial drift means that the cultural drift supported
by probability matching is not binomial: it is not equivalent to the Wright-Fisher
model of neutral evolution. One likely reason for this restricted variance is that
participants are trying to be representative. That is, they are producing responses
that have high likelihood under their estimate of the ratio of marbles in the bag.
For example, if you inferred a 7:3 ratio of marbles in the bag, and were asked
to tell someone what a likely set of draws from this bag looks like, you may try
to produce the most representative set, which is also a 7:3 ratio. This type of
data would give them the best shot at inferring the the same ratio that you had
inferred. Representativeness of this type has been explored experimentally (e.g.
Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Grether, 1992) and in cognitive modelling (e.g.
Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001; Rafferty and Griffiths, 2010).
One consequence of this restricted-variance form of cultural drift is that cul-
tural drift may eliminate variation at a slower rate than genetic drift does. This
has important implications for the use of drift models as null hypotheses, espe-
cially in relation to regularization studies because they deal with the selective
elimination of variation over generations of learners. A good indicator that a
trait is undergoing selection is that it fixes in a population significantly quicker
than it would under drift. If cultural drift eliminates variation at a much slower
rate than genetic drift does, that means that the use of binomial drift models
(imported directly from models of genetic evolution) will make the detection of a
wide range of weak selection pressures impossible for cultural data sets. For ex-
ample, let’s suppose a certain cultural selection pressure operates in accordance
with the basic selection model described in Section 1.6.1, Equation 1.3. If we
assume that the sampling error on this model is not binomial, but instead is
defined by a Gaussian distribution with the same standard deviations10 as the
data obtained in Experiment 1, the entire range of selection strengths from about
s = 0.27 down to s = 0 would not eliminate variation faster than binomial drift
would and therefore, would not be correctly detected as selection if a binomial
10The standard deviation values obtained per observation ratio were used to define the sam-
pling error about the model’s expected values, θ′. (Refer back to the plots in Figure 1.8, which
define the selection function that maps θ to θ′.) For θ = 0.5, the standard deviation of the data
in the 5:5 condition was used, for θ = 0.6, the standard deviation from the 6:4 condition was
used, and so on. The exact standard deviations, graphically shown in Figure 2.3 are as follows:
5:5 = 0.1061, 6:4 = 0.1070, 7:3 = 0.1085, 8:2 = 0.0965, 9:1 = 0.1523, 10:0 = 0.1405.
56
drift baseline were used as a null hypothesis. In this model, s = 0.27 has an
average fixation time of about 13.8 generations, close to binomial drift at 13.86,
whereas s = 0.28 is a little lower at 13.5 generations, and s = 0.26 is a little
higher at 14.2 generations. If restricted-variance drift is a general characteristic
of cultural evolution, then the many data sets which Bentley and colleagues have
shown to conform to binomial drift may very well be the result of non-neutral
copying processes. This suggests an important avenue for future research: we
need to understand what effects variance-restricted neutral sampling processes
have on macro-level analyses of cultural evolution, such as power law distribu-
tions. Do these processes also produce power law distributions, or do they result
in detectable deviations from the power law?
Finally, what is the reason that sampling error in cultural drift is so low? In
this basic frequency learning task, participants observe orange and blue marbles
in a particular ratio, and then they produce them in a particular ratio. These vari-
ants are not being copied directly, they are passing thorough participants’ minds
and their replication hinges on the cognitive mechanisms involved in perception,
processing, and production. The 10 variants that each participant observes lose
their discreteness when they pass through cognition. People may be forming
representations of these variants and their relative frequency. In the case of prob-
ability matching, participants are able to reproduce the observed ratio better than
a random sampling process such as drift, or an exemplar model that stores all
variants with their veridical frequencies and generates productions by randomly
sampling these variants, with replacement, from perfect memory. Instead, partic-
ipants in this task are employing a form of inductive inference to reverse-engineer
10 draws that are likely to come out of a bag, on the basis of 10 draws they have
observed from that bag. The results of this experiment show that the inductive
inference process can be less error prone than a random sampling process, and
in turn, lead to higher levels of transmission fidelity than processes that sample
directly from populations of cultural variants.
In short, there is no reason to assume that the mathematics of sampling phys-
ical entities in the world, or enumerable observations of cultural variants, should
apply to the type of sampling error that occurs in cultural evolution processes.
A better understanding of the cognitive bases of cultural drift is needed to pro-
vide cultural evolution research with appropriate null hypotheses for the accurate




The psychology of regularization
in language
In the previous chapter, probability matching was identified as an unbiased fre-
quency learning behavior that could support neutral drift in cultural evolution.
From this point forward, I will explore the cognitive biases that take participants
away from probability matching and cause them to eliminate variation during fre-
quency learning. This selective elimination of variation is known as regularization,
and has been studied in depth in the field of linguistics. Human languages contain
very little unpredictable variation (Chambers and Schilling-Estes, 2013) and when
language learners do encounter variation, they tend to regularize it. Regulariza-
tion has been documented extensively in natural language use contexts, such as
the formation of Creole languages from highly variable Pidgin languages (Bicker-
ton, 1981; Sankoff, 1979; DeGraff, 1999; Lumsden, 1999; Meyerhoff, 2000; Becker
and Veenstra, 2003), the formation of new signed languages (Senghas et al., 1997;
Senghas, 2000; Senghas and Coppola, 2001), historical trends of language change
(Schilling-Estes and Wolfram, 1994; Lieberman et al., 2007; van Trijp, 2013), and
children’s acquisition of language (Berko, 1958; Marcus et al., 1992; Singleton
and Newport, 2004; Smith et al., 2007) Regularization has also been documented
extensively in the laboratory through artificial language learning experiments
(Wonnacott and Newport, 2005; Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005, 2009; Reali
and Griffiths, 2009; Smith and Wonnacott, 2010; Perfors, 2012; Culbertson et al.,
2012). Because I will be taking an experimental approach, with adult learners,
to understanding non-neutral cultural evolution via regularization biases, I will
take a moment here to summarize some key existing regularization experiments
with adult learners.
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7:36:45:5 8:2 9:1 10:0
bul kav dup mig lam fud pin vat sab nek ges tuf
Figure 3.1: The stimuli used in Reali and Griffiths (2009). Top: the relative
proportions of each word pair. Middle: the word pairs. Bottom: the objects
(these were animated to appear 3-dimensional and shown as videos).
Reali and Griffiths (2009) address regularization at the lexical level and in-
vestigate how participants eliminate variation among word-meaning mappings.
Participants were trained on an artificial language that contained six meanings
(6 different objects), where each meaning was paired with two possible words (two
synonyms for that meaning). Figure 3.1 shows the object and word stimuli they
used.1 Participants observed 10 naming events per object, totaling 60 training
trials. On each trial a random object was chosen and it was named with one of the
two possible words. Stimuli were presented visually and auditorily. Each of the
two words in a pair was shown in a particular relative proportion to one another.
Each of the six word pairs followed one of the six possible relative proportions
for 10 trials: {5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:2, 9:1, 10:0}. Because these mappings are not all
deterministic, one-to-one mappings between words and meanings (i.e. they aren’t
all 10:0 ratios), this stimuli set contains unconditioned variation among lexical
items. And each ratio differs in its variability, with 5:5 ratios being the most
variable, 6:4 a little less variable, 9:1 only slightly variable, and 10:0 not variable
(i.e. fully regular).2 Then, in a testing phase, participants were shown an object
along with the two words that had appeared with it during training. Participants
were instructed to select one of the words. Each object was shown 10 times in
the testing phase, totaling 60 testing trials. Therefore, 10 naming events were
collected per object. The data of interest here were the relative proportions of the
words pairs that participants produced, and how they differed from the relative
proportion in which they were observed.
Figure 3.2 shows the results of Reali and Griffiths (2009). In the panel to
the right we can see that many participants regularized their productions by only
1These are the exact word stimuli, but the pairings among words may not be the same to
those used in the experiment. These images were kindly provided by Florencia Reali.
2The upcoming Section 3.1 explains how these different levels of variability can be quantified.
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Figure 3.2: The lexical regularization results of Reali and Griffiths (2009). Each
condition corresponds to one of the training ratios. Condition 1) 10:0, 2) 9:1, 3)
8:2, 4) 6:4, 5) 5:5. Left: mean frequency of word y from the training ratio, x:y.
Black dots correspond to the frequency of word y in the training stimuli and error
bars indicate one standard error of the mean. Right: The individual data points
per participant.
producing one of the words per object (with a frequency of y = 0 or y = 10).
More participants appeared to regularize by overproducing the word that oc-
curred most frequently in the training stimuli (word x from the training ratio
x:y). However, some participants seem to probability match, because there are
production frequencies of y that equal their observed frequency during training
(these are the data points that fall on the gray line, which I have added to the
figure). The panel to the left shows the mean of participants’ production fre-
quencies per condition. According to the most common definition of probability
matching in the literature, this result constitutes probability matching behavior
because there is no significant difference between participants’ mean production
frequency of word y and the observed frequency of word y. However, this def-
inition is misleading because the mode of participant behavior in this data set
is not on the mean: it is bimodal and participants are clearly regularizing their
responses. Reali and Griffiths (2009) do adopt the standard definition here and
therefore incorrectly characterize these responses as probability matching behav-
ior. It is precisely this potential for misidentifcation which prompted the more
stringent definition of probability matching behavior which I laid out in Section
2.1.
Reali and Griffiths (2009) also conducted this experiment in an iterated learn-
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Figure 3.3: The results of the iterated learning experiment in Reali and Griffiths
(2009). Each line shows the trajectory of one iterated learning chain for five
generations. The x-axis shows the produced frequency of word y from the initial
training ratio x:y.
ing format (refer back to Section 1.3), in which the production ratios of one par-
ticipant served as the training ratios for the next. When word frequencies are
culturally transmitted, they quickly converge toward fully-regular ratios (10:0 or
0:10). Figure 3.3 shows the results of the iterated learning chains. Each chain was
initialized in one of the six possible training ratios. These results show that indi-
vidual participants possess some sort of regularization bias for one-to-one map-
pings between words, but when their results are culturally transmitted, this bias
becomes very clear, as participant behavior converged to 10:0 production ratios
in only a few generations of learners. This difference between single-generation
behavior (obtained from the typical experimental design that compares one set of
training and testing data) and the behavior after multiple generations of learners
(obtained from the iterated learning experimental designs) exemplifies the use
of iterated learning as a tool for revealing inductive biases and will be further
discussed in Chapter 6.
Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) investigated regularization of determiners.
In the first experiment in this paper, participants were trained on an artificial
language consisting of 36 nouns, 7 intransitive verbs, 5 transitive verbs, 1 negative
marker, and 2 main determiners, one for each of the two noun classes. Each
training trial consisted of a video of a scene and a sentence in the language that
described that scene. Sentences were presented auditorily only. Testing trials
consisted of a spoken sentence completion task in which participants saw a novel
video of a scene and heard the first word (always a verb) of the corresponding
sentence. There was one control condition and four experimental conditions. In
every condition, the main determiner occurred in 60% of the training sentences.
In the control condition, no determiner occurred in the remaining 40% of the
sentences. In the experimental condition 2-ND, two additional noise determiners
occurred in the remaining sentences (20% with one noise determiner and 20%





Figure 3.4: Results of Hudson Kam and Newport (2009). Left: training dis-
tributions over determiners in each of the five conditions. Black indicates the
percentage of occurrences of the main determiners and grays indicate the differ-
ent noise determiners. In the control condition, there were no noise determiners.
Right: mean number of productions of the main determiner in each of the five
conditions.
in condition 8-ND there were 8, and in condition 16-ND there were 16. Noise
determiners were always presented with an equal number of sentences (Figure
3.4, left). The results of the sentence completion trials are shown in Figure 3.4
(right) in terms of the mean number of productions of of the main determiner.
Participants regularize in all of the experimental conditions by over-producing
the main determiner, and they do so more often in the conditions with more
noise determiners.
Smith and Wonnacott (2010) investigated the regularization of plural mark-
ers. Participants were trained on various scenes that contained one of four objects
(a cartooned cow, pig, giraffe, and rabbit) that were presented either as single
animals or as pairs of animals (pairs were always of the same animal type). In
each scene, the animals performed a “move” action, depicted with an arrow on
the screen, and sentence describing the scene was presented below. Each sentence
was composed of a verb (meaning “move”), noun (the animal name), and plural
marker (“fip” or “tay”), in that order. When a pair of animals were shown, the
sentence included one of the plural markers, but when one animal was shown, no
marker was shown in that slot. Plural markers were presented randomly with a
skewed, 0.75/0.25 probability, such that each participant saw one of the markers
in 75% of the plural sentences and the other one in 25% of the plural sentences.
In a testing phase, participants were shown a scene and prompted to type a
sentence describing that scene. This experiment was conducted in an iterated
learning format, such that the sentences that one participant produced served
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as the training sentences for the next learner. Over five generations of learners,
participants eliminated unpredictable variation in the language, but in a slightly
different sense than the experiments described so far. In this experiment, par-
ticipants did not regularize by eliminating one of the markers: they probability
matched the plural marker frequencies, maintaining the variation in that lan-
guage’s plural marker forms. Instead, they regularized by forming deterministic
mappings between plural markers and specific animals, such that two cows, for
example, would always be marked with “fip”, and two pigs, giraffes, and rabbits
would always be marked with “tay”. Figure 3.5 shows the results of this Smith
and Wonnacott (2010). The left-hand pane shows that only a few chains reg-
ularized by eliminating one of the variants. These are the chains that level off
at frequency counts of 0 or 16. Most learners maintain both marker variants in
their productions. The right-hand pane shows that regularity in the co-occurance
between plural markers and animal types emerges over the generations. Smith
and Wonnacott (2010) use conditional entropy as a measure of regularity (fur-
ther explained in Section 3.1). Lower conditional entropy indicates more regular
mappings between plural markers and animals, and a conditional entropy of zero
indicates fully regular (i.e. deterministic) mappings where each plural marker
occurs with one animal exclusively. The main result here is a gradual drop in the
average conditional entropy of the languages produced by the 10 chains, meaning
that each generation of participants tends to regularize the linguistic input they
receive.
Wonnacott and Newport (2005) investigated regularization of word orders in
an artificial language learning task. First, participants were trained on the vocab-
ulary items separately (5 nouns and 4 transitive verbs). Then, participants were
trained on 24 sentence descriptions of different scenes. These training sentences
varied in word order such that 66% of the sentences occurred in verb-object-
subject (VOS) order and 33% were verb-subject-object (VSO). In the testing
trials, participants were shown a scene and asked to describe it in the language
they had learned. There were two testing conditions: one in which they were
tested on six scenes they had seen during sentence training, and one in which
they were tested on six scenes they had not seen. These novel scenes contained
the vocabulary items that participants had been trained on in the vocabulary
training phase, but not the sentence training phase. Participants regularized the
word order of their productions when describing novel scenes: 75% of participants
fully-regularized these novel scenes by producing only one word order on all of
their testing trials. However, only 13% of subjects did this in the old scene con-
dition. This study showed that participants tend to regularize word order, but
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Figure 3.5: The results of the learning experiment in Smith and Wonnacott
(2010). Left: the trajectories of ten iterated learning chains, through different
frequency counts of the majority plural marker in the initial training set. The solid
line shows the mean frequency of that plural marker. Right: the mean conditional
entropy of each set of plural markers, conditioned on animal type, for all ten
chains, per generation. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. The printed
fractions show the number of languages that had significantly lower conditional
entropy than that expected by chance (i.e. via binomial drift of plural marker
variants across animal types).
do so significantly more when using novel vocabulary items that had not been
practiced in a particular word order.
The experiments above all show that adult learners tend to regularize un-
predictable linguistic variation and do so for different linguistic units (nouns,
determiners, plural markers, and word orders). But why does this happen? Why
don’t participants reproduce their training sets perfectly? And why do their
“errors” in production eliminate variation rather than introduce even more vari-
ation? Humans are excellent at tracking the statistical properties of linguistic
features (Fiser and Aslin, 2001; Maye et al., 2002; Newport and Aslin, 2004; Saf-
fran et al., 1996; Saffran, 2003; Vouloumanos, 2008) as well as events in their
environment (as discussed in Section 2.1 with regard to the probability matching
literature: Hasher and Zacks (e.g. 1979); Gelman (e.g. 1998); Vulkan (e.g. 2000)).
Given that there are a variety of instances in which adult learners do probabil-
ity match, exemplified in Experiment 1, why do they regularize linguistic input?
There are two main explanations for this in the literature. One is that human
learners possess an innate, and domain-specific bias for regularizing linguistic in-
put (DeGraff, 1999; Becker and Veenstra, 2003; Lumsden, 1999) which should
be especially pronounced in child learners (see Bickerton (1984)’s Language Bio-
program Hypothesis). The other is that regularization is due to domain-general
cognitive constraints on frequency learning, with a special focus on memory limi-
tations (Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005, 2009; Hudson Kam and Chang, 2009).
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The Less is More hypothesis (e.g. Goldowsky and Newport, 1993; Newport, 1990;
Ludden and Gupta, 2000; Chin and Kersten, 2009) is a memory-based explanation
for regularization behavior that may apply to children’s tendencies to regularize
more than adults in language learning tasks (Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005,
2009; Hudson Kam and Chang, 2009) and non-linguistic frequency learning tasks
(Weir, 1964; Derks and Paclisanu, 1967; Myers, 1976). Having a limited memory
capacity may cause learners to disregard or forget lower-frequency observations
and thus only produce the higher-frequency alternative, resulting in regulariza-
tion behavior.
In regard to this hypothesis, Hudson Kam and Chang (2009) showed that
alleviating cognitive load for adult language learners led them to probability
match more. Participants were taught to describe various scenes in an artificial
language with variable determiners (similar to Hudson Kam and Newport (2009),
described above). Then, in the testing trials, participants were prompted with a
scene and produced a sentence in the artificial language to describe it. There were
three testing phase conditions, one in which participants produced sentences from
memory, one in which the noun from the sentences were provided for the scene,
and one in which all of the words in the artificial language were provided on flash
cards and participants assembled the cards to describe the scene. Participants in
the first condition regularized as in Hudson Kam and Newport (2009). However,
participants in the other two conditions, where word recall was aided, probability
matched more among the determiner forms.
Vouloumanos (2008) also addresses the Less is More hypothesis by investi-
gating adult learners’ sensitivity to fine-grained statistical information in lexical
variation consisting of homonyms: word-meaning pairings in which one word
co-occurs with two or more objects. In the first experiment in this paper, partic-
ipants were trained on 12 different objects in an artificial language learning task.
Four of these objects were named with one word, four were named with three
words (in a 8:1:1 ratio) and four were named with four words (in a 6:2:1:1 ratio).
Then, in a testing phase participants were shown a word along with two objects
and told to selected the object that went “best” with that word. In every test
trial, one of the test objects had co-occurred more often with the word than the
other during training. Here, the “correct” response would be to choose the object
that had the higher co-occurrence. Participants had very low error rates in this
task, regardless of the particular relative co-occurrence rate between test objects.
For example, if object A occurred with the word 6 times and object B occurred
with the word 1 time, participants chose object A most often. Likewise, object
A occurred with the word only 2 times and object B occurred with the word 1
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time, participants still chose object A most often. This means that participants
are able to encode statistical information about low-frequency linguistic variants.
In the second experiment, the training stimuli were manipulated to contain much
higher levels of variation. Here, all 12 objects were named with four words in
a (in a 6:2:1:1 ratio). The results of this experiment showed that participants
maintained low error rates for the object that occurred 6 times, however the er-
ror rate on the low-frequency items was significantly higher than in Experiment 1.
Therefore, increasing the variability of the stimuli, such that participants had to
track more objects with in more variable mappings (6:2:1:1 vs 10:0) lead to worse
encoding or recall of observed proportions of low-frequency variants. Therefore,
memory limitations could be a possible driver of regularization behavior, but in
a finely graded way that depends on particular properties of the distribution over
observations.
This observation is corroborated by Gardner (1957) in a typical, non-linguistic
frequency prediction task in which adult learners had to predict which of several
lights would flash on any given trial. When participants observed two lights
flashing in a 70:30 or 60:40 proportion, they probability matched in their predic-
tions. However, when participants observed three lights flashing in a 70:15:15,
70:20:10, 60:20:20, or 60:30:10 proportion, they over-predicted the most frequent
light and under-predicted the infrequent ones. This suggests that participants
will regularize more when they must track more frequencies concurrently.
In a more direct investigation of the effect of working memory capacity on
regularization, Kareev et al. (1997) reported an effect of individual differences in
working memory capacity (as determined by a digit-span test) on participants’
perception of the correlation of two probabilistic variables. Participants with
lower capacity overestimated the most common variant, whereas participants with
higher capacity did not. Dougherty and Hunter (2003) reported that participants
with lower working memory were less likely to consider alternative choices in
an eight-item prediction task and were less likely to consider the low-frequency
alternatives than participants with higher working memory. However, differences
in working memory capacity (either between children and adults, or as elicited by
simpler and more complex stimuli sets) may not completely account for the full
amount of regularization behavior elicited in artificial language learning tasks.
In a targeted investigation of linguistic frequency learning Perfors (2012)
shows that placing constraints on memory encoding does not effect regularization
behavior. Participants were trained on an artificial language learning task based
on Hudson Kam and Newport (2009). The vocabulary consisted of 10 nouns
deterministically mapped to 10 different images (i.e meanings). Nouns were al-
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ways accompanied by one of 5 determiners that varied randomly in a 6:1:1:1:1
ratio. During the training phase, while participants were being taught this lan-
guage, they were also presented with one of six tasks that added a particular
type of cognitive load to their encoding of the language. These were 1) verbal
load : participants read a sentence and judged whether or not it was grammatical,
2) operational load : participants saw a simple equation and judged whether or
not the answer was correct (ex: 2/2 + 4 = 5), 3) low concurrent load : partici-
pants had to remember a sequence of three letters and report them at the end
of each trial, 4) high concurrent load : participants had to remember a sequence
of six letters and report them at the end of each trial, 5) concurrent operational
load : participants had to provide the answer to an equation, and 6) concurrent
verbal load : participants had to memorize a sequence of four, three-letter non-
sense words and report them at the end of each trial. These conditions were
compared to a control condition, in which the language was learned without an
additional task during training. The results show that participants did not regu-
larize in any of the experimental conditions. In fact, the trend appeared to go in
the opposite direction, with higher cognitive load leading to a more pronounced
under-production of the main determiner.
These results suggest that imposing memory constraints on learners does not
necessarily lead to regularization during language learning. However, it is still an
open question whether cognitive load during the production phase of the task,
which places constraints on memory recall, leads to regularization behavior in
artificial language learning tasks. Additionally, it could also be the case that
linguistic regularization is primarily driven by participants’ interpretation of the
goal of the task or by other pragmatic factors (Perfors, in preparation), such that
what participants think they are supposed to do with the linguistic statistics they
have encoded determines whether or not they make variable or regular produc-
tions. It is conceivable that regularization due to pragmatic factors could override
the nuanced differences in regularization behavior due to memory constraints on
frequency encoding or recall in linguistic frequency learning tasks.
The remaining experiments in this thesis were designed to address these issues.
Experiment 2 investigates the relative contribution of domain-general (due to
single versus concurrent frequency learning) and domain-specific (due to the use
of linguistic and non-linguistic stimuli) drivers of regularization behavior in the
basic frequency learning task. Experiment 3 takes a closer look at the levels
of variability in the particular training sets and their effect on regularization
behavior. Experiment 4 compares regularization behavior due to modulations of
cognitive load in the observation versus production phase. Finally, Experiment
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5 investigates the task framing and goal of the production task on regularization
behavior. But before I present these experiments, I will explain a little more
about what regularization behavior is and further develop our conceptual toolkit
for understanding and describing this behavior.
3.1 An information theoretic definition
The goal of this section is to develop a definition of regularization that is explicit
enough to be used for quantifying it. As we saw in the previous section, regular-
ization is the process of eliminating variation in language, and this can happen
at many different levels in a linguistic system: phonological, morphological, lexi-
cal, syntactic. More specifically, we can think of it as a process that compresses
language across some dimension. The regularization experiments reviewed above
all zoom in on a particular dimension of an artificial language and examine the
distribution of variation at that level before and after learning. As for the stud-
ies targeting the morphosyntactic level, Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) and
Perfors (2012) look at distributions of determiners and Smith and Wonnacott
(2010) look at distributions of plural markers. At the lexical level, Vouloumanos
(2008) looks at distributions of homonyms and Reali and Griffiths (2009) look at
distributions of synonyms. And at the syntactic level, Wonnacott and Newport
(2005) and Culbertson et al. (2012) look at distributions of words orders. Each
of these studies deals with a particular set of competing linguistic variants, which
are determiners, plural markers, nouns, or word orders.
This literature describes regularization as a process that leads one of the
variants (usually the most frequent one) to be over-represented in participants’
productions. This definition is fairly informal, and thus, different papers develop
different measures of linguistic regularity, most of which are based on the fre-
quency of the majority variant. Additionally, in the experiments where more
than one input distribution was tested (Vouloumanos, 2008; Hudson Kam and
Newport, 2009), a certain property of the distributions are found to modulate
the degree to which participants regularize. Hudson Kam and Newport (2009)
identify this property as the scatter of a distribution. For example, their training
condition 2 consists of a 30%, 30%, 20%, 20% global distribution over 4 different
determiners, and training condition 3 consists of a 30%, 30%, 10%, 10%, 10%,
10% global distribution over 6 different determiners. Here, condition 3 is more
scattered than condition 2. Vouloumanos (2008) identifies this property as the
variability of the learning context. For example, the variability of the learning
69
context is lower when objects co-occur with an 80%, 10%, 10% distribution over
3 different words than when objects co-occur with a 60%, 20%, 10%, 10% distri-
bution over 4 different words. All of these distributions over variants, regardless of
what linguistic level we are targeting, can be quantified in terms of their structure
and predictability via information theoretic notions of entropy.
A few existing papers on topics closely related to regularization have utilized
information-theoretic definitions of structure in language. Tamariz and Smith
(2008) and Cornish et al. (2009) develop a measure of compositional structure
in language called RegMap. Their latter formulation of this measure modifies
the information-theoretic definition of conditional entropy into an indicator of
the “degree of confidence that a signal element consistently predicts a meaning
element”. They apply this measure to the iterated artificial language learning
experiment of Kirby et al. (2008) to verify the emergence of compositional struc-
ture over several generations of learners. Ferrer i Cancho and Solé (2003) use the
conditional entropy of signal-meaning mappings in a model of Zipf’s principal of
least effort to quantify a hearer’s effort in decoding a message. This formulation
grounds decoding effort in the structure of the language: when signals predict
meanings with greater accuracy, conditional entropy is low and hearers expend
little effort in decoding the message. And as mentioned in the previous section,
Smith and Wonnacott (2010) also use conditional entropy as a measure of lin-
guistic structure and stand out as the one example of this in the regularization
literature to date.
In the following sections, I will extend the use of conditional entropy (as a
measure of linguistic structure) to a measure of the amount of regularization that
occurs between two signal-meaning mappings in successive time steps, and ex-
plain how conditional entropy not only describes the regularity of mappings in
a language (as in Tamariz & Smith, 2008; Cornish et. al, 2009; Ferer i Cancho
and Solé, 2003; Smith & Wonnacott, 2010), but also describes the regularity of
linguistic items, such as word orders, lexical items, and morphosyntactic markers.
The latter extension could serve as a common metric for regularization in exper-
iments such as Reali & Griffiths, 2009; Hudson Kam & Newport, 2009; Smith &
Wonnacott, 2010; Wonnacott & Newport, 2005; Vouloumanos, 2008.3
3Smith and Wonnacott (2010) are cited here too because this measure would apply to their




Entropy is a measure of the unpredictability of a random variable. Let’s walk
through the calculation of entropy with our example of marbles in bags. If a
bag contains many marbles, of which half are blue and half are orange, and one
marble is randomly drawn from this bag, anyone who tries to guess what color
that marble is will do no better than chance. Here, the unpredictability of the
marble color is at its maximum. This unpredictability can be quantified by the




p(x) log2 p(x) (3.1)
where X is the set of marble colors (x1 = blue and x2 = orange). In the case
of the 50/50 bag, the probability of x1 = x2 = 0.5 and the entropy of X =
−(0.5 · log2(0.5)) + (0.5 · log2(0.5)) = 1 bit. This means that 1 bit of information
is required to be able to say, with certainty, what the color of the marble is.
More intuitively, one bit of information is equivalent to the answer of one binary
question. The binary question in this case would be is the marble blue or orange? 5
If we change the relative proportion of marbles in the bag, then the amount of
information we need to predict the color of the draw changes. In a bag of 70%
blues and 30% oranges, we can be a little more sure about what color the draw
will be: probably blue. Here, x1 = 0.7, x2 = 0.3, and H(X) = 0.88 bits. This
means we only need to ask 0.88 of a binary question to be sure that the color was
blue or orange. And if the bag contains all blue marbles and no orange marbles,
we are certain the draw will be blue. Here, x1 = 1, x2 = 0, H(X) = 0 bits, and
we don’t have to ask any questions.
Entropy can also be calculated for non-binary variables. Suppose there are
three marble colors in the bag (x1 = blue, x2 = orange, and x3 = yellow). If
the proportion of these colors in the bag are x1 = 0.5, x2 = 0.25, and x3 = 0.25,
then H(X) = 1.5 bits. This means we have to ask an average of 1.5 (optimally
ordered) binary questions before we’re certain what the color is. So first, we
should ask is it blue or not? Half of the time (when the marble is blue) we will
be certain of the color. But half of the time we won’t and we’ll have to ask a
4All references to entropy in this thesis will be to Shannon entropy. Other notions of entropy
exist in the field of physics and I want to clarify that I will not be referring to these.
5If entropy is computed using a log with a base that equals the number of values the variable
can take (i.e. the number of variants), then entropy is always bounded by 0 and 1. The entropy
of an even distribution of blue, orange, and yellow marbles computed with log3 would be 1 trit,
equivalent to asking one ternary question: is it blue, orange, or yellow?
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further question: is it orange or not? Since we always have to ask the first binary
question, that takes one bit. And since half of the time we have to ask the second
binary question, that takes 0.5 bits (i.e. one binary question half of the time is 1
bit · 1
2
= 0.5 bits). The total here is 1 + 0.5 = 1.5 bits. If the questions were asked
in a non-optimal order, we’d arrive at a higher number of average questions until
we were certain of the color. For example, if we first ask is it yellow or not?, then
1
4
of the time we are certain, but 3
4
of the time we have to ask another question:
is it blue or not? With this ordering, we will have to ask an average of 1 · 1 +
1 · 3
4
= 1.75 binary questions. Thus, entropy is the average number of optimally
ordered questions that it takes to determine the outcome of an random process
with absolute certainty.6
So far, we have been calculating the entropy of the generating process (on the
basis of the proportions of marbles in the bag), but entropy can also be calculated
directly on data sets. Here, the data would be sets of draws from the bag and
entropy would tell us about the structure in the observed behavior of this random
marble generating process. For example, a set of 40 marble draws in which 20 are
blue and 20 are orange (i.e. x1 = 0.5, x2 = 0.5) has an entropy of 1 bit. Likewise,
entropy can be calculated on data sets where random variables are linguistic
variants. The entropy of Hudson Kam and Newport (2009)’s distribution over
6 determiners where x1 = 0.3, x2 = 0.3, x3 = 0.1, x4 = 0.1, x5 = 0.1, and
x6 = 0.1 is 2.37 bits. And the entropy of Vouloumanos (2008)’s distribution over
4 homonyms where x1 = 0.6, x2 = 0.2, x3 = 0.1, and x4 = 0.1 is 1.57 bits.
We know that in language, variation tends to be conditioned on other vari-
ables, such as determiners on noun classes, signals on meanings, and syntactic
structures on social register. Entropy is easily extended to account for this kind
of conditioned structure as well.
3.1.2 Conditional entropy
The equation for conditional entropy is as follows (Shannon, 1948):






p(x|y) log2 p(x|y) (3.2)
This tells us about the entropy of a set of variants (X), weighted by the set of
contexts (Y ) in which they occur. Let’s take an example where X is a set of words
and Y is a set of meanings. In this case, conditional entropy tells us about how
6Thanks to Jim Crutchfield and Ryan James for explaining entropy to me via this question-
based interpretation.
72
much information meanings carry about words in a particular linguistic system:
if we know what someone’s intended meaning is, the conditional entropy in bits
tells us how many binary questions we need to ask to be certain what word will be
said. Likewise, if we show a participant an object in an artificial language learning
experiment, conditional entropy tells us how predictable the participant’s usage
of the language is.
Mappings of words to meanings can be deterministic as in Figure 3.6a, where
meanings carry perfect information about words, and the conditional entropy is
at its minimum at 0 bits (See Box 3.1 for a walkthrough of this calculation).
Conversely, conditional entropy is at its maximum when meanings carry no infor-
mation about words: this is the case for a fully-connected mapping, such that all
words map to all meanings with equal probability. Here, maximum conditional
entropy is not bounded by 1, but depends on the total number of words in the
system. Mappings with intermediate values of conditional entropy are those that
contain some synonyms (where one meaning can be named by two words) and/or
homonyms (where one word can refer to two different meanings). Figure 3.6b
gives a rather unwieldily mapping where there are two homonyms, kal and buv,
and two pairs of synonyms: (kal, mig) and (kal, buv). If each meaning occurs
with the probabilities 0.3, 0.5, 0.2 (from left to right) and the synonyms in each
pair occur with probabilities 0.3 and 0.7, the conditional entropy of this mapping
is 0.71 bits (See Box 3.1 for a walkthrough of this calculation). If instead, the
synonyms occur with a 50/50 probability, this mapping is less predictable, with
conditional entropy at 0.8 bits. Figure 3.6c shows a mapping that only has two
pairs of synonyms and one deterministic mapping. The conditional entropy of
this mapping is identical to that of Figure 3.6b. This is to illustrate the direction-
ality of the conditional entropy calculation: both Figure 3.6b and c are identical
mappings as far the conditioning of words on meanings is concerned.
However, if we flip things around and calculate the entropy of meanings con-
ditioned on words, where X would be the set of meanings and Y would be the
set of words, then homonyms become the relevant source of variation. It is im-
portant to note here that H(X|Y ) 6= H(Y |X). The entropy of words conditioned
on meanings is not necessarily equal to the entropy of meanings conditioned on
words, for the same mapping. However, H(X) − H(X|Y ) = H(Y ) − H(Y |X)
(Cover and Thomas, 1991, p.17). This means that conditional entropy quanti-
fies the structure of a system in relation to one of the variables, while taking
the entropy of that variable into account. When the entropy of the conditioning
variable is at its maximum (as would be the case where all meanings (Y ) occur
with equal probabilities), then H(Y ) = 0 and the conditional entropy of the sys-
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buv migkal buv migkal dap vitbuv migkal
a) b) c)
Figure 3.6: Example word-meaning mappings (referred to in Example 3.1).
Example 3.1. Conditional entropy calculation
The amount of structure in a set of mappings between words and meanings
can be quantified by the conditional entropy of X (the set of words) given Y
(the set of meanings) using equation 3.2.
Let’s calculate the conditional entropy of the example mappings in Figure 3.6.
Let y1, y2, and y3 be the three objects (i.e. meanings) enumerated left to right.
Let xa, ...xn be the n words in each mapping, enumerated left to right.
Let the meanings occur 30%, 50%, 20% of the time, respectively, so that
y1 = 0.3, y2 = 0.5, y3 = 0.2.
a) This mapping is deterministic.
{xkal, xbuv, xmig}|y1 = {1, 0, 0}
{xkal, xbuv, xmig}|y2 = {0, 1, 0}
{xkal, xbuv, xmig}|y3 = {0, 0, 1}
0.3 · [(1 · log2(1)) + (0 · log2(0)) + (0 · log2(0))] = 0
0.5 · [(0 · log2(0)) + (1 · log2(1)) + (0 · log2(0))] = 0
+ 0.2 · [(0 · log2(0)) + (0 · log2(0)) + (1 · log2(1))] = 0
0 bits
b) Let’s assume 30/70 weights on each pair of synonyms, such that
y0 is named with kal 30% of the time and mig 70% of the time.
{xkal, xbuv, xmig}|y1 = {0.3, 0, 0.7}
{xkal, xbuv, xmig}|y2 = {0.3, 0.7, 0}
{xkal, xbuv, xmig}|y3 = {0, 0, 1}
0.3 · [(0.3 · log2(0.3)) + (0 · log2(0)) + (0.7 · log2(0.7))] = −0.264
0.5 · [(0.3 · log2(0.3)) + (0.7 · log2(0.7)) + (0 · log2(0))] = −0.441
+ 0.2 · [(0 · log2(0)) + (0 · log2(0)) + (1 · log2(1))] = 0
0.71 bits
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tem is just the (unweighted) average of the entropy of words (X) per meaning.
Most regularization experiments control the context stimuli so that they appear
uniformly. For example, Reali and Griffiths (2009) control their object stimuli
so that each object appears 10 times per participant, but the linguistic variants
(the names for those objects) vary in frequency. In these cases, referring to the
conditional entropy of the mapping is equivalent to referring to the (unweighted)
average of entropy of each synonym set.
Now that I have established conditional entropy as a measure of a mapping’s
regularity, I will turn to a measure of regularization.
3.1.3 Regularization is a drop in conditional entropy
At the beginning of this chapter, regularization was described as two processes:
1) the elimination of free variation by eliminating competing variants and 2) the
elimination of free variation by conditioning variants on different contexts.
Defining regularization in terms of conditional entropy accounts for both of
these processes on one scale. When a system loses variants, the conditional
entropy of that system goes down, and when a system gains more predictable
mappings, conditional entropy also goes down. For example, if the mapping in
Figure 3.6b were to lose the variant buv, then the conditional entropy would drop
by 0.44 bits. And if the mapping of (kal,mig) were to become more predictable,
by changing the weights from (0.3,0.7) to (0.2,0.8), then the conditional entropy
would drop by 0.05 bits. Thus, in terms of conditional entropy, moving from
(0.3,0.7) to (0.2,0.8) and increasing predictability, or from (0.3,0.7) to (0,1) and
eliminating a variant, is change of the same type: an increase in regularity. This
leads me to the following definition of regularization:
Regularization is a drop in entropy of variants (X) when condi-
tioned on certain contexts (Y ) over time.
This is a definition of regularization in terms of an outcome (human behavior),
not process (the mechanisms that create regularization behavior). I have taken
this approach because it is a useful framing for experimentalists, who largely
use participant behavior to infer the cognitive processes behind regularization.
Over the course of this thesis, we will see that many different processes can
elicit regularization behavior, such as cognitive load during frequency learning
(Chapter 3), domain-specific biases for linguistic stimuli (Chapter 3), strategies
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for solving a coordination game (Chapter 4), and even cultural drift (Chapter
5). Having a universal metric for quantifying regularization behavior has several
benefits. First, it allows experimentalists to discuss the different cognitive pro-
cesses that give rise to regularization behavior in the same, comparable terms.
Second, when several regularization processes are at play contemporaneously, it
allows the relative contribution of each process to be compared. Third, it should
make model selection over alternative hypotheses more comprehensive because all
processes can be formulated in terms of their effect on conditional entropy over
time. Fourth, it allows regularization at different levels of language to be com-
pared. The existing literature discusses regularization as if it were one monolithic
process, with experimental examples at phonological, morphological, lexical, and
syntactic levels. It is quite possible that different processes give rise to regulariza-
tion at these different levels. Although we should not conflate these processes, we
should maintain a universal definition of regularization behavior so that differ-
ences in behavior, due to these different processes, are more readily visible. And
last, in relation to all of the previous points, a universal measure of regularization
allows different experiments to be compared. As mentioned earlier, Hudson Kam
and Newport (2009) and Vouloumanos (2008) both report that the entropy of
training distributions modulate participant regularization behavior, and Hudson
Kam and Newport (2009) explicitly shows that higher-entropy distributions are
regularized more. What are the specific drops in entropy here? Are they the same
across experiments, or do they differ in systematic ways? If there’s a difference,
is this due to different processes underlying the regularization of determiners and
homonyms? Or is this difference just because higher-entropy distributions can
be regularized more and the two experiments used training sets that systemati-
cally differed in entropy? Being able to answer questions such as these will likely
sharpen the focus of the next generation of experimental design in regularization
research.
Most language learning experiments control their stimuli such that all of the
meanings occur the same number of times. This constitutes a uniform distribution
over contexts (Y ) where no context is more likely than any other, so H(Y ) = 0.
When this is the case, the conditional entropy, H(X|Y ), is equivalent to an
unweighted average of H(X) per y (refer back to Equation 3.2). All of the
experiments in this thesis present participants with uniform distributions over
contexts. In some of my analyses of participants behavior, I will refer to the
conditional entropy score as the drop in the average entropy of all synonym sets
over time. Please keep in mind that these two framings are identical.
Before leaving this section, I must point out one thing that seems to be over-
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looked in the regularization literature. On the basis of this regularization defini-
tion, it seems intuitive that unbiased probability matching behavior should entail
no drop in conditional entropy, however the specific amount of error on unbiased
probability matching leads to a small amount of regularization. This is (partially)
why drifting populations eventually end up losing variation over time. Only per-
fect probability matching, where there is no error, leads to no drop in entropy over
time. This may seem counter-intuitive, but referring back to the binomial drift
distributions in Figure 1.2, it is clear that error can lead to transitions between
input and output ratios that are regular (ex: 5:5 → 7:3), but also to transitions
that increase variability (ex: 7:3 → 5:5). Depending on the initial distribution
of input ratios, different numbers of regularity-increasing or variability-increasing
transitions will be produced by drift. If we start with a uniform distribution
over input ratios (as was the case in Experiment 1, where 32 participants were
trained on each input ratio: 5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:2, 9:1, and 10:0), then applying one
generation of N = 10 binomial drift yields an average change in entropy of -0.05
bits. This means that the resulting distribution of output ratios, depicted in in
Figure 1.2 differs from their respective input ratio by -0.05 bits on average. This
was calculated by subtracting the entropy of each output ratio from the entropy
of its input ratio, then weighting the resulting values by their probability under
one generation of drift (i.e. the probabilities shown in Figure 1.2), and averaging
them. All unbiased sampling processes that contain some amount of error should
yield a small amount of regularization behavior and it’s the amount of variance
in this sampling error that determines how much regularization behavior occurs.
So the above example proves that an unbiased sampling process, which by
definition is not a regularization process, can produce regularization behavior.
This issue suggests that experimentalists must pay special attention to how they
determine whether some observed regularization behavior was the result of a
regularization process or not. A good way to go about making this distinction
would be 1) to state that regularization behavior is supported empirically when
the change in entropy is significantly lower than zero and 2) to state that a regu-
larizing process (such as an inductive bias for variation elimination) is supported
empirically when the change in entropy is significantly lower than the change in
entropy that unbiased probability matching would yield for that task.
This makes life difficult for experimentalists who study regularization, because
it means that we must show a significant difference from a cognitive drift process
in order to conclude the existence of regularization biases. A baseline can be
calculated for any set of stimuli via random sampling methods like Monte-Carlo
Markov Chain methods (e.g. Smith and Wonnacott, 2010), however this will de-
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fine a baseline with binomial/multinomial variance. In the previous chapter, I
showed that the cognitive basis of drift is not necessarily binomial. However,
if the variance associated with human probability matching behavior is always
lower than that of its binomial/multinomial counterpart, then change in entropy
of these processes will always be lower than that of binomial/multinomial drift,
and therefore, the standard random sampling methods will represent a conser-
vative, worse-case scenario null hypothesis. For example, the restricted-variance
probability matching behavior in Experiment 1 has a change in entropy of 0.027
bits, which is closer to zero than binomial drift (although it happens to have pro-
duced a little more variability rather than regularity, this was not significantly
different from zero). This is good news. However, very little is known about the
variance associated with human probability matching behavior and it can be im-
possible to determine this baseline for a particular experiment that consistently
elicits regularization behavior, because there may be nothing one can do to get
participants to probability match in a similar enough experiment. This point will
be made concrete when I operationalize this baseline in Experiment 2.
3.2 Experiment 2:
regularization biases in frequency learning
At the beginning of this chapter, I reviewed a body of research that shows regular-
ization to be a complex phenomenon with many potential sources, both domain-
specific and domain-general. Experiment 2 is designed to tease apart the domain-
general and domain-specific drivers of regularization at the lexical level in adult
learners, and evaluate the relative contribution of each of these sources to our
overall regularization bias for language.
This experiment builds upon Experiment 1 by showing how two manipula-
tions can take learners away from probability matching and elicit regularization
behavior. The first manipulation recasts the one-item frequency learning task in
Experiment 1 as a multiple-item task in which participants learn about marble
draws from several different containers concurrently. This provides a picture of
regularization due to the general cognitive mechanisms associated with tracking
and producing multiple frequencies concurrently and relates to the work of Gard-
ner (1957), Newport (1990), Saffran (2003), McElreath et al. (2008), Hudson
Kam and Chang (2009), and Perfors (2012).
The second manipulation recasts Experiment 1 in a linguistic domain, where
participants learn about one object being named with two synonyms. This al-
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lows an assessment of how linguistic stimuli trigger domain-specific regularization
biases during frequency learning, relating to the proposals of language-specific
regularization biases discussed by Bickerton (1984), DeGraaff (1999), Lumsden
(1999), and Becker and Veenstra (2003).















Figure 3.7: Names of the four conditions in Experiment 2.
Of these four conditions, marbles1 is a replication of Experiment 1, with a few
minor adjustments to the procedure that allow for better comparability to the
three other conditions. The condition words6 combines the two manipulations to
study the full regularizing effect of the concurrent frequency learning of multiple
linguistic items. This condition doubles as a replication of the artificial word
learning experiment in Reali and Griffiths (2009).
We will see that both of these manipulations modulate regularization behav-
ior. In brief, the results of this experiment show that both linguistic domain and
multiple frequency learning elicit regularization behavior, whereas non-linguistic,
single frequency learning elicits probability matching behavior. Thus, lexical
regularization is rooted in domain-general and domain-specific sources. Further-
more, we will see that these sources independently contribute to participants’ full




573 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing
platform and completed our experiment online. Participant location was re-
stricted to the United States of America and verified by a post-hoc check of
participant IP address location. 61 participants were excluded on the basis of
the following criteria: failing an Ishihara color vision test7 (15), self-reporting the
use of a pen or pencil during the task8 (10), not reporting their sex or age (6),
self-reporting an age below 18 (1), or having previously participated in this or any
of my experiments, as determined by their user ID with MTurk (26). More par-
ticipants were recruited than necessary with the expectation that some would be
excluded by these criteria. Once the predetermined number of participants per
condition was met, the last participants were excluded, totaling 3 participants
across all conditions. All excluded participants received the full monetary re-
ward for the task, which was 0.10 USD in the one-item conditions (marbles1 and
words1 ) and 0.60 USD in the multiple-item conditions (marbles6 and words6 ).
The average time taken to complete the one-item conditions was 3 minutes and
46 seconds, with a standard deviation of 1 minutes and 27 seconds. The aver-
age time taken to complete the multiple-item conditions was 11 minutes and 21
seconds, with a standard deviation of 2 minutes and 6 seconds. Of the final 512
participants, 52% are female and the mean age is 33.4 (min = 18, max = 72)
with a standard deviation of 11.2 years. The breakdown of participants in each
of the four conditions (further described in section 3.2.1) is as follows:
Conditions: all marbles1 words1 marbles6 words6
Participant count 512 192 192 64 64
Age: mean 33.4 32.8 32.2 35 33.6
minimum 18 18 18 18 18
maximim 72 72 68 65 64
standard deviation 11.2 10.6 10.9 12 11.2
Sex (% female) 52% 47% 63% 47% 50%
7Only participants in the non-linguistic conditions were given the color vision test. I used
two plates from the Ishihara color vision test: plate 4 which tests for red-green color deficiency,
and plate 23 which tests for protanopia and deuteranopia (see Appendix A.2.1). Participants
were excluded if they gave an incorrect answer for one or both of these plates.
8In an exit questionnaire.
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Materials
The experiment was coded up as a Java applet that ran in the participant’s web
browser in a 600x800-pixel field. Photographs of 6 different containers (a bucket,
bowl, jar, basket, box, and pouch) and graphically generated images of marbles
in 12 different colors (blue, orange, red, teal, pink, olive, lime, purple, black,
yellow, grey, and brown) served as non-linguistic stimuli (Figure 3.8). Modified
photographs of 6 different novel objects (resembling mechanical gadgets) and 12
different nonsense words (buv, kal, dap, mig, pon, fud, vit, lem, seb, nuk, gos,
tef) served as linguistic stimuli (Figure 3.9).
Figure 3.8: Stimuli used in the non-linguistic conditions.
Figure 3.9: Stimuli used in the linguistic conditions.
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Marbles and words were organized into fixed pairs, so that certain features
could be controlled for to maximize distinctiveness between the stimuli in the
pair. Marble colors on the same row in Figure 3.8 constitute a pair (for example,
the blue and orange marbles are paired). Likewise, words on the same row in
Figure 3.9 constitute a pair (for example, buv and kal are paired).
Marble colors were chosen to differ in hue and brightness. Within-pair hue
differences were greater than 120◦ (meaning that they were chosen from approx-
imately opposite sides of the color wheel) and within-pair brightness differences
were greater than 20%. These criteria rule out, for instance, pairings such as red
and orange, red and pink, or black and grey. The RGB values for the colors used
are as follows:
blue orange red teal pink olive lime purple black yellow grey brown
R 0 255 204 0 255 0 67 153 0 255 153 102
G 51 128 0 204 153 65 215 0 0 204 153 51
B 204 0 0 255 153 1 9 153 0 0 153 0
Words were also paired to be contrastive. Words within a pair differed in place
of articulation and the letters they contained. Some examples of word pairings
ruled out by these criteria would be buv and pon (because b and p share the
same, bilabial, place of articulation) or seb and tef (because they share a letter,
e). These stimuli are closely based on the word stimuli used in Reali and Griffiths
(2009), but modified so that no words would be orthographically English, or have
likely pronunciations in English. Words were presented visually and were not
accompanied by auditory stimuli.
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Conditions and Design
The relative contributions of domain and concurrency to linguistic regularization
were investigated in a two by two experimental design, consisting of four condi-
tions:
1) Non-linguistic single frequency learning (marbles1)
Participants observed two marble colors being drawn from one container at a par-
ticular ratio (for example, 5 blue marbles and 5 orange marbles drawn in random
order). Participants were then asked to demonstrate what another several draws
from the same container are likely to look like. They were not asked to predict
specific future draws and thus no feedback was given. Participants observed 10
marble draws and produced 10 marble draws. Each participant observed one of
six possible ratios: 0:10, 1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6, 5:5. (To be clear, these ratios were not
used to probabilistically generate the draws participants observed; these are the
ratios of the actual marbles participants observed.) Each ratio was observed by
32 participants, totaling 192 participants for this non-linguistic single frequency
learning condition. Container stimuli were randomized across participants: each
participant only saw one container of the six in Figure 3.8. Equal numbers of
participants saw each container. Marble pairs were also randomized across par-
ticipants: each participant only saw one of the six marble pairs in Figure 3.8.
Equal numbers of participants saw each marble pair. The full details about the
observation and production regimes can be found in the next section, Procedure.9
2) Non-linguistic multiple frequency learning (marbles6)
This condition is similar to the marbles1 condition, with the difference that par-
ticipants observed 10 draws each from 6 different containers. Next, participants
were asked to demonstrate what another several draws from the same six con-
tainers are likely to look like. Participants observed 60 draws and produced 60
draws. Containers, marble pairs, and observation ratios were randomly assigned
to one another, without replacement. This means that each participant saw all
six of the containers, all six of the marble pairs, and all six of the ratios, in some
9This condition is a replication of Experiment 1 with some modifications so that it would
be comparable to the designs of the 3 other conditions in Experiment 2. The modifications
are: 1) The participant sees one of six containers (not just the bag) and one of six color pairs
(not just blue and orange). 2) Each production trial includes an OK button that appears after
the participant has clicked on one of the marbles/words. Participants can change their choice
before pressing OK. The OK button serves to recenter the mouse between production trials.
There was no recenter feature in Experiment 1. 3) The test-side of the majority marble is
random between trials per participant (as opposed to held constant).
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4:65:59:1 0:10 2:8 7:3
Figure 3.10: An example stimuli set for one participant in the non-linguistic
multiple frequency learning condition. This participant would observe a 1:9 ratio
of the pink and olive marbles drawn from the bucket, a 5:5 ratio of the blue
and orange marbles drawn from the bowl, and so on. The mapping between
containers, marble pairs, and ratios was randomized across participants.
combination. An example of one such assignment can be seen in Figure 3.10.
These assignments were re-randomized per participant, so that no two partici-
pants saw the same containers paired with the same marbles at the same ratios.
Assignments were pre-generated and screened to make sure that there was no cor-
relation between particular containers, marble pairs, or ratios across participants.
All Pearson correlation coefficients were between 0.083 and -0.064. There were
64 participants in this condition, yielding data for 384 (6x64) observed ratios.
3) Linguistic single frequency learning (words1)
This condition is similar to the marbles1 condition, differing only by the use of
linguistic stimuli (objects and words) instead of the non-linguistic stimuli (con-
tainers and marbles). Participants observed one object being named with two
words at a particular ratio (for example, buv 5 times and kal 5 times, in random
order). Participants were then asked to name the object like they had observed it
being named. They were not asked to predict specific future naming events and
thus no feedback was given. Participants observed 10 namings and produced 10
namings. Each participant observed one of six possible ratios: 0:10, 1:9, 2:8, 3:7,
4:6, 5:5. Each ratio was observed by 32 participants, totaling 192 participants
for this linguistic single frequency learning condition. Object stimuli were ran-
domized across participants: each participant only saw one object of the six in
Figure 3.9. Equal numbers of participants saw each object. Word pairs were also
randomized across participants: each participant only saw one of the six word
pairs in Figure 3.9. Equal numbers of participants saw each word pair.
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4) Linguistic multiple frequency learning (words6)
This condition is similar to the marbles6 condition, differing only by the use of
linguistic stimuli. This condition constitutes a replication of the word learning
experiment in Reali and Griffiths (2009), but with different object stimuli, modi-
fied word stimuli, and participants who completed the experiment online, rather
than in the laboratory. Participants observed 60 namings and then produced
60 namings. Object, word pair, and ratio assignments were randomized as in
marbles6. These assignments were also pre-generated and checked to make sure
that there was no correlation between particular objects, word pairs, or ratios
across participants. All Pearson correlation coefficients were between 0.082 and
-0.057. There were a total of 64 participants in this condition, yielding data for
384 (6x64) observed ratios.
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Procedure
The experiment consisted of an observation phase and a production phase (Fig-
ure 3.11). In each observation trial, a container/object was displayed on its own
for 1 second and then a marble/word was displayed above it for 2 seconds, with
no break between trials. There were 10 observation trials per container/object.
In each production trial, a container/object was displayed and the two marbles/-
words that appeared with it during observation were displayed below. This part
had no time constraint. When participants clicked on one of the marbles/words,
an OK button appeared between the two choices. Participants could change their
choice, but when they clicked on the OK button, their current selection was reg-
istered as their answer and this choice was displayed above the container/object
for 2 seconds. This OK button also served to center the cursor between trials.
Production trials repeated until 10 responses were collected per container or ob-
ject. Participants were not told how many observation or production trials there
would be. In the single frequency learning condition, participants received a to-
tal of 10 observation and 10 production trials. In the multiple frequency learning
condition, where participants observed 10 draws each from 6 containers, there
were a total of 60 observation and 60 production trials. Here, the order in which
the different containers appeared was randomized across observation and produc-
tion trials. For example, in observation trial 1 the participant sees one draw from
the box, in trial 2 they see a draw from the jar, in trial 3 they see one from the
basket, in trial 4 they see one from the box again, and so on. Likewise in the
production trial, the participant will be prompted to demonstrate a draw from
the pouch, then the basket, then the box, and so on. The production-phase lo-
cations of the two marbles/words were randomized per trial. For example, if the
two test choices were blue and orange marbles, then on some trials blue would be
on the left and on other trials, it would be on the right. The marble/word in the
pair that would be the more frequent item was randomly chosen per participant.
For example, in a 2:8 ratio, some participants would see the blue marble 8 times,
whereas others would see the orange marble 8 times.
After the production phase, participants were asked to estimate the generating
ratio that underlies each observation ratio they saw. Participants chose their
response with a discrete slider over 11 options of relative percentages. These
11 options ranged from {100:0, 90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 60:40, 50:50, 40:60, 30:70,
20:80, 10:90, 0:100}. See Appendix A.2 for the instructions and screen shots of
these sliders per condition: marbles1 (Figure A.2), words1 (Figure A.3), marbles6
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Figure 3.11: Schemas of the observation and production phases for each of the
four main experimental conditions.
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Next, in the one-item conditions only, participants were asked to report 1)
the number of times they think they saw each marble/word in the observation
phase and 2) the number of times they think they produced each marble/word
in the production phase. Participants chose their response with a discrete slider
over 11 options of relative counts. These 11 options ranged from {10:0, 9:1, 8:2,
7:3, 6:4, 5:5, 4:6, 3:7, 2:8, 1:9, 0:10}. See Appendix A.2 for the instructions and
screen shots of these sliders: marbles1 A.6 and words1 A.7.
Last, participants were given seven brief exit questions. Complete instructions
for all parts of this procedure and exit questions per condition can be found in
Appendix A.2.
3.2.2 Results
Summary of the ratios produced
In this section, I will present the raw ratios that participants produced. Then,
in the following sections, we will convert these data into the information theo-
retic measure of regularization (see section 3.1) and analyze the effects of the
experimental manipulations on participant regularization behavior.
Figure 3.12 shows the results of Experiment 2. A visual inspection of all
the results for marbles1 suggests that participants probability matched in this
condition, because the mode of each response distribution is located on the ob-
servation ratio. This falls under the behavioral definition of probability matching
(see section 2.1), where participants reproduce the variability they observe, with
some error. This condition seems to give a slightly noisier picture of probabil-
ity matching than in Experiment 1, which it was supposed to replicate. This
is most likely due to the within-participant randomization of test-side location
across production trials. This means that on any given production trial, variant x
appeared on the left- or right-hand side of the screen randomly. In Experiment 1,
variant x always appeared on the same side across all production trials (and this
was counterbalanced across participants). However, this test-side randomization
does not seem to have made things too difficult for participants because most
of them were still able to probability match, and consistently select variant x in
response to the 10:0 observation ratio in all four conditions.
In the three remaining experimental conditions, participants do not appear
to be probability matching. Instead, they tend to produce many fully-regular
responses in the ratios 10:0 or 0:10. For example, in the marbles6 condition for
observation ratio 8:2, we see less probability matching behavior (only 17% of




















































Figure 3.12: Results of the four main conditions in Experiment 2. Each row
shows the results of one experimental condition (marbles1, marbles6, words1,
words6). Each column corresponds to one of the six observation ratios, ranging
from 5:5 (on the left) to 10:0 (on the right). Each pane contains the distribution
of ratios that participants produced in response to one observation ratio. These
production ratios are displayed on the x-axis as the number of times a participant
produced variant x from the observation ratio x:y. Variant x corresponds to
whatever marble/word was in the majority during the observation phase. (In the
5:5 observation ratio there is no majority variant, so a random marble/color was
coded as variant x.) All observation ratios are indicated by a dashed line. For
example, the top left panel gives the results for the 32 participants in condition
marbles1 who observed a 5:5 ratio of marbles. Here, we see that 50% of these
participants also produced a 5:5 ratio, 22% produced a 4:6 ratio, 16% produced
a 6:4 ratio, and no participants produced only one marble color (i.e. a 10:0 or
0:10 ratio).
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participants produced the 10:0 ratio and 5% produced the 0:10 ratio). Across
all observation ratios in marbles6, words1, and words6, some degree of full reg-
ularization is obtained. The words1 condition seems to elicit equal amounts of
probability matching and regularization, given the bimodal distributions with
peaks on the observation ratios and 10:0 ratios, whereas marbles6 and words6
elicit more regularization behavior, with words6 eliciting the most.
Participants tend to regularize by over-producing the majority variant. All
bars on the right-most side of the panels show the participants who fully-regularized
by only producing the majority variant, whereas all left-most bars show the par-
ticipants who did the opposite and regularized by over-producing the minority
variant. For all 5:5 observation ratios there is no minority or majority variant,
but a large amount of full regularization is still obtained. This means that reg-
ularization is not completely dependent on the presence of a majority variant,
but is elicited by some more general properties of the domain and concurrency
manipulations in this experiment.
Regularization per condition
Now that that I have described the regularization profiles for this experiment, the
first question is: do these experimental conditions elicit a significant amount of
regularization? To address this question, the data in Figure 3.12 were converted
into the regularization measure set forth in Section 3.1, in which regularization is
defined as a drop in entropy within a pair of observation and production ratios.
Change in entropy was calculated for each pair of observation and production
ratios by subtracting the entropy of the observation ratio from the entropy of the
production ratio. Figure 3.13 plots the average change in entropy per experimen-
tal condition. When the average change in entropy is significantly below zero,
this is evidence that participants were regularizing their productions. When av-
erage change is not significantly different from zero, we can assume participants
were probability matching (but refer back to Section 3.1.3 for a discussion of this
point).
Significant differences from zero were assessed by using R (R Core Team,
2013) and lme4 (Bates et al., 2013) to perform a linear mixed effects regression
analysis. A model was constructed with entropy drop as the dependent variable
and condition as the independent variable (i.e. fixed effect). Participant was
entered as a random effect because in conditions marbles6 and words6, more than
one data point was gathered per participant. This violates the independence
assumption of many simpler statistics, such as the t-test, and therefore these
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Figure 3.13: Average change in entropy within observation and production ra-
tio pairs, per condition. Stars indicate significant difference from zero (all to
p < .001). Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals computed with the
bootstrap percentile method (Efron, 1979). A significant drop in entropy means
that participants regularized in that condition. Non-significant differences from
zero mean that participants probability matched. The bounds on entropy change
for this experimental setup range from -4.04 to 1.96.
marbles1 marbles6 t(1152) = −3.833, p < .001
words1 t(1152) = −4.362, p < .001
words6 t(1152) = −8.113, p < .001
marbles6 words1 t(1152) = −0.340, p = 0.73
words6 t(1152) = −4.110, p < .001
words1 words6 t(1152) = −3.940, p < .001
Table 3.1: Significance of pairwise comparisons between the four conditions in
Experiment 2.
could not be used. No obvious deviations from normality or homoscedasticity
were apparent from a visual inspection of residual plots, meaning that these data
do not violate the basic assumptions of a linear mixed effects regression analysis.
The model was releveled and run four times to obtain the intercept value
for each condition. Here, the intercept corresponds exactly to the mean entropy
change of the condition and the regression analysis provides a t-statistic to evalu-
ate whether or not this mean is significantly different from zero. Three of the four
experimental conditions elicited a significant amount of regularization behavior:
marbles6, t(1152) = −5.526, p < .001; words1, t(1152) = −6.519, p < .001; and
words6, t(1152) = −11.338, p < .001.10 In marbles1, change in entropy was not
significantly different from zero, t(1152) = −0.350, p = 0.73, which confirms that
10all p-values presented in this chapter are for 2-tailed tests.
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participants in this condition were probability matching.
Seeing that three of the four condition elicit regularization, the next logical
question is: are there significant differences in the amount of regularization be-
tween conditions? The same regression model was used to address this question,
because the releveled model results also provide t-scores for evaluating significant
differences between conditions. Table 3.1 reports all pairwise comparisons be-
tween conditions. All comparisons, except for that between marbles6 and words1,
are significantly different. This suggests that both manipulations, domain and
concurrency, elicit similar amounts of regularization behavior.11 The significant
difference between the probability matching condition marbles1 and the three
regularizing conditions marbles6, words1, and words6 is also an important find-
ing. As discussed in Chapter 2, probability matching with error can produce
instances of regularization behavior and thus, is the appropriate null hypothesis
to reject before claiming that a regularizing process is at play. Although these
three conditions were significantly different from zero, the fact they they elicit
significantly more regularization behavior than in a similar task where partic-
ipants probability match provides stronger support that participants are truly
regularizing in these conditions (refer back to Section 3.1.3 for a discussion of
this point).
In the following section, these differences per condition will be addressed in
a way that better illuminates the cognitive drivers of regularization, by look-
ing at the effects and interactions between the two main manipulations in this
experiment: domain and concurrency.
Effect of the experimental manipulations
In this section, I address the experimental manipulations that were hypothesized
to modulate regularization behavior, domain and concurrency, and investigate
how they are affected by the different observation ratios. To investigate the re-
lationship between these manipulations and regularization behavior, I performed
another linear mixed effects regression analysis. Entropy change was entered as
the dependent variable. Domain, concurrency, and the entropy of the observation
ratio were entered as the fixed effects, all with interaction terms. Participant was
entered as a random effect as random intercepts. No obvious deviations from
normality or homoscedasticity were apparent from a visual inspection of residual
plots. Table 3.2 summarizes this full model.
11At least for this task where participants learn about 6 items concurrently. It is quite possible
that learning about 3 or 12 items in the marbles domain will elicit significantly different amounts
of regularization compared to words1.
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model dependent variable fixed effects random effects




Table 3.2: The full model used in the linear mixed effect regression analysis of
regularization behavior in Experiment 2.
model dom, con con, obs dom, obs dom, con, obs
full model interact interact interact interact
A interact interact interact add
B add interact interact add
C interact add interact add
D interact interact add add
E interact add add add
F add interact add add
G add add interact add
H add add add add
Table 3.3: The nine logically possible relationships between the three fixed effects:
domain (dom), concurrency (con), and observation ratio entropy (obs).
P-values were obtained by likelihood ratio tests, performed by an ANOVA, on
the full model with the effect in question against a reduced model that omits the
effect in question. If the full model is significantly better at describing the data
than the reduced model, that means the effect in question is a significant predictor
of entropy change. The χ2 test statistic and p-value of the full to reduced model
comparison is reported for the effect in question. (e.g. Winter, 2013).
There is a significant effect of domain χ2(4) = 46.048, p < .001, concurrency
χ2(4) = 105.07, p < .001, and observation ratio χ2(4) = 520.23, p < .001 on
entropy change. The directionality and meaning of these effects will be discussed
after the significance of their interactions is determined.
Table 3.3 shows the nine possible relationships between variables in terms
of the interactive and additive effects they can have on one another. There
are several ways to assess the existence of interactions among these variables.
First, a model selection procedure can be used to determine the best-fit model.
Second, significance of each variable can be determined by removing, in turn,
each interaction from the full model, as in models A, B, C, and D. It should be
noted here that removing any one interaction necessarily removes the three-way
interaction. (So A should be compared to the full model, then B, C, and D
should be compared to A.) Third, significance of each variable can be determined
by adding each interaction to the fully reduced model H, as in models E, F, and
G. I will present each of these three assessment strategies, first to check that they
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corroborate one another, and second, to use as much information as possible for
inferring the presence of absence of particular interactions in the data.
Model selection. An ANOVA was run on all nine models and returned three
models that were significantly better than all others. These are model B (χ2(1) =
74.9409, p < .001, loglikelihood = -278.71), D (χ2(0) = 70.2497, p < .001, loglike-
lihood = -281.06), and F (χ2(0) = 74.6893, p < .001, loglikelihood = -281.06).
All of these models include an interaction between concurrency and observation
ratio, but differential evidence in support of the interaction of domain with the
other two variables: B says domain does not interact with concurrency, D says
domain does not interact with observation ratio, and F says that domain does
not interact with either of these variables. Recent developments in the literature
on model selection techniques advocate for multi-model inference (e.g. Burnham
and Anderson, 2002; Mars et al., 2012; McElreath et al., 2005), which takes into
account the information provided by the best set of models when drawing con-
clusions about one’s data. The conventional alternative would be to only make
inferences based on the model with the maximum likelihood, which in this case
is model B (χ2(1) = 4.6918, p = 0.03, from an ANOVA on models B, D, and
F only). However, given that model B has a marginal p-value and only slight
improvement in log likelihood, I will base my conclusions on the three best mod-
els. Together, these models provide 1) strong support that there is no interaction
between domain and concurrency, 2) strong support that there is an interaction
between concurrency and observation ratio, and 3) weak support that there is an
interaction between domain and observation ratio.
Selective omission. First, model A was compared to the full model with an
ANOVA and no significant effect of a three-way interaction was found (χ2(1) =
0, p = 1). Then, a comparison of models B, C, and D to A, found no significant in-
teraction between domain and concurrency (χ2(3) = 0.0065, p = .99), a significant
interaction of concurrency and observation ratio (χ2(3) = 74.942, p < .001), and
no significant effect of domain and observation ratio (χ2(3) = 4.6918, p = 0.20).
These results corroborate the model selection results above, and strengthen the
case that domain does not interact with the other variables.
Selective inclusion. Models E, F, and G were compared to the fully reduced
model H with an ANOVA and found no significant interaction between domain
and concurrency (χ2(1) = 0.0059, p = 0.94), a significant interaction of concur-
rency and observation ratio (χ2(1) = 74.695, p < .001), and a significant interac-
tion of domain and observation ratio (χ2(1) = 4.4462, p = 0.03). These results
also corroborate the model selection results, but strengthen the case that domain
interacts with observation ratio.
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Figure 3.14: a) Average change in entropy per observation ratio, per experimental
condition. b) The regression lines for the data plotted to the left according to
the best-fit model B.
To understand the directional effects of domain, concurrency, and observation
ratio on regularization behavior, Figure 3.14a plots the entropy drop per observa-
tion ratio, broken down by the four experimental conditions. Figure 3.14b plots
the regression lines for the data in Figure 3.14a according to the best-fit model
B. I will explain the directional effects in terms of the regression lines, but Fig-
ure 3.14a is provided so that these trends can be crosschecked on the raw data.
The regression analysis output in R for model B is provided in Table 3.4, giving
the estimates, standard errors, and t values of each parameter in model B. The
estimates in this table dictate the intercepts and slopes of the regression lines
plotted in Figure 3.14b. The intercept where observation ratio entropy equals
0 for marbles1 is given by the intercept estimate, 0.08567. This corresponds to
the mean change in entropy for participants who observed the 10:0 ratio in mar-
bles1. The other intercepts where observation ratio entropy equals 0 are 0.08567
+ 0.16715 for marbles6, 0.08567 - 0.11373 for words1, and 0.08567 + 0.16715 -
0.11373 for words6. The slopes of the regression lines are dictated by the esti-
mates on observation ratio and the two interactions with observation ratio. The
slope of marbles1 is -0.14094, marbles6 is -0.14094 - 0.49568, words1 is -0.14094
- 0.09968, and words6 is -0.14094 - 0.49568 - 0.09968.
If there were no effect of observation ratio on entropy change, then all of the
regression lines would be horizontal. Here, perfect probability matching behav-
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parameter estimate standard error t value
1) intercept (marbles1 ) 0.08567 0.04321 1.983
2) concurrency (multiple) 0.16715 0.04740 3.527
3) domain (words) -0.11373 0.04149 -2.742
4) observation ratio entropy -0.14094 0.05494 -2.565
5) interaction between 2 & 4 -0.49568 0.05622 -8.816
6) interaction between 3 & 4 -0.09968 0.04596 -2.169
Table 3.4: Summary of fixed effects for the best-fit model B. The estimates
determine the intercepts and slopes for the regression lines plotted in Figure
3.14b.
ior would be a horizontal line because this would lead to no change in entropy
despite the observation ratio seen. Therefore, the slope of the line is a measure
of divergence from probability matching behavior. If the line is sloped and below
zero, then this indicates regularization. If the line is sloped and above zero, then
this indicates that participants are producing more variable ratios than the ones
they’ve observed. The significant effect of observation ratio is due to all of these
lines being significantly sloped. The result that more regularization occurs for the
observation ratios with higher entropy is largely due to the different ceilings on
entropy change per observation ratio. Because regularization behavior is neces-
sarily constrained by the level of variation in the input, this is an important topic
for all analyses of regularization behavior. In this experimental design, the same
uniform distribution of observation ratios is used in each experimental condition
and therefore data can be meaningfully compared because they are all subject to
the same baseline constraints on entropy change.
If there were no effect of domain, then the regression line for marbles1 would
be on top of words1, and the line for marbles6 would be on top of words6. How-
ever the words domain lines are lower than those of the marbles domain, meaning
that participants regularize more in the words domain than in the marbles do-
main. This is the significant effect of domain. Likewise, if there were no effect
of concurrency, then the lines regression line for marbles1 would be on top of
marbles6, and the line for words1 would be on top of words6. However, the 6-
item lines are lower (on average) than those of the marbles domain. This means
that participants regularize more in the 6-item conditions and constitutes the
significant effect of concurrency.
As for the significance of the interactions, there would be no interaction be-
tween concurrency and observation ratio if the slope of marbles1 and marbles6
were identical, and the slope of words1 and words6 were identical. Otherwise,
observation ratio would be additively affecting entropy drop by shifting the lines
up and down, without changing the slope. However, this is not the case: the
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slopes vary within domain. Concurrency and observation ratio jointly modulate
entropy change by increasing the regularization of variable observations ratios
and increasing the variabilization of regular observation ratios, compared to the
one-item conditions. This constitutes the significant interaction between concur-
rency and observation ratio. Likewise, there would be no interaction between
domain and observation ratio if the slope of marbles1 and words1 were identical,
and the slope of marbles6 and words6 were identical. Here, we see that they are
nearly parallel. This is the interaction that was weakly supported by the set of
best-fit models. And lastly, the null result for an interaction between domain and
concurrency is seen in the fact that the two regression lines for the words domain
have the same relative slopes as the two regression lines for the marbles domain.
This indicates that there is no interaction between domain and concurrency.
Self-reported generating ratio estimates
Although participants’ production ratios are a proxy for their estimate of the
ratio of the marbles in the containers, or the relative frequency of the synonyms
in the language, participants were also asked about these estimates directly.
Figure 3.15 shows the estimated ratios, plotted in the same way that pro-
duction ratios were plotted in Figure 3.12. Participants estimated the relative
percentages of the two variants per item. The x-axis reports the estimated per-
centage of the majority variant in terms of a probability. The effects of the
experimental manipulations on ratio estimates were analyzed in the same way as
the production ratio data: in terms of entropy change. The entropy of each
observation ratio was subtracted from the entropy of its estimate to yield the
change in entropy for each observed and estimated pair of ratios. Figure 3.16
shows the average change in entropy of estimated ratios per condition. The same
linear mixed effects regression analysis from the previous section was conducted
to obtain significant differences from zero. The estimated ratios of marbles1 are
significantly different than zero, biased toward variability, (t(1152) = 2.286, p =
0.22), but none of the other conditions are significantly different from zero: words1
(t(1152) = 0.780, p = 0.44), marbles6 (t(1152) = 1.835, p = 0.07), and words6
(t(1152) = −1.458, p = 0.15). In no condition was a bias toward regularity
evident in participants’ estimated ratios.
Table 3.5 shows the pairwise comparisons between conditions. There are
two significant differences: significantly more regular ratios are estimated in
words6 than in marbles1 (t(1152) = −2.679, p = 0.007) and marbles6 (t(1152) =




















































10 .2 .4 .6 .8 10 .2 .4 .6 .8 10 .2 .4 .6 .8 10 .2 .4 .6 .8 10 .2 .4 .6 .8
Figure 3.15: Participants estimates of the generating ratio for the four main
conditions in Experiment 2. Each row shows the results of one experimental con-
dition. Each column corresponds to one of the six observation ratios, ranging
from 5:5 (on the left) to 10:0 (on the right). Each pane contains the distribu-
tion of participants estimates per observation ratio. These estimated ratios are
displayed on the x-axis as the proportion of variant x in their estimate. Variant
x corresponds to whatever marble/word was in the majority during the observa-
tion phase. All observation ratios are indicated by a dashed line. For example,
the top left panel gives the results for the 32 participants in condition marbles1
who observed a 5:5 ratio of marbles. Here, we see that 50% of these participants
reported a 5:5 generating ratio, 19% reported a 4:6 generating ratio, and 13%












Figure 3.16: Average change in entropy of estimated ratios.
marbles1 marbles6 t(1152) = −0.500, p = 0.62
words1 t(1152) = −1.065, p = 0.29
words6 t(1152) = −2.679, p = 0.007
marbles6 words1 t(1152) = −0.629, p = 0.53
words6 t(1152) = −2.329, p = 0.02
words1 words6 t(1152) = −1.549, p = 0.12
Table 3.5: Significance of pairwise comparisons between the four conditions in
Experiment 2.
ditions being more variable, because there was no significant regularization of
estimates in words6.
The same linear mixed effects regression analysis from the previous section
was conducted on the full model reported in Table 3.2, where the dependent
variable is change in entropy of the ratio estimates (rather than the production
ratios). The same independent variables are significant predictors of entropy
change of the estimated ratios. There was a significant effect of domain χ2(4) =
11.735, p = 0.02, concurrency χ2(4) = 34.916, p < .001, and observation ratio
χ2(4) = 562.04, p < .001. The direction of this concurrency effect has variable
ratios being estimated more often in the one-item tasks than the six-item tasks.
And the direction of the domain effect has the marble drawers estimating more
variable ratios than the word learners. This means that participants may be
encoding frequencies differently due to the concurrency manipulation and due to
the domain manipulation. All possible interactive and additive effects from Table
3.3 were assessed as well. An ANOVA showed the same set of models to be the
best fits: B (χ2(1) = 27.9293, p < .001), D (χ2(0) = 27.1800, p < .001), and F
(χ2(0) = 27.2416, p < .001). Whereas B was the best-fit model of these three
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for the production ratio data, none of these three models was significantly better
for the estimated ratio data. Participants’ production ratios and self-reported
estimates of the generating ratio are modulated by the same fixed effects.
In conclusion, there is no evidence that the errors in participants’ estimates of
the generating ratio are biased toward regularity in any of the conditions where
production ratios are regularized (words1, marbles6, words6 ). This suggests that
regularization behavior is not caused by a regularization bias during encoding, but
instead caused by something on the recall and production end of this experiment.
This explanation seems to fit the words1 condition best, where participants’ es-
timates accurately reflect the observed ratio, but their productions are regular.
In both of the six-item tasks, however, participants’ estimates were quite noisy
(refer back to Figure 3.12). This indicates that it was more difficult to estimate
the generating ratios in six-item task than in the one-item task. Although this
difference could very well be due to the higher cognitive load in the six-item task,
it is slightly concerning that these estimates seem to carry no information about
the observation ratio, whereas participants’ productions in the six-item task do.
In other words, participants tend regularize by over-producing the majority mar-
ble, but seem to have no knowledge about the relative frequencies of the two
marbles when it comes to the estimation part of this experiment. This could be
due to a greater lack of attention toward the end of the six-item task compared to
the shorter, one-item task. Or it could be that the format for eliciting estimates
in the six-item condition was more difficult or confusing than the format used for
the one-item condition (refer to the instructions and screen shots in Appendix
A). If this is the case, then this means that the six-item estimation data is of
low quality. However, the regression analysis on estimates did capture the same
effects and interactions as were present in the high-quality production data.
Self-reported observation and production frequencies
In the previous section, we saw that participants were worse at estimating ratios
for the six-item task than for the one-item task, and this is likely to be due to
the six-item task being more difficult, though the exact source of this difficulty is
unclear. We also saw that domain is still a significant predictor of entropy drop in
estimated ratios. It is possible that differences in frequency estimates are due to
domain-specific biases, but this could also be due to a difference in memorability
of the marbles versus words stimuli. The two additional questions asked in the
one-item tasks shed light on this difference. Participants reported how many
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Figure 3.17: Participants’ estimate of the number of times they saw variant x in
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Figure 3.18: Participants’ estimate of the number of times they produced variant
x in the production phase.
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that should avoid domain-specific biases that play into participants’ estimates
and reveal more basic differences in participants’ awareness of stimuli frequencies
across the two domains.
Figure 3.17 plots the number of times participants reported observing the
majority variant, per observation ratio and per condition (marbles1 or words1 ).
Participants in both conditions report their observation ratio with high accuracy.
Figure 3.18 plots the number of times participants reported producing the major-
ity variant, per observation ratio and per condition (marbles1 or words1 ). These
data are similar to the distributions produced by participants in each condition.
In general, marble drawers recall the probability matching productions they made
and word learners recall the regular productions they made.
The question of interest here is whether or not there is a significant difference
in recall accuracy across domain. A linear model was used to investigate recall
error as a function of domain and observation ratio12. For observation recall, a
model was constructed where domain and observation ratio were the indepen-
dent variables, and the dependent variable was the change in entropy between
the observed ratio and the ratio each participant recalled observing. For pro-
duction recall, the dependent variable was the change in entropy between the
ratio participants produced and the ratio they recalled producing. Neither model
revealed a significant effect of domain. There was no significant difference in
recall of observation ratios (t(380) = −0.392, p = 0.7) or recall of production
ratios (t(380) = 1.346, p = 0.18). There was a marginally significant effect of
observation ratio on the observed ratio recall (t(380) = −2.327, p = 0.20), with
participants recalling observations for the more deterministic ratios better. How-
ever, there was no significant effect of observation ratio on production ratio recall
(t(380) = −0.591, p = 0.56), as any effect there would be indirect. This means
that basic differences in the attention and recall of marble and word stimuli
frequencies are not biasing participants toward different levels of variability or
regularity across domains.
3.2.3 Discussion
Both of the experimental manipulations, domain and concurrency, bring par-
ticipants away from the probability matching behavior of marbles1 and elicit
regularization. Furthermore, there was no evidence that these two sources of
regularization behavior interact: they appear to be independent contributors to
12A linear mixed effects regression analysis could not be used here because the data points
in these conditions are independent observations (i.e. one per participant)
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the full amount of linguistic regularization elicited in condition marbles6. This
independence indicates that different cognitive mechanisms underpin regulariza-
tion behavior in these two manipulations. However, these mechanisms seem to
give rise to fairly similar regularization profiles in which the majority variant is
over-regularized. Although Occum’s razor would suggest that these two sources
of regularization are one and the same, the analysis of interactions revealed strong
support for an interaction between the concurrency manipulation and observation
ratio, but no strong support for an interaction between the domain manipulation
and observation ratio. This means that although word learners do appear to be
using frequency information to regularize with the majority variant, their regu-
larization behavior does not seem to be sensitive to the fine-grained difference in
stimuli frequencies from different observation ratios. In the non-linguistic domain,
participant regularization behavior shows significant differences with respect to
the specific observation ratios of the stimuli. This difference suggests that the con-
currency manipulation is closely tied to lower-level cognitive processes and mem-
ory constraints that operate directly on encoded frequency information, whereas
the linguistic regularization bias may be the result of a higher-level decision-
making process that uses encoded frequency information in a broader sense. If
this is the case, then the behavior of participants in linguistic regularization exper-
iments may be more sensitive to aspects of task framing, including participants’
perceived goal of the production phase, than participants in the basic frequency
learning experiments of classic psychoeconomics.
Further analysis of participants’ self-reported estimates of the generating ra-
tios showed that their regularization bias is not rooted in their estimates. In each
of the three conditions where participants regularize their productions (marbles6,
words6, and words6 ), participants’ estimates were not significantly biased toward
regularity or variability: they were fairly accurate. Although these estimates were
much noisier in the six-item tasks, indicating that the six-item task is associated
with higher cognitive load, these errors in encoding are not likely drivers of reg-
ularization since they themselves are not biased toward regularity. This finding
speaks to the results of Perfors (2012), which manipulated cognitive load during
linguistic frequency encoding in the observation phase, but found that partici-
pants did not regularize. My results have shown that the higher cognitive load
of the six-item conditions did not lead to biased encoding errors, and this may
also be the case for Perfors (2012). If encoding errors do not drive regulariza-
tion, then the drivers may lie in memory recall and production. This would also
explain the fact that participants in Perfors (2012) did not regularize, but the
participants in Experiment 2 did, because the production phase of Experiment 2
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also entailed high cognitive load (via concurrent frequency production), whereas
the production phase for Perfors (2012) did not. Also, domain was a significant
predictor for the estimated ratios data, with word learners yielding less of a vari-
ability bias than marble drawers. However, this difference between domain is
not due to a difference in participants’ attention or ability to recall the marbles
versus words stimuli: participants’ recall accuracy of the number of times they
observed and produced each variant were not different between domains. This is
evidence that learners only estimate word stimuli frequencies slightly differently
than marble stimuli frequencies. But it is not clear that these differences drive
regularization behavior, because the estimates showed no regularity bias. There-
fore, regularization due to domain may also fall largely on the production side of
the task.
In addition to Perfors (2012), two other well-known papers provide experi-
ments in which adult learners do not regularize linguistic input. Hudson Kam
and Newport (2005) contrast adult and child learners and conclude that child
learners regularize, whereas adult learners do not. However, their assessment of
regularization is more coarse-grained than that provided in this chapter, because
they group participants either as full regularizers, or variable users. Participants
who partially regularize, by making lower-entropy productions than their obser-
vations, would fall into the “variable users” category. They find that about 15%
of their participants fully regularize. For comparison, in the three conditions of
Experiment 2 where participants clearly regularize, the percentage of participants
who fully regularize are 29% in words1, 33% in marbles6, and 59% in words6. The
linguistic stimuli in Hudson Kam and Newport (2005) is far more complex than
that of Experiment 2, and this may be the source of regularization differences
here, but in relation to the data in this thesis, a 15% incidence in full regular-
ization behavior is by no means evidence that adult learners do not contribute
to regularity in languages, as Hudson Kam and Newport (2005) conclude. Reali
and Griffiths (2009) also conclude in one experiment (which words6 is a repli-
cation of) that no regularization bias is evident in the behavior adult learners,
whereas when the task is iterated, regularization behavior becomes evident be-
cause cultural transmission amplifies the behavioral consequence of participants’
weak regularization bias. However, the participants in their first experiment are
in fact regularizing, but their population-level analysis of regularization could not
detect this (refer back to Figure 3.2 and its accompanying discussion). This point
was thoroughly discussed in the literature review at the beginning of this chapter,
but it is worthwhile to mention again here that the results of Reali and Griffiths
(2009) do not conflict in any way with the results of words6 in Experiment 2.
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In the following sections, Experiments 3 and 4 further explore the issues of
domain-general regularization due to concurrent frequency learning and mem-
ory constraints, via small modifications to Experiment 2. In the next chapter,
Experiment 5 explicitly addresses the production side of this task: it explores
the decision-based strategies that may give rise to linguistic regularization when




a closer look at domain-general drivers
The previous experiment identified two independent sources of regularization in
an artificial language learning task: a domain-general component due to con-
current frequency learning, and a domain-specific component due to the use of
linguistic stimuli. Experiment 3 digs deeper into the domain-general aspects of
regularization and asks why participants regularize when learning about several
frequencies at once.
The artificial language learning experiments reviewed at the beginning of the
chapter are all concurrent frequency learning tasks that cover different numbers
of choice alternatives of the linguistic variable of interest: for example, Smith
and Wonnacott (2010) had two determiners, Hudson Kam and Newport (2009)
looked at 0, 4, 6, 10, and 18 determiners, Culbertson et al. (2012) had four word
order combinations, and Reali and Griffiths (2009) had 12 lexical items (2 per
object). It is likely that both the entropy of these distributions and the number
of choice alternatives modulates participants’ regularization behavior, but these
two factors are difficult to disentangle.
Extensive literature in psychoeconomics provides conflicting results on how
the number of choice alternatives modulate probability matching behavior. Gard-
ner (1957, 1958), Cotton and Rechtschaffen (1958), and McCormack (1959) found
that presenting more than two choice alternatives leads participants to regularize
by overproducing the higher-frequency alternative. However, Detambel (1955),
Wittig and Weir (1971), and Weir (1972) find the opposite result: the variabil-
ity of participant responses increases when learning about more than two choice
alternatives. Weir (1972) points out that the studies reporting regularization be-
havior used a similar feedback schedule in which participants were informed of
the correct choice after each testing trial, whether or not they made the correct
choice. And in the studies that report probability matching or increased variabil-
ity with number of choice responses, feedback was only given when participants
made the correct choice. Otherwise, they were aware they made an error, but were
not told what the correct response was. Because Experiment 2, along with most
artificial language learning experiments, gives no feedback and is not an explicit
per-trial prediction task, it is not possible to make straightforward predictions
from the psychoeconomics literature for the present experiment. However, this
literature does show that regularization behavior, of the type observed in artificial
language learning tasks, does occur in non-linguistic frequency learning and can
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be modulated by things related to cognitive load, like the number of items one
must track.
So, why do participants probability match in the one-item marble drawing
task, but regularize in the six-item marble drawing task? From the linguistic
regularization literature, we know that different levels of regularity in the train-
ing data modulate participant regularization behavior. But why do participants
regularize at all? Is this a direct response to instances of regular input data, or
is it just because they are learning about several items at once?
Experiment 3 addresses these questions by replicating the concurrent fre-
quency learning condition marbles6 with a set of observation ratios that contain
no regularity: {5:5, 5:5, 5:5, 5:5, 5:5, 5:5} This maximally variable set of obser-
vation ratios has an average entropy of 1 bit. As far as I am aware, no study
has been published in the psychoeconomics literature on probability matching
where participants observe all choice alternatives with equal frequencies. In the
linguistic regularization literature Culbertson et al. (2012) is the only example,
reporting a control condition in which participants observe four word order types
with equal frequencies. Here, participants probability matched (mean responses
were not significantly different than the input frequency). However in the other
conditions, when the input was skewed in a 7:3 ratio, participants did regularize.
This suggests that participants may only regularize when there is some evidence
of regularity in their input. The authors point out that the control condition data
seems to indicate an apparent substantive (i.e. direct) bias toward overproducing
three of the four possible orderings in the raw data. So a small regularization
bias may be at play, but this did not lead to a significant difference from the
input frequency, possibly due to the small sample size of 13 participants in this
condition.
If participants in Experiment 3 probability match in response to a maximally
variable training set, then this means that the presence of regularity in the obser-
vation ratios of Experiment 2 was the driving force behind regularization in the
concurrent frequency learning condition marbles6. But if participants regularize,
this means that there is something about multiple frequency learning itself that
elicits regularization behavior. I chose to conduct this new experiment in the
non-linguistic domain to see if concurrent frequency learning without evidence
for regularity can elicit regularization behavior in a domain where participants
naturally probability match given two choice alternatives.
Another interesting question that this new observation ratio set raises is about
the independence of the individual items being learned. If participants do reg-
ularize the maximally variable set, do they regularize it the same amount as
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they do the 5:5 ratio from marbles6, or do the other ratios in the observation
set modulate it somehow? Although languages contain individual, variable units
that people can make judgements about, such as a relative frequency of two past
tense inflections, languages are learned as systems and sets of frequencies may
be learned as systems as well. Learners may make higher-order generalizations
about the input they observe, such as “all containers like these are filled with
a 50/50 mix of marbles” (e.g. Kemp et al., 2007). In this sense, the maximally
variable observation ratio set is regular at a higher level: it contains ratios of all
one type. It is possible that multiple ratios of one type reinforce one another,
systematically. To supplement this investigation, I chose to test one more obser-
vation set: a maximally regular set of all 10:0 ratios. Participant responses to
this set will be compared to responses from the 10:0 ratio of marbles6.
3.3.1 Method
Participants
68 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing plat-
form and completed our experiment online. Participant location was restricted
to the United States of America and verified by a post-hoc check of participant
IP address location. 4 participants were excluded on the basis of the following
criteria: failing an Ishihara color vision test13 (0), self-reporting the use of a pen
or pencil during the task14 (1), not reporting their sex or age (0), or having previ-
ously participated in this or any of my experiments, as determined by their user
ID with MTurk (2). More participants were recruited than necessary with the
expectation that some would be excluded by these criteria. Once the predeter-
mined number of participants per condition was met, the last participants were
excluded, totaling 1 participant across all conditions. All excluded participants
received the full monetary reward for the task, which was 0.60 USD. The average
time taken to complete the experiment was 11 minutes and 17 seconds, with a
standard deviation of 2 minutes and 8 seconds. Of the final 64 participants, 50%
are female and the mean age is 35.1 (min = 20, max = 69) with a standard devi-
ation of 11.7 years. The breakdown of participants in each of the two conditions
(further described in section 3.3.1) is as follows:
13I used two plates from the Ishihara color vision test: plate 4 which tests for red-green color
deficiency, and plate 23 which tests for protanopia and deuteranopia (see Appendix A.2.1).
Participants were excluded if they gave an incorrect answer for one or both of these plates.
14In an exit questionnaire.
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Conditions: all all 5:5 all 10:0
Participant count 64 32 32
Age: mean 35.1 37.8 32.4
minimum 20 20 20
maximim 69 69 51
standard deviation 11.7 13.3 9.1
Sex (% female) 50% 65% 35%
Materials
The materials, stimuli, and presentation are identical to those in Experiment 2.
Conditions and Design
There are two conditions in this experiment, one in which participants receive
only 5:5 observation ratios, which will be called the all 5:5 condition, and one
in which participants receive only 10:0 observation ratios, which will be called
the all 10:0 condition. These two conditions will be compared to the marbles6
condition from Experiment 2.
condition set of observation ratios
marbles6 {5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:2, 9:1, 10:0}
all 5:5 {5:5, 5:5, 5:5, 5:5, 5:5, 5:5}
all 10:0 {10:0, 10:0,10:0,10:0,10:0,10:0}
Procedure
This is identical to the procedure used in marbles6 of Experiment 2.
3.3.2 Results
Summary of the ratios produced
Figure 3.19 shows the results of Experiment 3, along with the results of marbles6
from Experiment 2, reprinted for comparison.15 Participants in the all 5:5 condi-
tion do not appear to be probability matching on a 5:5 production ratio. Instead,
15In this chapter, all of the 6-panel plots like this are organized by observation ratio with
randomized container and marble color stimuli within each panel. Because the panels in this
experiment cannot be distinguished by observation ratio, I chose to group them by container
stimuli (but there was no significant effect of container on regularization behavior). The con-











































Figure 3.19: Results of the two conditions in Experiment 3. In the first row,
marbles6 is reprinted from Figure 3.12 for comparison. Each row shows the
results of one experimental condition and each column corresponds to one of
the six observation ratios. Each panel contains the distribution of ratios that
participants produced in response to one observation ratio. These production
ratios are displayed on the x-axis as the number of times a participant produced
variant x from the observation ratio x:y. Variant x corresponds to whatever
marble/word was in the majority during the observation phase. All observation
ratios are indicated by a dashed line. In marbles6 there were 64 participants, and
thus 64 data points (one from each participant) in each panel. In Experiment 3,
there were 32 participants in each condition and thus 32 data points (one from
each participant) in each panel. For example, the middle left panel gives the
results for 32 of the production ratios in condition all 5:5. Here, we see that 9%
of these participants also produced a 5:5 ratio, 16% produced a 4:6 ratio, 13%



























Figure 3.20: Average change in entropy of participants’ productions compared
to their observation ratio. a) Comparison between the 5:5 ratio from marbles6
(from Experiment 2) and all of the data from the all 5:5 condition of Experiment
3. b) Comparison between the 10:0 ratio from marbles6 (from Experiment 2)
and all of the data from the all 10:0 condition of Experiment 3.
they seem to regularize their responses, often by producing fully regular responses
in the 10:0 and 0:10 ratio. In the all 10:0 condition, participants appear to be
maintaining the 10:0 ratio in their productions better than they do for the 10:0
observation ratio in marbles6.
Effect of the different sets of observation ratios
Rather than looking at the overall entropy drop per condition, the comparisons of
interest here are between the conditions in Experiment 3 and their corresponding
ratio in marbles6. In the case of the all 5:5 condition, we want to know if the
amount of regularization that occurs when a 5:5 ratio is observed in the context
of only other 5:5 ratios is significantly different from when it is learned in the
context of a diversity of other ratios, as it is in marbles6. Likewise, we want to
know if responses to a 10:0 ratio differ between the all 10:0 marbles6 conditions.
Figure 3.20a shows the average change in entropy for the all 5:5 data and the
data from marbles6 for the 5:5 observation ratio only. Figure 3.20b shows the
average change in entropy for the all 10:0 data and the data from marbles6 for
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the 10:0 observation ratio only. Because the 5:5 observation ratio is already the
maximum entropy of 1 bit, entropy can only stay the same or go down for the two
data sets in Figure 3.20a. Likewise for Figure 3.20b, the 10:0 observation ratio is
already the minimum entropy of 0 bits, so entropy can only stay the same or go
up for these two data sets. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals and
were computed with the bootstrap percentile method (Efron, 1979).
To determine whether or not the difference in regularization in Figure 3.20a is
significant, I performed a linear mixed effects regression analysis. Entropy change
was entered as the dependent variable and condition,marbles6 (5:5) vs all 5:5,
was entered as the fixed effect. Participant was entered as a random effect as
random intercepts. There was no significant difference between regularization in
these conditions (t(254) = 0.341, p = 0.73). Participants do not regularize any
less or any more when learning about 5:5 ratios in the context of other 5:5 ratios
than when they are learning about a 5:5 ratio in the context of many different
ratios.
I performed another linear mixed effects regression analysis on the 10:0 obser-
vation ratio data as well, to determine whether or not the difference between con-
ditions in Figure 3.20b is significant. Entropy change was entered as the depen-
dent variable and condition, marbles6 (10:0) vs all 10:0 ) was entered as the fixed
effect. Participant was entered as a random effect as random intercepts. There
was a significant difference between these conditions (t(254) = −3.457, p < .001).
Participants maintain more 10:0 ratios when learning in the context of other fully
regular ratios than when learning in the context of more variable ratios.
3.3.3 Discussion
Participants regularize just as much when learning about six pairs of marbles
in 5:5 proportions as they do when learning about one pair of marbles in a 5:5
proportion that was learned in the context of other, more regular ratios. This
means that there is something about concurrent frequency learning itself that
causes participants to regularize. Regularization behavior does not necessitate the
presence of a majority variant or the presence of some evidence of regularity in the
observation set, whether it takes the form of fully regular (10:0) ratios or partially
regular ratios with non-zero entropy (ex: 6:4). Additionally, if participants were
forming higher-order generalizations about their training set, this did not lead
to a significant difference in regularization behavior for the maximally variable
observation set.
The maximally regular set, on the other hand, did lead to significantly different
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results. When participants were learning about six completely deterministic items
(where only one color came out of each container) then participants produced
fully regular responses more often than when learning about one 10:0 ratio in
the context of other, more variable ratios. This is evidence that the fully regular
ratios may be reinforcing each other. However, it may also be evidence that
the other ratios in marbles6 are interfering with the 10:0 item. A higher-order
generalization that could interfere with the 10:0 item from marbles6 may be along
the lines of “all these containers seem to be variable, so maybe the one container
I only saw one color come out of actually has another color in there, so I should
produce some draws of that color.” Alternatively, since production trials on the
10:0 item include two possible production choices (one color that was observed and
another one that was not), the fact that participants choose the unseen marble
more in marbles6 may be due to an aspect of higher cognitive load in marbles6
regarding the stimuli numbers. These two data sets may have differed in regularity
because participants in the all 10:0 condition observed 6 marble color stimuli,
whereas participants in marbles6 observed 11 (and 11 unique colors may be harder
to remember than 6). There may be a continuum of regularization behavior for
experiments using 1 item and 2 variants, up to 6 items and 12 variants, such that
stimuli numbers in between the marbles1 and marbles6 conditions may elicit
interpolated levels of regularization. This point could be addressed in the future
by training participants on a three-item task with 6 marble colors, or a one-item
task with more than two color variants.
As a general conclusion, this experiment suggests that regularization is trig-
gered by concurrent frequency learning itself and that individual regularization
profiles obtained in marbles6 may be relatively similar to those obtained for any
combination of six observation ratios. This has important implications for the
analyses in Chapter 6, which address the evolution of frequency distributions
from the experiments in this thesis.
If changes in frequencies over time are more determined by the observed ratio
of the stimuli than by their specific learning context, then the changes in fre-
quencies of each pair of variants can be modeled independently of one another.
However, this experiment also provided evidence that the 10:0 ratio is likely to
be a stronger attractor than indicated by the data in marbles6. As soon as more
than one variant pair enters a 10:0 ratio, they may be more likely to remain in a
fully regular state and perhaps, be more likely to convert other items to that state
as well. The 5:5 ratio, on the other hand, does not appear to be an attractor that
keeps productions in a highly variable state. This implies that highly variable
sets of frequencies are less likely to be faithfully transmitted between learners
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than more deterministic sets. For now, I will leave these topics to Chapter 6.
This experiment touched on issues of cognitive load and the possibility of
memory constraints affecting regularization behavior, but left these questions
largely unsatisfied. The following section presents another variation on Experi-
ment 2 that addresses these issues more directly.
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3.4 Experiment 4:
a closer look at memory
Some of the results we have seen so far suggest that aspects of the production
phase may be driving regularization behavior. When participant responses were
compared across domain, participants in the one-item conditions were fully aware
of the frequencies of marbles/words they observed. However, when it came to the
production phase, word learners produced many fully-regular responses whereas
marble drawers did not. The difference in participant behavior across these two
conditions is likely due to a difference in participants’ interpretation of the task.
The heavily bimodal distribution of participant responses in words1, in which
some participants probability matched perfectly and others fully-regularized, cor-
roborates this view. This suggests that some participants explicitly decided to
match the frequencies, whereas others may have thought they should choose the
“best” word. This relates to task framing and will be explored further in Exper-
iment 5.
We also saw some evidence that participants’ biases on frequency estimates
were not candidate sources of the behavioral bias toward producing regular ra-
tios. As discussed in the literature review at the beginning of this chapter, Perfors
(2012) has shown that increasing cognitive load in the observation phase (i.e. dur-
ing memory encoding) does not lead to regularization behavior. Perfors (2012)
also reports Bayesian modeling evidence showing that learners will not regularize
under memory constraints unless they possess an inductive bias toward regular
ratios in their frequency estimates. This result is corroborated by the frequency
estimate data in Experiment 2. Participants under cognitive load in the six-item
conditions were worse at estimating the generating ratios behind the data they
observed, however this estimate itself was not biased toward regularity. The fact
that estimates were much worse in the six-item conditions does show that cog-
nitive load was higher when participants learned about six items concurrently,
as opposed to one item on its own. This means that cognitive load may be
equally high during the production phase, where participants must produce mar-
bles draws/naming events for several different items concurrently. So perhaps
it is the cognitive load involved in concurrent frequency production that drives
regularization behavior.
Experiment 4 consists of two manipulations to words6 in Experiment 2 that
are designed to alleviate cognitive load during the observation and production
phase. The hypothesis is that alleviating cognitive load in the production phase
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only will lead to a significant decrease in regularization behavior, whereas allevi-
ating cognitive load in the observation phase only will not.
3.4.1 Method
Participants
154 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing
platform and completed our experiment online. Participant location was re-
stricted to the United States of America and verified by a post-hoc check of
participant IP address location. 26 participants were excluded on the basis of
the following criteria: self-reporting the use of a pen or pencil during the task16
(5), not reporting their sex or age (3), or having previously participated in this
or any of my experiments, as determined by their user ID with MTurk (18). All
excluded participants received the full monetary reward for the task, which was
0.60 USD. The average time taken to complete the experiment was 10 minutes
and 14 seconds, with a standard deviation of 1 minute and 49 seconds. A log was
kept of the number of times the experiment was accessed. 67% of all people who
accessed the experiment completed it.17 Of the final 128 participants, 40% are
female and the mean age is 34.6 (min = 19, max = 66) with a standard devia-
tion of 11.8 years. The breakdown of participants in each of the two conditions
(further described in section 3.3.1) are as follows:
Conditions: all observation in blocks production in blocks
Participant count 128 64 64
Age: mean 34.6 34.2 35.0
minimum 19 19 19
maximim 66 66 65
standard deviation 11.8 11.6 12.0
Sex (% female) 36% 41% 31%
Completion rate 67% 66% 68%
16In an exit questionnaire.
17I only began collecting this type of data for Experiment 4, which is the last experiment I
ran. At least for this experiment, we can say that participants were not selectively dropping out
between conditions because the split was near-even between conditions (66% and 68%, see table
above). All of the MTurk experiments reported in this thesis prevented the same IP address
from accessing the experiment more than once. Therefore, we can assume that the completion
rate refers to unique users and not several attempts from the same user.
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Materials
The materials, stimuli, and presentation are identical to those in Experiment 2.
Conditions and Design
There are two conditions which constitute manipulations to the observation and
production phases. The details of these differences are presented in the Procedure
section below. Both of the conditions in Experiment 4 will be compared to the
data from the words6 condition in Experiment 2.
condition observation trials production trials
words6 interleaved interleaved
observation in blocks in blocks interleaved
production in blocks interleaved in blocks
Procedure
The procedure used in the words6 condition of Experiment 2 was modified by
organizing trials into blocks per object. This means that each of the 10 training
trials per object were presented consecutively. In the observation in blocks con-
dition, only the observation phase was in blocks, whereas the production phase
remained interleaved and identical to that of words6 (refer back to the schemas
in Figure 3.11). In this condition, for example, a participant would see 10 naming
events for one of the objects, then 10 naming events for another one of the ob-
jects, and so on until 10 naming events for each of the six objects had been seen.
The order in which objects appeared was randomized across participants. In the
production in blocks condition, only the production phase was in blocks, whereas
the observation phase remained interleaved and identical to that of words6. In
this condition, participants would generate 10 naming events for one item, then
10 more for another item, and so on. The order in which objects appeared was
randomized across participants.
3.4.2 Results
Summary of the ratios produced
Figure 3.21 shows the results of Experiment 4, along with the results of words6
from Experiment 2, reprinted for comparison. The results of both conditions











































Figure 3.21: Results of the two conditions in Experiment 4. In the first row,
words6 is reprinted for comparison. Each row shows the results of one exper-
imental condition. Each column corresponds to one of the observation ratios,
ranging from 5:5 (on the left) to 10:0 (on the right). These production ratios are
displayed on the x-axis as the number of times a participant produced variant
x from the observation ratio x:y. Variant x corresponds to whatever marble/-
word was in the majority during the observation phase. All observation ratios are
indicated by a dashed line. For example, the bottom left-hand pane shows the
results for the 5:5 observation ratio in the production in blocks condition. Here
we see that 28% of the participants produced variant x 0 times, 11% produced
it 5 times (the same frequency in which they observed it), and 19% produced it
10 times. In the 5:5 observation ratio there is no majority variant, but in all of
the other observation ratios variant x corresponds to the majority variant. In
the next pane to the right, variant x was observed 6 times. Here, it was also
produced 6 times by only 3% of participants, whereas 27% produced it all of the




































Figure 3.22: a) The average change in entropy of each observation and production
ratio pair, per condition. b) The average change in entropy of estimated ratios,
compared to observation ratios. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
to do so by overproducing the majority word, and this effect is stronger as the
frequency of the majority word increases.
Effect of condition on regularization behavior
Figure 3.22a shows the average change in entropy of each observation and pro-
duction ratio pair, per condition. If the average change in entropy is significantly
below zero, then participants are regularizing. Significant differences from zero
were assessed by a linear mixed effects regression analysis. A model was con-
structed with entropy change as the dependent variable and condition as the in-
dependent variable (i.e. fixed effect). Participant was included as a random effect
as random intercepts. No obvious deviations from normality or homoscedasticity
were apparent from a visual inspection of residual plots.
The model was releveled and run two times to obtain the intercept value for
each condition. Here, the intercept corresponds exactly to the mean entropy
change of the condition and the regression analysis provides a t-statistic to evalu-
ate whether or not this mean is significantly different from zero. Both conditions
elicited a significant amount of regularization behavior: observation in blocks
(t(766) = −11.180, p < .001), production in blocks (t(766) = −10.739, p < .001).
As for differences between conditions, a linear mixed effects regression analysis
was conducted to determine whether or not the type of observation or production
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regime significantly contributed to the prediction of participant regularization
behavior. Entropy change was entered as the dependent variable. Observation
regime (interleaved or in blocks), production regime (interleaved or in blocks), and
the entropy of the observation ratio were entered as the independent variables (i.e.
fixed effects). Participant was included as a random effect (as random intercepts).
P-values were obtained by likelihood ratio tests, performed by an ANOVA, on
the full model with the effect in question against a reduced model that omits the
effect in question. If the full model is significantly better at describing the data
than the reduced model, that means the effect in question is a significant predictor
of entropy change. The χ2 test statistic and p-value of the full to reduced model
comparison is reported for the effect in question.
There was not a significant effect of blocking production trials on regular-
ization behavior (χ2(1) = 1.0634, p = 0.30): the full model which included pro-
duction regime type as a predictor did no better than the reduced model that
omitted production regime type. Therefore, alleviating cognitive load during the
production phase does not lead participants to regularize significantly less (as
hypothesized) or more.
Also, blocking observation trials had no significant effect on regularization
behavior (χ2(1) = 0.3817, p = 0.54): the full model which included observation
regime as a predictor did no better than the reduced model that omitted it. If
alleviating cognitive load during the observation phase caused participants to
encode frequencies differently, this did not lead to a difference in regularization
behavior.
Effect of condition on self-reported frequency estimates
Although the blocking of observation trials did not lead to a significant differ-
ence in regularization behavior, it still may affect how participants encode the
frequencies. Are people regularizing the same because there is no difference in
encoding between the two observation regimes? Or are people regularizing for
other reasons, which do not heavily involve frequency knowledge?
Participants’ self-reported estimates of the generating ratios were analyzed in
the same way that they were in Experiment 2. Figure 3.22b shows the average
change in entropy between each observation ratio and the participant’s estimate
of the generating ratio behind that observation ratio, per condition. The results
of these data for words6 are re-printed for comparison (left-most bar). Differences
between conditions were assessed by the analysis carried out for Figure 3.22a, but
with the relevant dependent variable: entropy change between observation and
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estimated ratio.
There was not a significant effect of blocking production trials on partici-
pants’ estimate of the generating ratios (χ2(1) = 0, p = 1): the full model which
included production regime as a predictor did no better than the reduced model
that omitted production regime. This would be expected since the production
regime should not effect participants’ encoding of frequencies. However, block-
ing observation trials did have a significant effect on participants’ estimate of the
generating ratios (χ2(1) = 6.2725, p = 0.01): the full model which included obser-
vation regime as a predictor explained more of the data than the reduced model
that omitted it. Participants in the observation in blocks condition reported more
variation 1) than was actually present in their observation set and 2) than partic-
ipants in the two other conditions with interleaved observation phases did. This
indicates that participants notice more variation in their observation ratios when
observation trials are in blocks than when they are interleaved.
3.4.3 Discussion
All together, these results show that alleviating cognitive load during observation
allows participants to encode more variation. However this does not affect the
extent to which they regularize their responses. Additionally, alleviating cogni-
tive load during production does not lead to a change in regularization behavior,
as hypothesized. This may be because the manipulations in this experiment did
not change the cognitive load very much. However, these results show that the
particular level of regularity that participants produce when learning about six
items concurrently18 is quite robust to these experimental manipulations. This
indicates that an important driver in regularization behavior in this task may
have to do with participants’ perceived goal in this task. As discussed earlier in
the analyses of the domain-specific regularization behavior obtained in Experi-
ment 2, words1, the linguistic framing of the task may prompt participants to
choose the“best” word in their production trials. Therefore, the linguistic framing
of this task may have swamped out any nuanced difference in regularization be-
havior due to the difference in encoded frequencies from the observation in blocks
manipulation. Additionally, if participants were trying to choose the “best” word
in the production trials, this would have precluded them from probability match-
ing their observation frequencies even if it would have been easier for them to do
so when production trials were in blocks. On the basis of this, I hypothesize that
18Although the trials were not interleaved in the observation in blocks condition, participants
still learned about all six items before they began the production phase. This still required
participants to keep track of frequency information for all of the items at the same time.
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if Experiment 4 were run again in the non-linguistic domain with marbles and
container stimuli, the production in blocks condition may elicit significantly less
regularization, because linguistic-domain regularization biases will not be present
to override this behavior.
For now, we will leave the investigation of regularization due to memory con-
straints and turn our attention to the pragmatic factors that may be eliciting






In the previous chapter, we saw how reframing our basic frequency learning task
as a word learning task can take participants away from probability matching
behavior and elicit regularization. We also saw that this type of domain-specific
regularization is more likely to be due to production aspects of this task than to
a distortion of the observed frequencies encoded in memory. This is because the
linguistic framing of the task prompts participants to do something different with
the frequencies they remember when they come to the production phase of the
experiment. If linguistic-domain frequency learning tasks are easily modulated
by task framing, then this may be an important source of the discrepancies found
in the linguistic regularization literature (as discussed in Chapter 3).
This chapter presents Experiment 5, in which the production phase of our
basic frequency learning task is manipulated to investigate another potentially
important source of regularity in language: the pressure to coordinate. Language
can be understood as a coordination game (Vanderschraaf, 2014), where the so-
lution is arbitrary (Saussure, 1966), because it does not matter which signal two
people use for a meaning, so long as it allows the players to arrive at the same
meaning (Lewis, 1969). If language is a coordination game, what coordination
strategies do people use in language learning and production? And do players
modulate their coordination strategies on the basis of their shared experience
with a linguistic system?
Because I am interested in the roots of linguistic regularization behavior, I
am going to focus on frequency information as a form of shared experience that
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two learners can have about their language. In Experiment 2, we saw that lan-
guage learners do use their experience of the relative frequencies of lexical items
to inform productions, and most often they do so by over-producing the majority
variant via regularization. If linguistic regularization behavior has any basis in
domain-general coordination strategies, we may expect to see this behavior paral-
leled in a non-linguistic coordination task. The goal of this chapter is to determine
whether two coordinating individuals spontaneously use their shared experience
with relative frequencies of non-linguistic stimuli to succeed in a coordination
task.
In Experiment 1, I showed that participants probability match in a basic fre-
quency reproduction task and are able to make predictions about the ratio of
future events. In the linguistic condition of Experiment 2, I re-framed the task so
that participants were making the same kind of predictions, not about marbles in
containers, but about words for objects. Although participants learned about the
frequencies equally well across domains, many participants in the word produc-
tion task seemed to fully regularize: they only produced the most frequent word
on all production trials. Full regularization with the observed majority variant
is behaviorally equivalent to maximization: choosing the most frequent outcome
on all trials. As discussed in Section 2.1, maximizing is the rational strategy
to play in prediction tasks if outcomes are truly random because choosing the
most frequent outcome on all trials maximizes the expected payoff. Although
the psychoeconomics literature has shown it to be notoriously difficult to get
participants to maximize in frequency-based prediction tasks, even with exten-
sive training (Shanks et al., 2002), participants readily maximize in a linguistic
frequency learning task. One of the crucial differences in framing between these
two tasks is that one involves making predictions about asocial events in your
environment, and the other involves making predictions about the behavior of
another individual, namely whoever was producing the names for the objects in
the observation phase of the word learning task. Only one more step is needed to
turn this task into a coordination game: have participants predict the behavior
of someone else who is predicting their behavior. The questions here are: Does a
coordination game that involves frequency learning also elicit maximization be-
havior? How is this modulated by the particular frequencies observed? And how
does this compare to regularization behavior in the linguistic frequency learning
tasks?
To investigate this, we1 took Experiment 1 and changed the production task.
1This experiment was jointly developed and run in the lab with Caroline Kamps for her
master project, co-supervised by Simon Kirby and myself. The design of Experiment 5 was the
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In the new experiment, Experiment 5, participants observe 10 marble draws from
a bag (one at a time, just as in Experiment 1), but instead of being asked to pro-
duce several more likely draws to come from this bag, they are asked to coordinate
with a partner, who also saw 10 draws from the same bag. In this new production
phase, participants are asked to write down a marble color and told that the only
goal is to write the same color that their partner writes on their piece of paper.
This is repeated 10 times, without feedback, and constitutes a series of one-shot
games played between a pair of participants.2 We will see that this production
regime elicits a different profile of responses than those elicited in Experiments
1 and 2, but one that is still dominated by regularization behavior. But before I
describe the experiment in detail, I will present the game theory behind this new
production task and attempt to link rational behavior in coordination games to
regularization behavior in frequency learning tasks.
4.1.1 A game-theoretic analysis of this coordination game
In game theoretic terminology, the production task in Experiment 5 is a tacit
coordination game (Schelling, 1960, 54-58). In tacit coordination games, individ-
uals must coordinate their behavior to arrive at the same solution in a situation
where communication is incomplete or impossible. This is a form of a pure co-
ordination game, where there is no conflict of interest between players; players
want to coordinate and they both receive an equal reward if they succeed. Ad-
ditionally, the solution in coordination games is arbitrary; any action can be the
correct solution, so long as both of the players choose that action. These are
either played as one-shot games, or repeated games where feedback may or may
not be given.
A similar tacit coordination game to Experiment 5 is called Heads and Tails
(Schelling, 1960, 56; Mehta et al., 1994a, 164). Here, two players have to choose
between heads or tails and they know that if they choose the same thing as
their partner, they get a reward. Figure 4.1 gives the standard notation of this
game as a payoff matrix. If participants choose (heads, heads) or (tails, tails),
they will each get a payoff of 1. If participants choose (heads, tails) or (tails,
heads) they will get nothing. Many games, this one included, have one or more
product of many conversations with various members of the Language Evolution and Computa-
tion Research Group at the University of Edinburgh, namely Kenny Smith, Nikolaus Ritt, Bill
Thompson, Kevin Stadler, Catriona Silvey, James Winters, Matthew Spike, Mark Atkinson,
and Justin Quillinan.
2It is important to keep in mind that the production phase is without feedback, because
informing participants of success or failure to coordinate per production trial, or allowing them
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Figure 4.1: A standard example of a pure coordination game.
equilibrium points, which is a set of strategies that rational players will converge
upon. In Heads and Tails there are two strategies that a player can take (heads
or tails) and four sets of strategies that the pair of players can take: (heads,
heads), (heads, tails), (tails, heads), (tails, tails). Nash (1950) formalized the
concept of an equilibrium for game theory: a particular strategy set is in a Nash
equilibrium if neither player can improve their own payoff by unilaterally changing
their strategy. In Heads and Tails, the strategy set (heads, tails) is not a Nash
equilibrium because player A can increase their payoff by switching to the tails
strategy. Likewise, player B could increase their payoff by switching to the heads
strategy. If at least one player can do better by switching to another strategy,
that strategy set is not a Nash equilibrium. The strategy set (heads, heads),
however, is a Nash equilibrium, because if either player switched to tails, their
payoff would go down.
In Heads and Tails, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria of (heads,
heads) and (tails, tails) (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). When a player chooses
one strategy all of the time, then this is known as a pure strategy. However,
a player may also adopt a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution
over pure strategies. Nash (1950) proved that all games with a finite number of
players have at least one mixed strategy equilibrium. In Heads and Tails there
is one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, where heads or tails is played randomly,
with equal probability. The expected payoffs for the pure strategies are (1,1)
and the expected payoff for the mixed strategy is (0.5,0.5). The probability that
two rational players will achieve coordination is this game is 0.5 (Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994). In standard game theory, the payoff values in the matrix
constitute all of the information that rational players need to know to make their
decisions.
The coordination game of Experiment 5 is equivalent to that of Heads and
Tails (Figure 4.2), with an unspecified but positive, equal payoff for each player
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Figure 4.2: The coordination game used in the production phase of Experiment
3, where payoff x > 0.
Nash equilibria: two pure strategies (red, red) and (blue, blue) and one mixed
strategy with a (0.5, 0.5) probability distribution over each pure strategy. If par-
ticipants in Experiment 5 act rationally, and only use the payoff information to
inform their decisions, we would expect them to either choose the red marble in
all of their production trials, choose the blue marble in all of their production
trials, or play the mixed strategy and produce a 5:5 (or near-5:5) ratio of reds
and blues. Additionally, rational participants would be expected to succeed in
coordinating no better than chance. However, people use more than just the pay-
off information to coordinate: they make decisions on the basis of asymmetrical
saliencies between their options, known as focal points.
4.1.2 Focal points in coordination games
It is well-known that people are more successful at coordinating in one-shot co-
ordination games than classical game theory can explain (Bardsley and Mehta,
2010). Schelling (1960) carried out a series of informal coordination games and re-
ported that participants regularly coordinated at rates much higher than chance.
In the case of the Heads and Tails game, he reported that 86% of participants
chose heads and this result was replicated in a controlled experiment by Mehta
et al. (1994a), where 87% of participants chose heads. Schelling proposed the
concept of focal points, now also known as Schelling points, to explain people’s
uncanny success at solving coordination games. He describes focal points as a
class of solutions that have a particular prominence or conspicuousness that “may
depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or ge-
ometric configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they
know about each other (p.57).” Critically, focal points deal with information ex-
ogenous to the payoff structure of the game and thus affect human decision making
in coordination games in a way that standard game theory does not account for.
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One of the main sources of exogenous information is the labelling of the choices
(Mehta et al., 1994a; Sugden, 1995), such as heads or tails, red or blue, etc. In
Heads and Tails, participants seem to share a pre-existing convention or shared
cultural knowledge that makes heads the preferred choice. Color can also be used
as a focal point for successful coordination. Mehta et al. (1994b) show that two
colors, red and blue, are strongly preferred as focal points among their partici-
pants during a coordination game. In another coordination experiment by Wilson
and Rhodes (1997), which required a set of color stimuli that participants were
unable to exploit for coordination, the researchers excluded red and blue because
“pre-tests indicated that subjects automatically coordinated around these two
colors”. Scott-Phillips et al. (2009) also show that participants successfully ex-
ploit color while trying to solve a coordination game and that red was exploited
most often (from a set of four possible colors: red, blue, green, and yellow).
In Experiment 5, all participants see draws of red and blue marbles in the
observation phase and may infer that the other participant also saw red and blue
marbles. This inference may limit participants’ productions to red and blue,
although they are free to write any color in the production phase in attempt
to coordinate. Because these two colors are the two most common focal colors,
their relative difference in saliency may not be large enough for participants to
exploit one of these colors as a focal point for successful coordination. I will assess
participants’ ability to coordinate on the basis of color, but my main interest is
in their ability to coordinate on the basis of frequency.
4.1.3 Frequency-based focal points
In addition to color, the shared observation phase introduces another form of
labelling that may be exploited for coordination: the observed majority and mi-
nority marble. Several of the games reported in Schelling (1960) and Mehta
et al. (1994a) were solved with recourse to cultural prominence, which is corre-
lated to frequency. For example, in the game Name a Mountain, most players
chose Everest, which is explained (in a somewhat post hoc fashion) as being the
most culturally prominent option.
Sugden (1995) formalizes the link between cultural prominence and rational
choice via players’ use of the relative frequency of options in the environment.
In his hypothetical game Name a Word, players must say any word and coordi-
nate on their choice of the word. Assuming that each player has an independent
random sample of words (from a particular newspaper they occasionally read),
he shows that the decision rule “choose the most frequent item in my sample”
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maximizes the expected payoff. The more skewed the veridical distribution is,
the more likely players are to successfully coordinate on whatever the most fre-
quent word in their sample was. Many events in the world follow highly skewed
distributions, the most ubiquitous example being the power law (Clauset et al.,
2009; Mitzenmacher, 2004; Bookstein, 1990), and word frequencies reliably con-
form to power law distributions (Zipf, 1932). Therefore, the decision rule “choose
the most frequent item in my sample” is well-suited to coordinating on words or
natural events in the environment.
Experiment 5 serves as an empirical test of this frequency-based decision rule
in a non-linguistic domain and I hypothesize that participants will coordinate on
the higher-frequency item. To disentangle any effects of coordination on the basis
of focal color, I ran this experiment in two conditions: a 5:5 observation ratio and
a 7:3 observation ratio. In the 5:5 observation ratio, there is no frequency-based
focal point and we can determine whether or not participants successfully coordi-
nate on the basis of color. In the 7:3 observation ratio, there is a frequency-based
focal point and this will be counterbalanced so that half of the participants see
blue as the majority and half see red as the majority. From this counterbalance,
we can see if successful coordination was due more to frequency or to color.
4.1.4 Nash equilibria and regularization behavior
As stated earlier, there are three Nash equilibria strategies in this game: two
types of pure strategy, where participants either produce all red or all blue, and
a mixed strategy, where participants choose between red and blue randomly, with
equal probability (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Each of these strategies is
associated with a production ratio. Participants playing the pure strategy will
produce a 0:10 or 10:0 ratio. Participants playing the mixed strategy will be
most likely to produce a 5:5 ratio, but with binomial variance due to the random
sampling nature of this strategy. Playing either of the pure strategies after ob-
serving a variable ratio will lead to regularization behavior as defined in Section
3.1. If participants distinguish between the two pure strategies on the basis of
focal-frequency and choose the majority variant on all of their production trials,
then this is equivalent to regularizing by overproducing the majority variant (as
obtained in Experiment 2) and is also equivalent to maximizing during frequency
prediction. Furthermore, if different observation ratios modulate participants’
likelihood of playing the pure strategy, then this may result in different levels of
regularization per observation ratio condition, as obtained in Experiment 2.
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4.1.5 Research questions
The most basic research question here is, can participants coordinate in this task?
And if so, do they exploit the marbles’ colors and/or relative frequencies as focal
points for successful coordination? Of particular interest is how participants ex-
ploit frequency. Do participants regularize during tacit coordination? And how
does this regularization profile compare to regularization during linguistic fre-
quency learning and production? Since we saw how Nash equilibrium strategies
overlap with regularization behavior, we also want to know if participants are
achieving the Nash equilibrium strategies and whether strategy choice is modu-
lated by the different observation ratios.
4.2 Experiment 5:
regularization biases in coordination
4.2.1 Method
Participants
60 participants were recruited from the University of Edinburgh student com-
munity via the university’s online participant recruitment system. 37 of the
participants were female and the mean age was 23.9 years (min = 22, max =
33) with a standard deviation of 3.2 years. Because the experiment was carried
out in pairs, participants either brought a friend along as the second participant,
or were paired with another solo respondent. All participants received £4 (the
advertized £3 plus a £1 bonus) in monetary compensation for their time. Only
participants who self-reported normal color vision were recruited and this was
verified by an Ishihara color vision test.3
Materials & Stimuli
60 sequences of marble draws were randomly generated in compliance with two
observation ratios. The 30 sequences in the 5:5 condition each consisted of 5 blue
marbles and 5 red marbles in random order. The 30 sequences in the 7:3 condition
were counterbalanced so that 15 sequences were comprised of 3 reds and 7 blues,
and 15 were comprised of 3 blues and 7 reds, also in random order. To ensure a
3This was the same test used in Experiment 2 and 3 (see Appendix A.2.1). Printouts of the
two plates were held up and participants wrote down the number they saw. All participants
answered correctly for both plates. One plate tested for red-green color deficiency and the other
tested for protanopia and deuteranopia.
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representative sample of random sequences, 70% of the sequences began with the
majority marble and 70% of the sequences ended with the majority marble. This
was done because of primacy and recency effects in learning. Because participants
are better at recalling the first and last elements of a sequence (e.g. Deese and
Kaufman, 1957), if all of the first and last observation trials happened to be the
majority marble, then the data sample itself may bias participants away from
a 7:3 representation of their observations. Likewise, the sequences in the 5:5
condition were also made to be representatively random in their first and last
elements. 7 strings began and ended with blue, 8 strings began with blue and
ended with red, 7 strings began with red and ended with blue, and 8 strings
began and ended with red.
These sequences were delivered to participants via a black magician’s bag
with two internal compartments and a handle, which the experimenter held. One
compartment contained approximately 45 red marbles and the other compart-
ment contained approximately 45 blue marbles. The compartments were divided
by a piece of black fabric attached to a semi-circular piece of metal that could be
flipped from one side of the bag’s lip to the other, via a small switch under the
handle. The contents of only one compartment can be accessed when someone
reaches into the bag.4 This allowed for the accurate presentation of a controlled
set of marble draws across participants. If participants had been making truly
random draws from a bag of mixed red and blue marbles, there is no guarantee
that the 30 slots in each observation condition would be filled in a finite amount
of time. So this departure from the “no misleading participants” culture of ex-
perimental economics was done for practical considerations5. Participants were
fully debriefed after the experiment ended.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of an observation phase and a production phase. Two
participants entered the room and sat side by side to fill out their consent forms,
take a color blindness test, and receive instructions (see Appendix A.3 for the
exact verbal and written instructions). Participants then sat in chairs back to
back for the remainder of the experiment. They were instructed to remain silent
throughout the experiment and not to engage in any form of communication with
their partner. In the observation phase, participants drew marbles from the same
4Participants were asked if they noticed anything strange about the bag in an exit question-
naire. Only one of the 60 participants reported that they did, saying she noticed there were
some marbles on the other side of some fabric which she could not grab.
5and a weak sense of morality in general.
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bag, but could not see their partner’s draws. On each trial, the experimenter held
out the bag and participant 1 drew a marble from the bag, looked at it, and put it
back in the bag. The experimenter then moved to participant 2 for them to do the
same (see Figure 4.3). While the experimenter walked from one participant to the
other, she flipped the switch on the handle to open the appropriate compartment
and shook the marbles in the bag (to mask any sound of the switch and to simulate
mixing the marbles so participants would think they had an independent draw
from their partner). Participants took turns making draws in this way until each
participant had seen 10 draws. A second experimenter seated off to the side wrote
down the result of each draw to have a record of what participants actually saw,
in case there were any errors in delivering the pre-generated sequences.6 The
writing was inaudible and kept in pen on a padded clipboard.
In the production phase, each participant was given one white, unlined index
card and they were both asked to write down a marble color. They were told
that the only goal in this part of the experiment is to write the same marble
color that their parter writes on their paper. And if they both write the same
marble color, they will receive a small monetary bonus. When both participants
had written down their response, the cards were collected and placed face down
on the ground. No feedback was given. Each participant was given another index
card and the same instructions were repeated. Production trials were repeated
until each participant had written down 10 marble colors. Response time was
unconstrained and most participants took about 5 seconds per production trial.
Participants wrote with graphite pencils or black pens to avoid giving them red
or blue color cues. Participants then completed an exit questionnaire, looked at
the outcome of their coordination attempts, and were debriefed. Each participant
received a £1 bonus and was told it was “for the matches they got correct”7, so
that all participants would be paid equally for their time.
6All pre-generated sequences were delivered correctly.
7All pairs achieved at least one match.
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Figure 4.3: Photos illustrating the observation phase procedure of Experiment 5,
where a pair of participants take turns drawing marbles from the same bag. Top:
participant one draws a marble and puts it back into the bag. Middle: the ex-
perimenter moves to the next participant, flipping the switch out of participants’
line of site while “mixing” the marbles with her left hand. Bottom: participant
two draws a marble and puts it back into the bag.
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Conditions
Two different observation ratios were tested. 30 participants observed a 5:5 ratio
and 30 participants observed a 7:3 ratio. Participants received the same observa-
tion ratio and counterbalance condition as their partner8. Participant behavior in
this task is independent of the set of draws that their partner saw. The only rea-




First we will discuss the ability of participants to coordinate in this game. Fol-
lowing Mehta et al. (1994a) and Bardsley and Mehta (2010), we calculate the
coordination index, which is a summary statistic of how well participants are
able to coordinate in this task. Rather than reporting the number of coordina-
tions actually achieved per pair, this reports the probability that coordination
will be achieved between any two participants in our participant pool, chosen at





N(N − 1) (4.1)
where N is the total number of participants and ni is the number of participants
that gave each response 1...k. This metric ranges from 0 (where no coordination
is achieved) to 1 (where coordination is always achieved). For example, the
coordination index of Mehta et al. (1994a)’s Heads and Tails result (where 87
participants responded heads and 13 responded tails) is pcoord = 0.77. Because
this index returns the probability that two individuals drawn from the population
without replacement will coordinate, the true chance level will be slightly lower
than pcoord = 0.5. In the following sections, I will present the coordination indices
per observation ratio condition. The chance-level index for the 30 participants in
one observation ratio condition is pcoord = 0.4915.
8There was one exception due to odd numbers in the counterbalance condition: for one pair
in the 7:3 condition, one partner saw 7 blues and 3 reds, and the other saw 7 reds and 3 blues.
Again, participant behavior in this task is independent of their partner’s behavior, so the type




Because participants were not aware that there would be multiple production
trials, the first production trial constitutes a true one-shot game. This section
presents the results of the first production trial only.
Color as a focal point. To determine whether or not participants successfully
exploited color for coordination, I computed the coordination index where ni
encodes the color identity of participants’ one-shot response. This tells us how
well participants were able to coordinate by biasing their productions toward
one of the colors. The results show that color was not successfully exploited for
coordination. In the 5:5 condition, 14 participants produced the blue marble and
16 produced the red (pcoord = 0.485, p = 0.86). The p-value that I have chosen
to report with the pcoord index is that of a two-tailed, exact binomial test. This
gives the probability of obtaining a particular split of the two marble types (here,
14 blue and 16 red) if participants were randomly choosing each type with a
probability of 0.5. If p ≤ 0.05, this means that participants were coordinating
on one of the variants significantly better than chance. In the 7:3 condition,
13 participants produced the blue marble and 17 produced the red (pcoord =
0.492, p = 0.59). Participants perform at chance levels in both observation ratio
conditions: neither the red nor blue color identity was successfully exploited for
coordination.
Frequency as a focal point. When we look at participants’ coordination suc-
cess based on the observation frequency for their response, participants perform
significantly better than chance (pcoord = 0.76, p < .001). Here, the coordination
index was computed so ni encodes participants’ response options as the majority
or the minority marble. Participants in the 7:3 condition were the only ones
who observed a majority marble. Of the 30 participants in this condition, 26 of
them produced the majority marble in their first production trial. But perhaps
this high number of majority productions is because participants were ignoring
the coordination aspect of this task and just probability matching on their first
production, as in Experiment 1. To assess this possibility, the p-values were re-
computed with an exact binomial two-tailed test where the probability of the
two responses is not 0.5, but equal to the observation ratio, 0.7. Even using a
0.7 binomial baseline, production of the majority marble is significantly higher
than chance (p = 0.047). But as we saw in Experiment 1, binomial probability
matching is not the appropriate baseline here. If participants were probability
matching in this task, the variance would be restricted compared to that of the bi-
nomial and that means the p-value here should be lower than it is under binomial
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sampling. Therefore, we can safely say that participants are not just probability
matching in this task. Rather, participants are exploiting the common ground
frequency information they share with their partner to succeed in this coordi-
nation task. Furthermore, it is clear that participants’ overproduction of the
majority variant is specifically due to a coordination attempt, and not some kind
of general production bias, because participants in Experiment 1 who also saw
the 7:3 observation did not produce the majority marble on their first production
trial more than chance with the 0.7 binomial baseline (pcoord = 0.58, p = 1 in an
exact binomial test with 32 trials and 23 majority marble productions)9.
Coordination across all production trials
Although one production trial is enough to analyze participants’ use of color and
frequency as focal points, this section assesses how well participants were able to
coordinate in this entire task by pooling all 10 production trials together, yielding
300 data points per observation ratio condition.
Color as a focal point. In the 5:5 condition, participants successfully coor-
dinated on the blue marble, producing blue on 169 trials and red on 131 trials
(pcoord = 0.51, p = 0.03). In the 7:3 condition, participants did not successfully
coordinate on the basis of color, producing blue on 139 trials, red on 160 trials,
and green on 1 trial (pcoord = 0.497, p = 0.25). Here, the coordination index was
computed for all three variants produced (blue, red, and green) but the green
trial was discarded for the binomial test. In the last section, we saw that color
was not successfully exploited on the first production trial in either condition.
However, across all 10 production trials color was successfully exploited by par-
ticipants in the 5:5 condition, but not in the 7:3 condition. There are two possible
explanations for the difference in 5:5 results. First, the one-shot analysis used
30 data points and the pooled analysis used 300 data points. It is possible that
participants were trying to coordinate on blue in the first trial, but the effect
was too small to detect in the small sample size. The second, and perhaps more
interesting option, is that participants may have started trying to coordinate
on blue sometime after the first production trial. There is evidence in repeated
games without feedback, such as this one, that learning can take place and player
behavior can become more rational, adjusting in the direction of Nash equilibria
over time (Weber, 2003; Rick and Weber, 2010). Therefore, it could be the case
that over the course of the production phase, participants figured out how to
9This p-value = 1 because 23/32 is as close to 0.7 as possible for 32 draws. These 32
participants exactly probability matched on their first draw at the population level.
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coordinate on the basis of color saliency. However, I have no explanation for why
blue was chosen over red. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the literature shows that
red and blue are both strong focal colors. Although the present result shows that
blue was exploited more than red, Scott-Phillips et al. (2009) found red to be
exploited more than blue. It is likely that these colors are nearly tied for focal
strength and whichever one wins out in any given experiment may depend on
the specifics of the experimental design and the exact shade of the red and blue
stimuli.
Frequency as a focal point. In the 7:3 condition, participants successfully
coordinated on the majority marble, producing it 193 times and producing the
minority marble 107 times (pcoord = 0.54, p < .001 with a 0.5 binomial baseline).
The 0.7 binomial baseline also yields a significant difference, showing that par-
ticipants are not simply probability matching in this task (p = 0.032 with a 0.7
binomial baseline).
Regularization profiles: the entropy of variants
In this section, I present the distribution of ratios that participants produced
and then assess participant regularization behavior as we did in Experiment 2,
by calculating the change in entropy between each participant’s observation and
production ratio. I will also make some comparisons to other regularization pro-
files from Experiments 1 and 2. To understand how coordination behavior elicits
regularization, above and beyond that obtained in the same frequency learning
task, I will compare the results of Experiment 5 to Experiment 1. And to shed
some light on the similarity between non-linguistic coordination and linguistic
regularization, I will also compare Experiment 5 to the one-item word frequency
learning in words1, from Experiment 2. Both comparisons will be restricted to
the data obtained from the 5:5 and 7:3 observation ratios, because these were the
only data collected in Experiment 5.
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of ratios that participants produced in Ex-
periment 5, per observation ratio, and re-plots the data from Experiment 1 and 2
for comparison. First let’s look at the regularization profiles for the coordination
task. In the 5:5 condition we see that most participants also respond with a 5:5
ratio, and only a few participants fully regularize by producing all red marbles
or all blue marbles. In the 7:3 condition, more participants produce fully regular
sequences, fewer participants produce the 5:5 ratio, and not many probability
match by producing a 7:3 ratio. In fact, the mode of the response distribution
is on the 6:4 ratio, biased toward the majority variant. Nearly all regularization
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during coordination occurs in the direction of the majority marble.
In comparison to Experiment 1, we can see that the regularizing effect of coor-
dination is not due to the basic frequency learning and production task at hand,
because very little regularization behavior is obtained during probability match-
ing. In comparison to Experiment 2 (words1 ), the regularization profile of word
learning appears more similar to that of coordination. Upon visual inspection,
it seems that participants learning about word frequencies also are most likely
to produce a 5:5 ratio when they’ve observed a 5:5 ratio, and less likely to fully
regularize. In the 7:3 condition, word learners also regularize by overproducing
the majority variant. However, there are some differences as well. Coordina-
tors seem less likely to probability match in the 7:3 condition than word learners
do. To investigate this point I coded participants binarily as exact probability
matchers or not. There were 12 perfect probability matchers in the 5:5 condition
and 3 perfect probability matchers in the 7:3 condition. A Pearson’s Chi-squared
test (with Yates’ continuity correction) showed a significant effect of observation
ratio on the number of perfect probability matchers (χ2(1) = 5.6889, p = 0.02).
Additionally, it seems that coordinators are more likely to fully regularize in the
7:3 condition (where they have a frequency-based focal point) than in the 5:5
condition (where they do not), whereas word learners seem equally likely to fully
regularize, regardless of their observation ratio. However, this apparent differ-
ence in coordinators was not statistically significant. Participants were coded
binarily as a full regularizer or not. There were 4 full regularizers in the 5:5
condition and 7 full regularizers in the 7:3 condition. A Pearson’s Chi-squared
test (with Yates’ continuity correction) showed no significant difference in the
number of full regularizers between observation ratio conditions in coordinators
(χ2(1) = 0.4453, p = 0.51). The same was done for word learners, with 7 full
regularizers in the 5:5 condition and 8 full regularizers in the 7:3 condition. This
difference was not significant either (χ2(1) = 0, p = 1).
Figure 4.5 shows the overall amount of regularization elicited in Experiment
5, again with comparisons to the 5:5 and 7:3 data from Experiment 1 and Ex-
periment 2 (words1 ). Here, we see that coordination elicits regularization be-
havior: the change in entropy in Experiment 5 is significantly lower than zero
(t(59) = −3.8887, p < .001, one sample t-test, two-tailed). Coordination also
elicits significantly more regularization behavior than the probability matching
behavior of Experiment 1 (t(76.97) = −3.1258, p = 0.003). However, the amount
of regularization elicited by coordination and word learning is not significantly
different (t(121.992) = 0.7644, p = 0.45). In terms of regularization differences
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Figure 4.4: The distribution of ratios produced, per observation ratio (5:5 or 7:3)
in Experiment 1, 2, and 5. The x-axis plots the number of times a participant
produced the observed majority (x from the observation ratio (x:y) and the dotted























Figure 4.5: Mean entropy drop in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 (words1 only), and
Experiment 5. Each bar includes pooled data from the 5:5 and 7:3 observation
ratios of each experiment.
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ences (Experiment 1, 5:5 vs 7:3: t(48.884) = −0.6686, p = 0.51; Experiment 2
(words1 ), 5:5 vs 7:3: t(61.576) = −0.2105, p = 0.83; Experiment 5, 5:5 vs 7:3:
t(54.198) = 0.2219, p = 0.8252). This is due to the large amounts of probability
matching and production of 5:5 ratios obtained in these experiments, regardless
of observation ratio.
Participant achievement of Nash equilibria
In a one-shot game, it is impossible to tell which strategy, if any, participants are
employing when they produce either red or blue. But taking all production trials
into account, participants can be classified according to the Nash equilibrium
strategies. I will classify participants who only produced all reds or all blues as
pure strategy players and participants who only produced a 5:5 ratio of reds and
blues as mixed strategy players. This is a conservative definition of mixed strategy
players because players do not know how many production trials there will be
and could end up producing ratios off the 5:5 mark at the time the production
phase cuts off. Of the 60 total participants, 10 adopted a pure strategy and 19
adopted a mixed strategy (Figure 4.6a).
Observation frequency modulation of Nash equilibria strategies
A different proportion of participants played the pure and mixed strategies in each
observation ratio condition. In the 7:3 condition (Figure 4.6b), an equal number
of participants played either strategy: 7 played a pure strategy and 7 played
the mixed strategy. In the 5:5 condition (Figure 4.6c), 3 participants played
a pure strategy and 12 played the mixed strategy. However, the observation
ratio was not found to be a significant predictor of the strategy participants play
(χ2(1) = 1.710, p = 0.191).
In the 7:3 condition, where frequency is a potential focal point, participants
who play the pure strategy seem more likely to do so with the majority marble.
Of the 7 participants who played the pure strategy, 6 played it with the majority
marble and 1 played it with the minority marble. Despite the small data set, this
difference is approaching significance (χ2(1) = 3.5714, p = 0.059), but we can
not reject the null hypothesis that focal-frequency has no effect on which pure
strategy participants decide to play. Because focal-frequency was shown to be a
significant predictor of participant behavior on the first production trial, I believe
that a larger sample of pure strategy players would show significantly more plays
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Figure 4.6: Breakdown of the strategies played by participants in Experiment 5
for a) all participants, b) participants in the 7:3 observation ratio condition, and
c) participants in the 5:5 observation ratio condition.
Regularization: the conditional entropy of the sequences
Thus far in our analysis, we have been assessing regularization behavior in terms
of the relative proportions of the variants, because this is how regularization has
proceeded in all previous experiments. After the data was collected for Exper-
iment 5, however, it became clear that many participants had produced some
unusually structured sequences. Furthermore, the particular structures that they
tended to produce constituted an alternative way to increase the predictability
of their responses. Because this was a rather exploratory experiment and I am
interested in all the ways that participants’ tacit coordination behavior compares
to behavior during linguistic frequency learning and production, I will include a
post-hoc analysis of the sequence structures in this final section.
A structure-based coordination strategy would entail using some sort of rule
system where a participant’s choice on a trial is affected by their choice in a
previous trial. For a first pass at this kind of structural analysis, we will de-
termine whether a participant’s choice on trial t is affected by their choice on
the immediately preceding trial t-1. This will treat sequences as being gener-
ated by a first-order Markov model and ask whether there is good evidence that
the transition probabilities between states are not equally weighted. Thus, our
null hypothesis is a Markov model with 2 states, red and blue. From each state
there are two edges, one going back to the same state and one going to the other
state, and both of these edges are taken with equal probability. If we choose
an initial state with equal probability and run this model for 10 time steps, a
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length-10 sequence of marble draws will be generated. This model can generate
1024 sequences, which is the number of permutations of m elements in a length-n
sequence, given by mn. Each of these sequences has the same probability of being
generated: 1
1024
. If we classify sequences according to their ratio (ex: 5:5), this
random process is more likely to generate some ratios than others. The number
of sequences in each ratio is n!
(n−k)!(k!) , which is the number of combinations of k
reds and (n−k) blues in a length-n sequence. The distribution of ratios that this
process is expected to generate is as follows:
ratio of red:blue 0:10 1:9 2:8 7:3 4:6 5:5 6:4 7:3 8:2 9:1 10:0
combinations 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1
probability .001 .009 .044 .117 .205 .246 .205 .117 .044 .009 .001
These combinatorics result in different probabilities that each ratio will be pro-
duced by this random process. This probability distribution is given by the
binomial equation (refer back to Equation 1.1), where p = 0.5. This constitutes
the baseline we will be working with when determining whether participants are
producing more structured sequences than expected by chance. I will come back
to the importance of this baseline in a moment.
The measure of structure that we will use is the conditional entropy of a
sequence. This tells us about the skew in weighting on the edges of the first-
order Markov model by quantifying, in bits, how much information is needed to
fully predict the next trial outcome, given that we know what the previous trial
outcome was. An example calculation is given in Box 4.1.
The conditional entropy score is bounded by 0 and 1 for binary sequences
when log base 2 is used in the calculation. Sequences in which each element
is completely predictive of the element that follows it, such as 0101010101 or
111111111 have the minimum conditional entropy of 0 bits (and thus, are highly
structured). Sequences in which each element carries no information about the
element that follows it have the maximum conditional entropy of 1 bit, such as
01100 (and are not structured). For binary sequences of length 10, the maximum
entropy is 0.98 bits and is achieved in sequences such as 0011010011, where the
four possible transition types (00, 01, 10, 11) occur nearly equally10
10Only binary sequences where length−14 is an integer can have a maximum entropy of 1 bit.
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Example 4.1. Conditional entropy of a binary sequence
The amount of structure in a binary sequence can be quantified by the
conditional entropy of X (the set of elements at time t) given Y (the
set of elements at time t− 1):






p(x|y) log p(x|y) (4.2)
Let’s calculate the conditional entropy of an example binary sequence:
0110110110
Let y0 be the number of 0s and y1 be the number of 1s at time t − 1.
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Figure 4.7: The entropy and conditional entropy of a) all binary sequences of
length 10, which constitute the 1024 sequences participants can produce, b) all
sequences used in the observation phase of Experiment 5, and c) all sequences that
participants produced in Experiment 5. The skew of this distribution exemplifies
regularization as a process that takes participant behavior into the low entropy
regions of all possible behaviors.
Figure 4.7a plots each of the possible 1024 sequences in terms of their con-
ditional entropy and entropy. If participants are producing sequences by ran-
domly selecting between red and blue on each production trial, then the 60 se-
quences obtained in Experiment 5 should conform to a random sample from
this baseline distribution. Figure 4.7b shows the location of the 60 observa-
tion sequences in this space, which constitute a random sample in the 5:5 ra-
tio (where entropy = 0.88 bits) and 7:3 ratio (where entropy = 1 bit). Fig-
ure 4.7c shows the location of the 60 sequences that participants produced.
These sequences are not likely to be a random sample from the baseline dis-
tribution in terms of entropy (t(59) = −3.4583, p = 0.001) or conditional entropy
(t(59) = −4.6118, p < .001).11 They are highly skewed toward predictable se-
quences with low entropy and low conditional entropy. The skew of this distribu-
tion exemplifies regularization as a process that takes participant behavior into
the low entropy regions of all possible behaviors.
In particular, there are four sequences that account for the largest share of
regularization. Two of these sequences are located in the bottom left corner
of Figure 4.7c, where conditional entropy and entropy are both 0 bits. These
sequences are 0000000000 and 1111111111, and correspond to the pure Nash
11I conducted a one-sample, two-tailed t-test comparing the entropy/conditional entropy
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of conditional entropy scores for a) all possible sequences
in a 5:5 ratio and b) all 5:5 sequences participants produced in Experiment 5.
equilibrium strategy. The other two sequences are located in the top left corner
where conditional entropy is at its minimum, but entropy is at its maximum.
These are the two alternating sequences: 0101010101 and 1010101010, which
correspond to the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy. These salient sequences,
which make up 0.4% of the sequences participants could have produced in this
task, constitute 25% of participants’ actual productions.
In Figure 4.7a, we can see that the entropy and conditional entropy of se-
quences are correlated. If something such as a regularization process is causing
participants to overproduce one of the variants, leading to a drop in entropy,
then the conditional entropy score of the sequence will also go down, even though
there was no process at play that explicitly targeted the temporal structure of
the sequence. Therefore, to be sure that the observed drop in conditional en-
tropy is not due to a variant-based regularization process, we should look for
drops in conditional entropy within a given production ratio, because all of these
sequences will have the same entropy. Within-ratio drops in conditional entropy
provide more definitive support for the presence of a regularization process that
targets the temporal structure of participants’ productions. I will restrict this
within-ratio analysis to the 5:5 ratio, because this is the ratio with 1) the widest
range of conditional entropy values and 2) the highest number of sequences, both
theoretically and in the data obtained from participants.
Figure 4.8a shows the baseline distribution of conditional entropy scores across
the 252 possible sequences in a 5:5 ratio and Figure 4.8b shows the distribution
of conditional entropy scores for the 18 5:5 sequences that participants produced
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in Experiment 5. The sequences that participants produced are not likely to be
a random sample from this baseline distribution (t(17) = −2.4982, p = 0.02).12
Participant productions are more structured, with a mean of 0.64 bits, whereas
the baseline mean is 0.89 bits.
Are participants producing structured sequences because they are in a tacit
coordination situation, or could it be that people always produce structured se-
quences regardless of the task at hand? It is well-known that humans have sys-
tematic biases in random sequence perception (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972;
Hahn and Warren, 2009) and production (Tune, 1964). When people attempt
to generate random sequences, their productions tend to be more rule-governed
(Brugger, 1997) with repetitions of specific subsequences and too many alterna-
tions, resulting in lower average conditional entropy than truly random sequences
(Baddeley, 1966). To determine whether it is the pressure to coordinate that
causes participants to produce more structured sequences, I compared the con-
ditional entropy scores of the 5:5 productions across all experimental conditions
reported in this thesis. Figure 4.9 shows the mean values for Experiment 1, the
four conditions in Experiment 2, Experiment 5, and the baseline distribution for
a 5:5 ratio. All distributions, except for the words6 condition, are significantly
unlikely to be a random sample from the 5:5 baseline distribution 13. They all are
more structured than the baseline, but Experiment 5 shows the highest degree of
structure.
Of the data sets in Figure 4.9, Experiment 1 provides the closest coordination-
less comparison to the task of Experiment 5. The observation phase of both of
these experiments was essentially the same: participants observed 10 marble
draws from a bag (with blue/orange marbles in Experiment 1 and blue/red mar-
bles in Experiment 5). The production phases were also similar: participants
produced a sequence of 10 marbles, one at a time, and they could not see a his-
tory of their past productions. However, Experiment 1 framed the production
task by asking participants to indicate what several more random draws from
this bag are likely to look like and Experiment 5 framed it as a tacit coordina-
tion game. Therefore, the amount of structure obtained in Experiment 1 should
give us an idea of how biased participants’ attempts of random sequence pro-
duction are in this type of task (without a coordination component). The set
12As above, I conducted a one-sample, two-tailed t-test comparing the conditional entropy
of participant productions to the mean of the baseline distribution over conditional entropy
values, but only for sequences in the 5:5 ratios.
13Experiment 1: χ2(4) = 87.8926, p < .001. Experiment 2, marbles1 : χ2(4) = 14.9375, p =
.005, marbles6 : χ2(4) = 30.8059, p < .001, words1 : χ2(4) = 30.8059, p < .001, words6 : χ2(4) =
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Figure 4.9: Mean conditional entropy of all 5:5 production sequences in Experi-
ment 5, Experiment 1, and the four conditions in Experiment 2: marbles1, words1,
marbles6, words6. The baseline mean is that of all possible 5:5 production se-
quences and represents the average conditional entropy that would be expected
if participants were not biasing their productions toward structured sequences.
Error bars are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (Efron, 1979).
of sequences produced in Experiment 5 are significantly more structured than
those of Experiment 1 χ2(4) = 9.598, p = 0.047. This means that the pressure
to coordinate causes participants to structure the sequence of their productions
above and beyond their tendency to do so when attempting to produce random
sequences.
4.2.3 Discussion
In this chapter we have touched on several aspects of non-linguistic coordination
and regularization behavior. The most important result was that participants can
coordinate in this task, and they do so by spontaneously exploiting the relative
frequency of variants in an environment they share with their partner. This
behavior only makes sense if participants were able to infer the relative frequency
of marbles in the bag, on the basis of their observed sample from the bag, and infer
that their partner was also likely to see a sample from the bag which was skewed
toward the same marble color that their sample was skewed toward. In some
ways, this is very similar to what takes place during coordination in language.
There exists a veridical distribution over utterances in any given language, for a
specified time frame, but every user of this language has only experienced a sample
of these utterances. If two users of the language are to coordinate on the same
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arbitrary signal for a meaning, they could exploit the relative frequency of the
signals for that meaning to achieve coordination. This is exactly what language
users seem to do when they are taught a variable language: they produce a more
deterministic language by overproducing the signal that had the highest relative
frequency in their sample.
In this experiment, participants preferred to coordinate on the basis of a vari-
ant’s frequency, rather than its content: they did not exploit color-based focal
points when the marbles could be distinguished on the basis of their relative
frequency. This may be because the two colors that were provided as common
ground (red and blue) are the two most preferred colors for coordination. If only
one of these colors were used along with a dispreferred coordination color, such as
beige, then it is possible that participants would have exploited color for successful
coordination even if one of these colors occurred in the majority of observations.
However, it may be the case that frequency information is always given prefer-
ence. Through personal communication with Karen Schloss (at the Palmer Visual
Perception and Aestheics Lab in UC Berkeley), higher-level cognitive mechanisms
involved in frequency learning may be trumping people’s basic color preferences.
According to her, the blue and orange pair of marble colors used in Experiment
1 are the most and least preferred colors, respectively (according to an United
States participant pool) and blue should have been over-produced in Experiment
1, but this was not the case. Instead, the frequency learning task in Experiment
1, which lead participants to reliably probability match, seems to have overridden
participants’ basic color preferences. In Experiment 5, the higher-level cognitive
mechanisms involved in tacit coordination did lead participants to coordinate on
the preferred color (blue), rather than probability match, but when frequency
information was added on top of the same marble color information, participants
abandoned the focal-color strategy and coordinated on the majority marble only.
It is quite possible that coordinating individuals privilege frequency-based infor-
mation over content of signals in all tacit coordination games, precisely because
the solution to such games is arbitrary and agnostic to content. This would imply
that, in the coordination game of natural language use, the frequency of linguistic
features may play a larger role in language learning and production than their
various content features do.
This experiment also demonstrated that the pressure to coordinate elicits
regularization behavior, and the amount of regularization it elicits was not sig-
nificantly different from the amount elicited by word learning. This suggests that
the same mechanism may underlie regularization in language and in non-linguistic
coordination. However, there were some differences when we took a more detailed
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look at the regularization profiles. Although word learners and coordinators both
fully regularize, some word learners also seemed to probability match, whereas
coordinators do not: instead, some coordinators play a mixed strategy, producing
5:5 ratios.
Another difference unique to coordination is the amount of regularization
obtained in terms of sequence structure. Coordinating individuals produced se-
quences with lower conditional entropies than participants in any other experi-
ment in this thesis. This may be because whole sequences can also serve as focal
points, and is evidenced by the fact that participants converged upon 4 specific
sequences (all red, all blue, red-blue alternating, and blue-red alternating) with
a probability much higher than chance. If these highly structured sequences do
serve as focal points, then changing the production task to be more explicitly
about whole-sequence matching may increase the percentage of participants that
produce these four sequences. For example, instead of coordinating color by color
in a series of one-shot games, participants could construct a sequence of 10 draws.
This sequence would then be compared to their partner’s and only if all marbles
match up, would they receive a reward. I hypothesize that a production task such
as this will lead to even more structure-based regularization (i.e. lower conditional
entropy of the sequences participants produce). However, such structure-based
coordination does not seem to have any parallels in the timecourse production of
synonyms.
In summary, participants exploit frequency in a non-linguistic coordination
game, often by playing the pure Nash equilibrium strategy on the majority vari-
ant, and this leads to regularization behavior. Participants do not regularize in
a matched task without coordination, but do regularize to a similar extent in a
word learning task, which is not an explicit coordination game. The similarities
in regularization between coordination and word learning suggest a functional ac-
count of coordination as a mechanism that contributes to regularity in language.
In this way, coordination may be a key component of the domain-specific regu-
larization bias described in Experiment 2, if a linguistic framing of a frequency
learning task is enough to trigger coordination strategies in participants. Or, it
could constitute yet another contributor to the overall regularity observed in lan-





Inductive biases and Bayesian
model fitting
In the previous chapters, we have been looking in detail at human frequency
learning behavior and experimentally determining what aspects of the learning
context affect that behavior. Most notably, it is the type of stimuli (linguistic or
non-linguistic), the number of frequencies a participant must track at one time
(for one versus six items), and the goal of the task (coordination or imitation1)
that affect the amount of variation participants maintain or eliminate in their
productions. These different learning contexts modulate the cognitive system by
triggering different learning mechanisms, each of which may have its own bias.
Because word learners, concurrent frequency learners, and coordinators demon-
strated a consistent bias toward producing regular mappings, this is evidence that
these three learning contexts engage biased cognitive processes.
In Chapter 1, I discussed culture as having two distinct phases of its life
cycle: an internal phase, where it exists in the neuronal architecture of a cognitive
system, and an external phase, where it exists as behavioral and concrete artifacts.
The data obtained from behavioral experiments only allows us direct access to
this external phase. However, behavioral data provides clues to the internal states
when analyzed, and statistical tests help determine whether behaviors across
experimental conditions are the result of different cognitive mechanisms or not.
In this chapter, I sharpen the focus on the internal phase of culture’s life cycle
and ask what cognition-internal forces could be producing the various degrees
of biased behavior that participants demonstrate. Short of doing neuroscience,
cognitive modeling allows us to assess hypotheses about what is going on inside
1Here I’m referring to Experiments 1 though 4 loosely as imitation tasks, because the only
goal was to produce draws that are likely to come from the bag, or to name the object as you
observed it being named.
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people’s heads as they produce the behavior that they do. Improving our picture
of these cognition-internal mechanisms helps us sketch the environment through
which culture and languages replicate. Just as we might want to find out what
caused some change in a population of organisms, such as why some particular
trait exists with such a high frequency (is it because of some selective pressure,
or could it just be due to drift?), we want to know what forces give rise to the
particular distribution of variants in a population of cultural artifacts. This is
done by positing different models of these processes and evaluating which model
best accounts for the data at hand.
The major force that shapes culture is the inductive bias of the cognitive
agents that transmit it. As discussed in Chapter 1, cultural transmission is a
reverse engineering process where agents generate behaviors in response to other,
observed behaviors. In the case of language learning, this may involve an inference
of the grammar underlying observed utterances, and this inferred grammar would
then be used to generate more utterances. In the case of frequency learning,
agents see events occurring with specific frequencies, such as two marble colors
being drawn from a bag, and must infer the relative proportion of marbles in the
bag to predict what further draws from that bag might look like. If a learner’s
predictions consistently deviate from the observed frequencies, then an inductive
bias must be at play.
A special class of cognitive models, Bayesian models, allow for the explicit
quantification of inductive biases that learners employ when making inferences
about the processes that generate observed data. In this chapter, I apply a
Bayesian model of frequency learning developed by Reali and Griffiths (2009)
to quantify participants’ inductive biases during frequency learning to the five
experiments in this thesis. In this model, the inductive bias is represented as
a prior probability distribution over all possible observation ratios, such that
certain ratios may be a priori more probable. When participants are viewing
marble draws from containers, they may think 50/50 ratios are more plausible,
but when participants are viewing words being used to name objects, they may
think deterministic mappings are more plausible. Learners then combine their a
priori biases with the data they observed to arrive at an estimate of the relative
frequency of the marbles in the bag, or the relative frequency of two synonyms in
a language. When participants are asked to imitate their observations, they may
use this estimate during production. In this way, participants’ productions may
be biased due to their inductive bias in frequency estimation.
In the following sections, I will describe this model in more detail and then
quantify participants’ frequency learning biases by fitting this model to my em-
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pirical data. Essentially, the model fitting procedure asks: what kind of bias
would a Bayesian learner need to have to produce the data that participants pro-
duced? Although I do not assume that participants are perfect Bayesian rational
learners, the model fits may be a fair approximation of participants’ inductive
biases. Therefore, I will assess how well this model fits the data and detail its
capabilities and limitations in describing human probability matching and reg-
ularization behavior. Finally, I will assess the insights gained and suggest some
improvements to this modeling framework.
5.1 A model of frequency estimation
This section describes the beta-binomial Bayesian model of frequency estimation
as developed by Reali and Griffiths (2009). Assume that a set of variants exist
in the world with a particular relative proportion to one another (such as a
70/30 ratio of marbles in a bag) and a learner observes N instances of those
variants (such as N draws from that bag). Here, we will only consider sets of
two variants, but this model generalizes to sets of any size. Let x denote the
number of occurrences of variant x and let y denote the number of occurrences
of variant y, which equals N − x. The learner’s estimate of the true proportion
of each variant is the world is denoted by θx and θy, respectively. The problem
that the learner is faced with is estimating θx and θy from their observations x
and y. Since θy follows directly from θx, and y follows directly from x, we can
solve this estimation problem in terms of x and θx only. From here onward, an
un-subscripted θ will refer to the estimate of the proportion of variant x.
This frequency estimation problem will be solved through Bayesian inference.
A Bayesian rational learner uses Bayes’ rule (Equation 5.1) to infer what hypoth-
esis (θ) generated the observed data (x).
P (θ|x) ∝ P (x|θ)P (θ) (5.1)
Bayes’ rule combines the prior probability over all hypotheses, P (θ), with the
likelihood of the data under each hypothesis, P (x|θ), to arrive at a posterior
probability of each hypothesis given the data, P (θ|x). The learner then uses
these posterior probabilities to inform their choice of a hypothesis.
In the beta-binomial implementation of Bayes’ rule, the prior follows a beta
distribution and the likelihood follows a binomial distribution. Here, the prior is
a beta distribution over all hypotheses (Equation 5.2), where B(·, ·) is the beta
function (Boas, 1983).
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For the purpose of exploring inductive biases related to regularization and prob-
ability matching, we will only consider a subset of priors which follow a symmet-
rical beta distribution (as in Reali and Griffiths (2009)). This reduces the beta


























parameter captures how regular or variable learners expect their observa-
tions to be.2 Figure 5.1 shows some example priors from the range of symmetrical
priors achievable by this model. When α
2
< 1, learners have a regularization bias
and their prior is symmetrically peaked at θ = 0 and θ = 1. When α
2
> 1, learners
have a variability bias and their prior is peaked at θ = 0.5. When α
2
= 1, learners
are unbiased and their prior is flat, meaning they expect all hypotheses to be
equally likely. The prior distribution gradually becomes peakier (unimodally) as
α
2
gets larger and peakier (bimodally) as α
2
gets smaller than 1.
beta(0.1,0.1) beta(0.5,0.5) beta(1,1) beta(2,2) beta(3,3)



































Figure 5.1: Example symmetrical prior beta distributions.
beta(0.1,0.2) beta(3,2) beta(2,0.1)






















Figure 5.2: Example asymmetrical prior beta distributions.
2I kept the α2 notation of Reali and Griffiths (2009) to prevent confusion in cross-referencing.
This is a notational hang-over from the Dirichlet-multinomial version of this model where
the number of variants, k, is larger than two and the prior parameter is αk . For example, if
participants were estimating the relative proportion of three marbles in a bag, I would use a
Dirichlet-multinomial Bayesian model with a prior parameter α3 .
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All asymmetrical priors are excluded from this model. Some examples of
asymmetrical priors are shown in Figure 5.2. By definition, all asymmetrical
priors incorporate a direct bias toward variant x or variant y. Because there was
no behavioral evidence of direct biases for the particular marble or word stimuli
used, these priors will not be considered.
The next component of Bayes’ rule is the likelihood function, P (x|θ). This
assigns a probability of observing each value of x under each value of θ. For our
case of two variants, the likelihood function is defined by a binomial distribution:






































=0.5, N=10    =0.5, N=20 =0.7, N=10 =0.7, N=20
Figure 5.3: Example likelihood binomial distributions.
Figure 5.3 shows some examples of binomial distributions for different values of
θ and N . Under a binomial likelihood function, each estimate always assigns the
highest probability to its equivalent value of x. For example, if a bag contains a
50/50 ratio of blue to red marbles, the most likely outcome in a series of 10 draws
is 5 blues and 5 reds (θ = 0.5 and x = 5). Likewise, if a bag contains a 70/30
ratio, then the most likely outcome is 7 blues and 3 reds (θ = 0.7 and x = 7).
The last component of Bayes’ rule is the posterior probability over hypotheses,
P (θ|x). Because the beta prior is conjugate to the binomial likelihood (Raiffa and
Schlaifer, 1961; Gelman et al., 2013), the posterior will also be a beta distribution,
and can be expressed simply as:
Beta(β1 + x, β2 +N − x) (5.5)








+N − x) = θ α2−1+x(1− θ)α2−1+N−x (5.6)
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This distribution provides learners with the posterior probability of each hypoth-
esis and concludes the process of Bayesian inference. Some examples of posterior
distributions for N = 10 and different values of x and α
2
are shown in Figure 5.4.



































x=7,    =0.01 x=7,    =1 x=7,    =10 x=5,    =0.01 x=5,    =10
Figure 5.4: Example posterior beta distributions.
But how does a learner use these posterior probabilities to generate new data?
In the frequency learning Experiment 2, participants observed 10 marble draws
or naming events that constituted their input data, x. They were then asked
to produce several more draws or naming events that may be likely to occur.
Participants must have formed some estimate of the probabilities of the variants
associated with each referent and generated a new set of variants from this es-
timate somehow. There are a variety of ways to implement hypothesis selection
and data generation for a Bayesian rational learner. Three reasonable hypothesis
choice strategies are:
1. maximizing : learners choose the maximum a posteriori hypothesis (MAP),










3. sampling : learners choose a hypothesis by randomly sampling it from the
posterior distribution, according to the posterior probability of each hy-
pothesis.
After a hypothesis has been chosen by one of the above methods, data is gener-
ated from the hypothesis according to its likelihood under that hypothesis. Since
the likelihood function of this beta-binomial Bayesian model is binomial, data
production will also follow a binomial distribution. This is equivalent to generat-
ing data by randomly drawing marbles/words from the hypothesized proportion,
with replacement. Rational learners must have complete knowledge of how data
are generated from hypotheses (i.e. what the data likelihoods are). In a cul-
tural transmission situation, the production likelihoods of one agent will be the
likelihoods the next agent should use during induction. When all agents in the
population are assumed to have identical learning algorithms, as most research
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in cultural evolution assumes and will be assumed here, this means that the
induction and production likelihoods should be identical for one learner.
So now we have a complete model that takes a learner from a specific type of
input data (x) to a specific type of output data (x′). Reali and Griffiths (2009,
p.321) provide equations for calculating the probability of producing any value







B(x+ x′ + α
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The equation for the maximizer model is obtained by replacing the term for the














α +N − 2
))N−x′
(5.9)
These equations put the model into a format that we can use to fit to our
experimental data, because our data is in the format of input-output (x to x′)
transitions and these equations assign a probability to each of these transitions.
The model fitting task at hand is to determine which prior bias and hypothesis
choice strategy assigns the greatest probability to participant behavior, and thus,
best explains participant behavior.
5.2 Model fitting procedure
This section explains how the sampler, averager, and maximizer models are fit to
participant data by maximum likelihood estimation of the prior parameter α
2
.
The best-fit model is the one that assigns the highest probability to the set
of x to x′ transitions produced by participants. Varying the model’s parameters
varies the model’s fit. We want to determine which combination of parameters
gives the model the best fit (i.e. explains participant behavior best). In our
3In this paper they refer to the averager as a MAP learner, although their equations are
explicit about the use of the posterior mean for hypothesis selection. To avoid any confusion in
terminology, I will stick to my labels of sampler (consistent with their terminology), averager
(which produces data distributions that correspond to the posterior predictive distribution),
and maximizer (which I use as a synonym for MAP).
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experimental setup, the parameters N , x, and x′ are given: these are the number
of marble draws or naming events that participants observe per referent (N = 10),
the frequency with which they observed variant x per referent (x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
or 5, depending on the observation ratio), and the frequency with which they
produced variant x per referent (x′ = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10). The only
parameter that is not known is the one corresponding to participants’ prior bias,
α
2
. The following describes the maximum likelihood estimation procedure used
to determine the best-fit value of α
2
for a given model (sampler, averager, or
maximizer).
First, a candidate value of α
2
was plugged into the model and then the prob-
ability of each (x, x′) transition in the data set was calculated under that model
(via its corresponding equation, 5.7, 5.8, or 5.9). Next, the natural log of each
probability were summed to yield the log likelihood score for this data under
the α
2
candidate in question. For example, take this hypothetical data set with
5 data points: (x, x′) = {(5,4),(5,5),(5,5),(5,7),(5,8)}, where N = 10, and the
candidate α
2
= 1. The probability of each data point under the sampler model
is {0.165, 0.180, 0.180, 0.126, 0.077}. The natural log of these probabilities are
{-1.80, -1.71, -1.71, -2.07, -2.56} and their sum is -9.85. This is the log likelihood
score for this data set given a sampler model where α
2
= 1. This calculation was
repeated for a discrete set of candidate α
2
values in the range of 0 < α
2
≤ 100, in
0.001 increments. The maximum likelihood estimate for the best-fit value of α
2
is
the one with the log likelihood score closest to zero. All scores in this range were
unimodal, with one global maximum (refer ahead to 5.6).
To find out what percentage of the data a model explains, we can work out
the prediction rate from the log likelihood of the model:






The exp(·) function is used when the natural logarithm (log base e) is used
in the log likelihood calculations. Otherwise, the argument of exp(·) should be
multiplied by the natural log of the base used. The prediction rate for our example
data set above is exp(−9.85
5
) = 14%. This means that the model, on average4, will
correctly predict each data point 14% of the time. This is equivalent to saying
that the model accurately predicts 14% of participant behavior.
4Because the averaging was done in log space, this average is the geometric mean, which is
the appropriate mean for comparing rates of change.
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All of model fitting in this chapter will be carried out on data sets that ex-
clude the 10:0 observation ratio because the maximizer model is undefined for
y = 0 when α
2
≤ 1 and can not assign probabilities to participant production in
response to the 10:0 observation ratio. This is known as the sparse data problem
(e.g. Murphy, 2001), which is common in maximum likelihood estimation for rare
or non-existent data points, and applies to the 10:0 observation ratio data because
input data points for variant y are non-existent. There are various methods for
dealing with this problem, but I will deal with it by just excluding the 10:0 obser-
vation ratio data from analysis. Additionally, the 10:0 observation ratio provides
the least informative data for discriminating between different models because
perfect probability matchers and perfect regularizers will respond identically to
a 10:0 observation ratio, by producing only 10:0 observation ratios.
As a terminological note, I will refer to the best-fit priors as weak, medium,
or strong biases, depending on their values of α
2
. Following Perfors (2012), I will
refer to priors in the order of magnitude of tenths (0.1 ≤ α
2
< 1) as a weak
regularization bias, hundredths (0.01 ≤ α
2
< 0.1) as a medium regularization
bias, and thousands and below (0 ≤ α
2
< 0.01) as a strong regularization bias.
Likewise, I will apply this same classification to the variability bias and refer to
priors in the order of magnitude of ones (1 < α
2
≤ 10) as a weak variability bias,
tens (10 < α
2




5.3 A note on comparing model fits
Normally, several models are fit to one data set to determine which model best
explains the data at hand. In the following sections, I will be fitting the same set
of models to all of the different data sets collected in this thesis. In many cases,
the number of data points collected differs per experiment and per experimental
condition. This means that the raw log likelihood scores cannot be directly
compared across data sets. Log likelihood scores will generally be much lower
for data sets that contain more data points because each observation receives a
log likelihood under the model, and more observations mean more log likelihood
scores are summed (remember, these scores are all negative). Instead, prediction
rates should be used to compare fits across data sets. As seen in Equation 5.11,
the prediction rate is based on the average log likelihood per data point, and this
is what makes fair comparisons possible.
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There remains one further issue in comparing model fits across data sets. Dif-
ferent data sets can contain different amounts of variability and prediction rates
will necessarily be lower for data sets that are more variable. Only determinis-
tic processes can be predicted with 100% accuracy and the ceiling on prediction
rates is relative to the entropy of the data set as a whole. For example, Figure
5.5 reprints the distribution of production ratios from the 5:5 observation ratio























Figure 5.5: Reprints of the distribution of production ratios from the 5:5 ob-
servation ratio in marbles1 (left) and marbles6 (right). The entropy of each
distribution is 1.87 bits for marbles1 and 3.28 bits for marbles6.
At the population level, probability matching profiles are more deterministic
than regularization profiles: the entropy of the population of responses to the 5:5
observation ratio in marbles1 is 1.87 bits and in marbles6 it is 3.28 bits. This
means that any participant’s response in marbles1 is more predictable than in
marbles6 and thus, will have a higher ceiling on prediction rate than marbles6.
The ceiling on the prediction rate can be calculated by fitting the data to itself,
because the closest description of any data set is itself. This yields a ceiling of
27% for the example distribution from marbles1 and a ceiling of 10% for the
example distribution from marbles6. This means the best that any model can do
in predicting marbles1 is 27%, whereas in marbles6 it is only 10%. Therefore, it
would be misleading to compare prediction rates between data sets that differ in
variability because models fit to variable data will always be penalized.
I have not come across any existing literature that addresses this problem
(again, because model fits are usually compared within one data set and this
problem does not arise) so I have developed an adjusted prediction rate, which
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should be used as a guide in comparing model fits across different data sets. The
adjusted prediction rate is calculated by dividing the prediction rate by its ceiling:




In all model fit results, I will report the adjusted prediction rate in parentheses
next to the real prediction rate.
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5.4 Model fitting results for Experiment 1
5.4.1 Biases underlying probability matching behavior
In this section, we look at how the models fit the probability matching behavior
obtained in Experiment 1. Figure 5.6 shows the log likelihood calculations for the
range of priors explored (0 < α
2
≤ 100) for the sampler, averager, and maximizer
models.5 The maximum likelihood estimate of α
2
is the value at the peak of each
curve and corresponds to the prior that best explains participants’ productions.


















Figure 5.6: Log likelihoods of Experiment 1 data for different values of α
2
under
the sampler, averager, and maximizer models.
best-fit α
2
log likelihood prediction rate
model sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max.
best-fit prior 1.39 0.66 1.66 -276 -254 -254 17% (49%) 20% (57%) 20% (57%)
Table 5.1: Maximum likelihood estimates of the best-fit prior parameter α
2
for
participants in Experiment 1.
The best fit values of α
2
are reported in Table 5.1 along with their corresponding
log likelihood and prediction rate. The model that returns the best fit overall is
indicated in bold. Both the sampler and maximizer models yield a best-fit prior
with a weak variability bias (α
2
= 1.39 and 1.66, respectively) and the averager
model yields a prior with a weak regularity bias (α
2
= 0.66). All of the models
do fairly well at explaining the data, but the averager and maximizer models do
best with a 20% prediction rate.
5The reason I have explored such a wide space of variability-biased priors is because the
space of priors itself is skewed. The prior favoring maximum-variability lies at α2 =∞, whereas
the prior favoring maximum-regularity is α2 = 0 (only one unit away form the unbiased prior
α
2 = 1). Priors favoring maximum-variability are all binomials where p = 0.5 and certainly
lie within the scope of participant behavior. This prior would be returned by the model fit if,
for example, participants were responding randomly in the production phase. Because this is
the prior that corresponds to “nothing matters, this experiment is boring”, I will include large
values of α2 in the search range as a precaution.
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observation ratio 5:5 6:4 7:3 8:2 9:1
mode of responses 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
mean of responses 0.47 0.56 0.67 0.77 0.86
Table 5.2: The mode and means of participant responses per observation ratio in
Experiment 1. The modes equal the observation proportion of variant x (from
observation ratio x : y) and the means are all slightly biased in the direction of
the 5:5 production ratio.
Intuitively, we would expect probability matching to be best described by an
unbiased prior, α
2
= 1, however none of the models return an unbiased prior as the
best fit. Although the data in Experiment 1 do qualify as unbiased probability
matching behavior because the mode of participant responses is on the input
ratio and there was no significant difference between the mean and the input
ratio (refer back to the definition on page 48), the raw data was slightly skewed
toward the 5:5 ratio (see Table 5.2). This may be what the sampler and maximizer
models are picking up on when returning a weak variability bias as the best-fit
prior. However in the case of the averager, a weak regularity bias seems largely
unfounded on the basis of this data. (Over the course of this chapter we will
see that the averager provides the least intuitive results, and the reasons behind
this will be discussed further in Section 5.9). The sampler and maximizer fit
indicates that participants possess a weak variability bias when reasoning about
the ratio of marbles in containers and this is supported by the observation that
humans tend to expect random events to be uniformly distributed (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1972). A bias toward a 5:5 ratio is evidence of an expectation that
two marble colors are uniformly distributed. As anecdotal support for this claim,
one participant who received the 8:2 observation ratio left a comment saying “I
really do hope the marbles were random. It was crazy how many blues there
were!” Incidentally, this person also produced a 8:2 ratio. If Experiment 1 were
run with a larger sample size, mean responses may turn out to be significantly
lower than the input ratios and support a variability bias interpretation. However,
we can not draw that conclusion given the present data set.
Comparing these model fitting results to the coin flipping experiment of Reali
and Griffiths (2009), their best-fit prior for the sampler model was α
2
= 4.38,
which is a stronger variability bias than those returned for the marble drawing
data. I chose to use stimuli of marbles and containers because people are likely
to have a different prior over the possible proportions of marbles in bags than the
possible weightings of heads and tails on a coin. Participants are likely to have
had experience with variable proportions of marbles in bags, but in the case of
coin flipping, especially with real coins as used in Reali and Griffiths (2009), par-
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ticipants are likely to only have experience with evenly weighted coins and thus,
possess a strong prior bias toward θ = 0.5. They showed that this was the case;
iterated learning chains of participants which were initialized with a 9:1 obser-
vation ratio, quickly converged to 5:5 production ratios, despite strong evidence
in the initial data that the coin was biased. From personal communication with
one of the authors, when this coin flipping task was piloted on a computer, where
heads and tails images appeared on a the screen, participants probability matched
more. This makes sense because participants may have less reason to believe that
a computer-generated series of coin flips is constrained by the physical nature of
coins and thus, the computer-based framing of the task may have prompted par-
ticipants to entertain hypotheses differently. Experiment 1 revealed a different
kind of prior, one closer to probability matching, because participants’ priors
within the marble drawing task framing were not strong enough to overwhelm
the data they had observed.
5.5 Model fitting results for Experiment 2
Now, we will look at the experimental manipulations that take participant behav-
ior away from probability matching and see what these models tell us about the
biases underlying participants’ regularization behavior in Experiment 2. This
experiment consisted of four conditions: a replication of Experiment 1 called
marbles1, a replication of Experiment 1 with linguistic stimuli (synonyms and
objects instead of marbles and containers) called words1, and two multiple fre-
quency learning conditions, in which participants learn about six containers or
six objects concurrently, called marbles6 and words6 respectively. The two ma-
nipulations in this 2 × 2 design are domain and concurrency and both elicited
regularization behavior.
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5.5.1 Domain-specific regularization biases
In this section, the sampler, averager, and maximizer models are fit to participant
data pooled by domain (marbles vs. words) to determine whether participants
possess different prior expectations about the relative frequencies of marbles in
containers versus synonyms for objects. In short, does the difference in task
framing by domain trigger different frequency learning biases? The best-fit values
for prior parameter α
2
are shown in Table 5.3.
best-fit α
2
log likelihood prediction rate
data set sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max.
marbles1 & marbles6 0.43 1.55 2.55 -1136 -1359 -1359 9% (41%) 6% (27%) 6% (27%)
words1 & words6 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 0.92 -1170 -1537 -1537 9% (24%) 4% (11%) 4% (11%)
Table 5.3: Maximum likelihood estimates of the best-fit prior parameter α
2
per
domain for participants in Experiment 2.
Each model fits a more regular bias to the words domain than the marbles do-
main, indicating that there is less of a regularization bias underlying the produc-
tion of these data compared to those of the words domain, and this is consistent
with participant behavior across domain. In the words domain, all of the best-fit
priors are regularization biases. For the sampler and averager models, the best-fit
bias is the maximally-regular bias of α
2
≈ 0, and for the maximizer model, a weak
regularization bias is the best fit. This is consistent with recent findings that weak
inductive biases are sufficient for maximizers to produce strongly biased behavior
(Griffiths and Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007; Smith and Kirby, 2008; Thompson
et al., 2012). On the other hand, the results of the sampler and averager models
suggest that there are strong regularization biases for the linguistic domain. This
interpretation is in line with the argumentation of Bickerton (1984), although a
Bayesian prior need not be interpreted as an innate bias. The prior represents all
of the knowledge that the learner brings to the task, before any data for the task
at hand is seen (Griffiths and Kalish, 2007). Therefore, the prior could represent
a regularization bias acquired during language acquisition, or even something as
short-term as a priming effect.
In the marbles domain, the sampler’s bias is weakly regular, while the averager
and maximizer models both show variability biases. This could be because the
later two models are picking up on the tendency of participants to bias their
marble drawing ratios slightly toward the 5:5 ratio, as found in Experiment 1,
whereas the sampler is more sensitive to the regularity obtained in marbles6.
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5.5.2 Demand-based regularization biases
In this section, the models are fit to participant data pooled by the concurrency
manipulation (single vs concurrent frequency learning) to determine the prior
bias associated with these conditions. It is a little less intuitive to ask about
differences in prior expectations due to the concurrency manipulation than it was
for the domain manipulation. Because this manipulation increases cognitive load
for participants, regularization behavior here is likely due to memory constraints.
Although these constraints can impose a bias during induction, the Bayesian
model carves up induction with an explicit bias on frequency estimation only,
and this may not be the same, or only source of regularization bias produced by
memory constraints. Whatever is going on to elicit different regularization behav-
ior between these two conditions, the Bayesian model will respond to participant
regularization behavior by capturing it in the prior parameter, as if it were a prior
bias on the estimates of frequencies. So the model fits presented in this section
should be understood as a catch-all indicator of participants’ inductive biases due
to cognitive load manipulation.
Table 5.4 gives the model fitting results to the Experiment 2 data pooled by
single frequency learning (marbles1 & words1 ) and concurrent frequency learning
(marbles6 & words6 ).
best-fit α
2
log likelihood prediction rate
data set sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max.
marbles1 & words1 0.47 0.66 1.66 -657 -720 -720 13% (33%) 11% (28%) 11% (28%)
marbles6 & words6 ≈ 0 0.59 1.59 -1650 -2210 -2210 8% (33%) 3% (13%) 3% (13%)
Table 5.4: Maximum likelihood estimates of the best-fit prior parameter α
2
per
domain for participants in Experiment 2.
The fits indicate that participants have stronger regularization biases for the
concurrent frequency learning conditions than the single frequency learning con-
ditions. The sampler model fits a weak regularization bias to single frequency
learning and a fully regular bias to concurrent frequency learning. The aver-
ager fits a weak regularization bias to both conditions, with concurrent frequency
learning biased more toward regularity. The maximizer fits a weak variability
bias to both, with concurrent frequency learning less biased toward variability
than single frequency learning. In all cases, the sampler is the better fit again,
with a prediction rate of 13% for single frequency learning and 8% for concurrent
frequency learning.
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5.5.3 Best-fit biases per condition
In this section I present the model fits to each of the four conditions separately to
see how the models capture the graded increase in regularization behavior across
these conditions. Table 5.5 shows these model fitting results per condition.
best-fit α
2
log likelihood prediction rate
data set sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max.
marbles1 1.74 1.66 2.66 -314 -324 -324 14% (47%) 13% (33%) 13% (33%)
marbles6 ≈ 0 1.5 2.5 -811 -1034 -1034 8% (44%) 4% (22%) 4% (22%)
words1 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 0.96 -332 -384 -384 13% (26%) 9% (18%) 9% (18%)
words6 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 0.9 -838 -1152 -1152 7% (23%) 3% (10%) 3% (10%)
Table 5.5: Best-fit prior per condition in Experiment 2.
The first row shows the fits for marbles1. This was the only condition in this
experiment where participants probability matched and all models fit this data
with a variability bias and predict the data equally well, at 14% and 13% per-
cent. The next two conditions, marbles6 and words1, elicited similar amounts
of regularization behavior, but yield different model fits for the averager and
maximizer. This may be because the mass on production ratios are distributed
differently between conditions and correspond to different likelihoods under each
model. In words1, mass is mostly on fully-regular responses and perfect proba-
bility matching, whereas in marbles6 it is mostly on fully-regular responses with
large amounts of noise in between. The models distribute likelihood across behav-
iors differently, and the sampler seems to be responding more to the fully-regular
responses (by assigning the same, maximally regular bias to these two conditions),
the maximizer is responding to the probability matching component of words1
and the noise component of marbles6, and the averager’s response is somewhere
in between. Words6 is best fit by a regularization bias for all models, but again
the maximizer only assigns a weak bias. Considering the two word learning con-
ditions together, there is very little difference in the model fits. This indicates
that the inductive bias toward regularity is fixed in the words domain and cor-
roborates the findings in Chapter 3 that language-specific biases are across the
board and do not interact with the domain-general biases elicited by concurrent
frequency learning.
The sampler model is best at predicting the data in all four conditions, how-
ever it shows little sensitivity to the different levels of regularity in these data
sets, fitting all conditions in which participants regularized some amount with the
maximally regular prior α
2
= 0. The maximizer model does the best at responding
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to the different levels of regularization behavior per condition and returns best-
fit inductive biases that match the increasing level of regularity obtained across
these four conditions (refer back to Figure 3.13)
5.6 Model fitting results for Experiment 3
This experiment is a replication of marbles6 for two additional sets of observation
ratios. It consisted of two conditions: one in which all observation ratios were
10:0, and one in which all were 5:5. Because I am excluding 10:0 data to obtain
fits for maximizers, I will just present the results of the all 5:5 condition here.
Because the results of the all 5:5 were not significantly different from those of
the 5:5 ratio in marbles6, I would expect the models to return the same best-fit
priors as they for the whole marbles6 data set. However, this was not the case.
best-fit α
2
log likelihood prediction rate
model sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max.
all 5:5 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 -501 -610 -610 7% (41%) 4% (24%) 4% (24%)
marbles6 ≈ 0 1.5 2.5 -811 -1034 -1034 8% (44%) 4% (22%) 4% (22%)
Table 5.6: Best-fit priors for Experiment 3 (top) and the fits for marbles6 in
Experiment 2 reprinted for comparison.
All models respond with a maximally-regular best-fit prior. Of all the ob-
servation ratios, the probability of fully-regular responses is lowest given a 5:5
observation ratio for all models. Because the maximally regular prior assigns the
most likelihood to these rare events (which are actually quite frequent in the all
5:5 data set), it is the best-fit prior for all models. These model fits seem inad-
equate because participants could have produced many more regular responses
than they did in the all 5:5 condition, and this shows that the models are not
sensitive to the diverse levels of regularization that are possible here. The sam-
pler model provides the best fit here because it assigns more likelihood to the
fully regular production ratios than the averager and maximizers do and thus, it
scores a higher likelihood and prediction rate for this data set.
Due to the limited diversity of this data set, the Bayesian model has responded
with a best-fit prior for the 5:5 region of the model’s behavior only. This touches
on an import point in both model fitting and experimental design, which is that a
diversity of observation data is required to make better estimates of participants’
inductive biases. There are two parts to this explanation and I will go over them
briefly here as an aside.
168
First, the models return different priors for individual observation ratios. Ta-
ble 5.7 shows the model fit results for each observation ratio in marbles6.
best-fit α
2
log likelihood prediction rate
model sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max.
5:5 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 -171 -211 -211 7% 4% 4%
6:4 ≈ 0 2.11 3.11 -183 -238 -238 6% 2% 2%
7:3 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 0.27 -141 -165 -163 11% 8% 8%
8:2 ≈ 0 0.89 1.89 -149 -191 -191 10% 5% 5%
9:1 0.78 2.49 3.49 -163 -218 -218 8% 3% 3%
Table 5.7: Best-fit priors for each observation ratio in marbles6.
All of the models return a best-fit prior of ≈ 0 for the 5:5 observation ratio
data. This tells us that the models are not treating the all 5:5 any differently
than they are the marbles6 data. So perhaps, participants’ inductive biases do
operate similarly in these two experiments.
Second, the global fit to all of the individual observation ratios is not a simple
average of the individual best-fit priors. The average of the priors in Table 5.7
is 0.156 for the sampler, 1.098 for the averager, and 1.752 for the maximizer.
In Section 5.3 I discussed how the log likelihood scores were constrained by the
entropy of the each data distribution. These likelihood scores are also constrained
by the entropy of the model’s distribution of behavior, and this varies depending
on the observation ratio. The balance point between these two ceilings (how
much likelihood can be assigned to the data and can be assigned by the model)
determines the weighting on the averaged priors.
5.7 Model fitting results for Experiment 4
This is perhaps the most interesting data set to fit the Bayesian models to. Ex-
periment 4 was a replication of words6 where cognitive load was lightened for
participants by either blocking observation trials or blocking production trials.
Although this manipulation did not lead to a significant difference in regular-
ization behavior, according to the linear mixed effects regression analysis, it did
yield a significant difference in participants’ estimates of what they thought the
generating ratio was for the data they observed. Participants in the observation
in blocks condition reported estimates consisting more of the variable ratios (to-
ward the 5:5 end of the ratio set) than participants in the production in blocks
condition. In asking participants directly about their estimates, I am asking them
about what their prior is. Although these self-reports will not accurately reflect
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the prior, they provide another source of information on what it might be. So in
this section, I will compare the best-fit priors to participants’ self-reported priors.
best-fit α
2
log likelihood prediction rate
model sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max.
observation in blocks ≈ 0 1.49 2.49 -1002 -1443 -1443 4% (18%) 1% (5%) 1% (5%)
production in blocks ≈ 0 0.19 1.19 -871 -1234 -1234 7% (30%) 2% (9%) 2% (9%)
Table 5.8: Best-fit priors for Experiment 4.
The sampler model returns a prior favoring maximum regularity for both
conditions (due to its lack of sensitivity for the range of possible regularization
behavior, as mentioned in the previous section) and therefore can not tell us much
about the difference in participants’ self-reported priors. However, the averager
and maximizer models both return priors that are in line with participants’ ratio
estimates in these conditions: they return a prior that favors more variation in
the observation in blocks condition than in the production in blocks condition.
Participants’ ratio estimates in observation in blocks were clearly biased toward
variability, and in production in blocks they were clearly unbiased (refer back
to Figure 3.22). The averager and maximizer return a variability-biased prior
in observation in blocks, however neither capture the unbiased estimates in pro-
duction in blocks : the averager model fits these with a weakly regular prior and
the maximizer fits these with a weakly variable prior. Although the absolute
bias strengths do not equal the actual bias in the self-reported estimates, with-in
model rankings are consistent with them.
Because Bayesian model fits rely entirely on participant behavior, this model
must be picking up on the nuanced differences in regularization behavior to re-
cover these biases in participants’ estimates, despite the inability of the linear
mixed effects regression analysis to detect a significant difference in regulariza-
tion behavior across these two conditions. However, the model fits tell us that
the experimental manipulation has affected the data, and done so in a way that
is consistent with a Bayesian model’s instantiation of participants’ inductive bias
on frequency estimation.
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5.8 Model fitting results for Experiment 5
5.8.1 Biases underlying coordination behavior
In Experiment 5, participants worked with a partner to coordinate on a marble
color on the basis of shared experience with draws from a bag, which provided
common ground color and relative frequency information. Data were collected
for two observation ratios only, 7:3 and 5:5, in separate conditions. Table 5.9
gives the model fitting results for these data pooled together (top row), just the




log likelihood prediction rate
model sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max. sam. avg. max.
all data 0.18 1.98 2.98 -139 -154 -154 10% (67%) 8% (53%) 8% (53%)
5:5 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 -67 -72 -72 11% (73%) 9% (60%) 9% (60%)
7:3 0.32 1.98 2.98 -72 -83 -83 9% (60%) 6% (40%) 6% (40%)
Table 5.9: Best-fit priors for Experiment 5.
The 5:5 condition is best-fit by a fully regular bias by all models (refer back to
Section 5.6 for comments the models’ lack of sensitivity to regularization behavior
from 5:5 observation ratios). For the 7:3 condition, the sampler returns a prior
weakly biased for regularity and the averager and maximizer models return a
prior weakly biased for variability. The variability-biased priors result from the
high number of 5:5 ratios participants produce in this task. The analyses of
Experiment 5 showed that this bias toward 5:5 ratios was the result of a bias
toward regularity at the level of whole sequences (i.e. the low conditional entropy
of perfectly alternating sequential color choices). However, this shows up simply
as a bias for 5:5 ratios to the Bayesian model. Model fits to the pooled data
(top row) follow the 7:3 pattern. The averager and maximizer model fits are
completely driven by the more regular observation ratio (see Section 5.3 for an
explanation of this) and the sampler is driven by both observation ratios.
This experiment explicitly manipulated the production phase of the basic
frequency learning task used throughout this thesis to see how higher-cognitive
decision strategies lead to regularization behavior. Because this Bayesian model
defines a prior on frequency estimates, it can only respond to participant data as
if it were the result of a bias on the estimation procedure. However, information
about the inductive biases at play in coordinating humans, whether they be
estimation biases or higher-level inferences about what type of data should be
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produced in this coordination task, will be reflected (in one way or another) in
the Bayesian model fit. When the mapping between the architecture of human
inductive biases and the way the model carves up the inference process does not
correspond, this may lead to best-fit priors that are difficult to interpret. This
issue will be addressed further in the discussion section.
5.9 A closer look at the model’s behavior
Now that we have seen the model fit results for each experiment, let’s take an in-
depth look at the range of behaviors that the sampler, averager, and maximizer
models produce. Elaborate descriptions of the model’s behavior are not found
in the existing literature on this beta-binomial model of frequency estimation, so
the facts presented in this section are my own observations and descriptions, and
are customized to the parameters I’ve used in my experiments and the measure
of regularization I have employed. In this section, I will examine the relationship
between biased priors and the biased behaviors that result from them and make
frequent use of these two distinct concepts. Further ahead, in Figure 5.10, I
will plot the relationship between different values of α
2
and the exact level of
regularization behavior they give rise to. In the discussion section, I will assess
each model’s ability to describe participant behavior in light of the model fit
results and the types of behavior that each of the models are capable of producing.
Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 show the behavior of the sampler, averager, and max-
imizer models, respectively, for three example values of α
2
. Each row corresponds
to one value of α
2
: 0.01, 1, and 100. Each column corresponds to one of the six
observation ratios, ranging from 5:5 (on the left) to 10:0 (on the right). The
model’s behavior is defined by the probabilities with which the model produces
each possible ratio, given each possible observation ratio (just as participant be-
havior was described by a probability distribution over production ratios). One
of the first things to notice is that all of these models behave similarly when α
2
is
high (the bottom row of each model, where α
2
= 100, is nearly identical). In fact,
when α
2
= ∞ model behavior is identical: all distributions are binomials where
p = 0.5, regardless of the observation ratio. Table 5.10 prints the mean of each
distribution and Table 5.11 prints the variances. On all three models for α
2
= 100
(where 100 is a good proxy for ∞) the mean and variance of these distributions

































Figure 5.7: Behavior of the sampler model, for three example values of α
2
: 0.01
(regularization bias), 1 (unbiased), 100 (variabilization bias). Each row corre-
sponds to one value of α
2
. Each column corresponds to one of the six observation
ratios, ranging from 5:5 (on the left) to 10:0 (on the right). Each panel contains
the distribution of ratios that the model would produce in response to one obser-
vation ratio. These production ratios are displayed on the x-axis as the number
of productions of variant x from the observation ratio x:y. Variant x corresponds
to whatever variant was in the majority during the observation phase. All ob-
servation ratios are indicated by a dashed line. For example, the top left panel
shows the behavior where α
2
= 0.01 in terms of a probability distribution over
all possible productions. Here, the probability of producing variant x 5 times is
0.17. There’s a 0.16 probability of producing it 6 times, and a 0.13 probability of
producing it 7 times. Because a symmetrical prior is used in these models, the
observation ratios not shown (4:6, 3:7, 2:8, 1:9, 0:10) are all mirror images of 6:4,

































Figure 5.8: Behavior of the averager model, for three example values of α
2
: 0.01
(regularization bias), 1 (unbiased), 100 (variabilization bias). Each row corre-
sponds to one value of α
2
. Each column corresponds to one of the six observation
ratios, ranging from 5:5 (on the left) to 10:0 (on the right). Each panel con-
tains the distribution of ratios that the model would produce in response to one
observation ratio. These production ratios are displayed on the x-axis as the
number of productions of variant x from the observation ratio x:y. Variant x cor-
responds to whatever variant was in the majority during the observation phase.

































Figure 5.9: Behavior of the maximizer model, for three example values of α
2
: 0.01
(regularization bias), 1 (unbiased), 100 (variabilization bias). Each row corre-
sponds to one value of α
2
. Each column corresponds to one of the six observation
ratios, ranging from 5:5 (on the left) to 10:0 (on the right). Each panel contains
the distribution of ratios that the model would produce in response to one obser-
vation ratio. These production ratios are displayed on the x-axis as the number of
productions of variant x from the observation ratio x:y. Variant x corresponds to
whatever variant was in the majority during the observation phase. All observa-
tion ratios are indicated by a dashed line. The distribution for a 10:0 observation
ratio when α
2
> 1 is undefined, because the mean is greater than 10. However, it
is plotted here with the maximum mean, 10.
175
When the prior is unbiased (α
2
= 1), we would expect the model’s behavior
to be unbiased as well. Unbiased behavior is defined by distributions where the
mean equals the observation count of variant x. Surprisingly, only the maximizer
model produces unbiased behavior when the prior is unbiased. The means of each
distribution that the maximizer with α
2
= 1 produces are all equal their respective
observation count of variant x (Table 5.10, third to last column). Additionally,
the mean and variances of the maximizer with α
2
= 1 show that this model is
equivalent to binomial drift, because they are identical to the mean (pN) and
variance (p(1 − p)N) of binomial drift (see the last column of Tables 5.10 and
5.11). In fact, for all values of N , a maximizer with α
2
= 1 is equivalent to
binomial drift (not shown). This is an important point that will be taken up in
the discussion, in relation to the Wright-Fisher drift equivalence results of Reali
and Griffiths (2010).
As for the sampler and averager models, when they have unbiased priors their
behavior is always biased toward variable responses. This is because both of their
hypothesis selection strategies choose the average of the posterior distribution (the
averager chooses it deterministically and the sampler chooses makes stochastic
hypothesis choices that are evenly distributed about the posterior mean) and this
average corresponds to a more variable value of θ than the mode (except for when
the average equals the mode at α
2
= 0). Thus, only when α
2
= 0 do these two
models produce unbiased behavior. This is problematic given our understanding
of regularization and shows that these two models implement a counter-intuitive
relationship between the prior bias and behavioral bias. Also, this is why most
of the sampler and averager best-fit priors were α
2
= 0 for the data sets where
participants regularized: these models can not capture regularization in the sense
of a behavioral bias toward over-producing the majority variant.6
The maximizer, on the other hand, is capable of mean overproduction of the
majority variant. When α
2
< 1, means are all greater than the observed count of
variant x. This is why the maximizer model was able to fit the regularization data
with various strengths of a regularity-biased prior: this model has a wider range
of regularization behavior that allows for finer sensitivity to the different levels
of regularity produced by participants in the different experimental conditions.
In Table 5.10 it can be seen that the sampler and averager models always be-
have with identical means.7 This is because the hypothesis selection strategy of
6As far as I am aware, this has not been discussed on in the existing literature on this model,
so I am not sure what to make of this, besides just throwing out these models and sticking to
the maximizer for describing regularization behavior.
7This is the analytical solution for an infinitely large population.
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sampler averager maximizer binomial
α
2
= 0.01 1 100 0.01 1 100 0.01 1 100
5:5 5.000 5.0 5.0 5.000 5.0 5.00 5.0 5.0 5.00 5.0
6:4 5.998 5.8 5.05 5.998 5.8 5.05 6.2 6.0 5.05 6.0
7:3 6.996 6.7 5.10 6.996 6.7 5.10 7.5 7.0 5.10 7.0
8:2 7.994 7.5 5.14 7.994 7.5 5.14 8.7 8.0 5.14 8.0
9:1 8.992 8.3 5.19 8.992 8.3 5.19 10.0 9.0 5.19 9.0
10:0 9.990 9.2 5.24 9.990 9.2 5.24 11.2 10.0 5.24 10.0
Table 5.10: The mean of each distribution in Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8, Figure 5.9.
The rightmost column gives the mean of the binomial distribution where p = x
N
of each observation ratio x:y.
sampler averager maximizer binomial
α
2
= 0.01 1 100 0.01 1 100 0.01 1 100
5:5 4.54 4.23 2.61 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.5 2.50 2.50 2.50
6:4 4.36 4.11 2.61 2.40 2.43 2.50 2.34 2.40 2.50 2.40
7:3 3.82 3.76 2.61 2.10 2.22 2.50 1.88 2.10 2.50 2.10
8:2 2.91 3.17 2.60 1.60 1.88 2.50 1.10 1.60 2.50 1.60
9:1 1.65 2.35 2.60 0.91 1.39 2.50 0.01 0.90 2.50 0.90
10:0 0.02 1.29 2.60 0.01 0.76 2.50 undef. 0.00 2.50 0.00
Table 5.11: The variance of each distribution in Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8, Figure
5.9. The rightmost column gives the variance of the binomial distribution where
p = x
N
of each observation ratio x:y.
the sampler is symmetric about the posterior mean, producing binomial distribu-
tions of data from a hypothesis sampled evenly about the mean. The averager’s
hypothesis selection strategy deterministically chooses the posterior mean and
produces data from this mean via binomial sampling. Only the maximizer model
differs in respect to mean behavior per observation ratio, because its hypothesis
selection strategy takes the mode of the posterior. Therefore, the mean of the
maximizer’s behavior is offset from the mean sampler and averager behavior by












= 0 for the averger, the maximizer produces identical behavior when its
α
2
= 1. Likewise, when the averager’s α
2
= 1, 1.5, 2, or 2.5, the maximizer produces
identical behavior at α
2
= 2, 2.5, 3, or 3.5, respectively. For all values of α
2
on the
averager model, the maximizer produces identical behavior with a prior that is
greater by one unit. That is why all of the model fit results show a unit difference
relationship between the best-fit priors of the averager and maximizer whenever
the maxmizer’s best-fit prior is α
2
= 1 or greater (for an example, refer back to
the fit results for Experiment 2, Table 5.5, top two rows). When the maxmizer’s
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unbiasedregularity bias variability bias
Figure 5.10: Average change in entropy (in bits) for all observation ratio to
production ratio transitions in the sampler, averager, and maximizer models for
five example values of α
2
. The models vary in their ability to regularize.
best-fit prior is less than α
2
= 1, this describes behavior that the averager model
is not capable of, and the averager will return a best-fit prior of α
2
= 0 (again,
see Table 5.5, bottom two rows).
In terms of variance (Table 5.11), both the averager and maximizer produce
behaviors with binomial variance, because their productions follow binomial dis-
tributions. Therefore, these models are equivalent to Wright-Fisher drift for val-
ues of α
2
that lead to unbiased behavior (for the maximizer, this is when α
2
= 1 and
for the averager, this is when α
2
= 0). The sampler, however, does not produce
binomially distributed data, except when α
2
= ∞. Besides this one exception,
the variance of the sampler is always higher than binomial variance. Therefore,
the behaviorally unbiased case of the sampler (when α
2
= 0)8 is not equivalent to
binomial drift, because these distributions are not binomials, but does constitute
a form of cultural drift that is not accounted by the Wright-Fisher model. This
is an important point that I will return to in the discussion.
Now that we have seen the behavioral profiles of each model, I will assess the
different levels of regularization behavior that these models are capable of. The
extent to which a model can regularize is determined by the mass it places on
production ratios that have lower entropy than its observation ratio. The models
8The quirk in the sampler and averager models, where maximally biased priors lead to
unbiased behavior, is correct. Refer back to Table 5.10.
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can achieve this in two ways: 1) by biasing the mean of productions toward
regular ratios (as the maximizer does) and 2) by increasing the variance and/or
skew of productions, such that extremely regular ratios are produced with a higher
probability (as the sampler does). For an example of the first point, compare the
8:2 panes for the maximizer where α
2
= 0.01 and α
2
= 1 (Figure 5.9). The mean
of the distribution for α
2
= 1 is x′ = 8, whereas for α
2
= 0.01 it is higher than x,
at x′ = 8.74 and therefore places more mass on the 10:0 production ratio. For
an example of the second point, compare the 8:2 panes for the sampler where
α
2
= 0.01 and α
2
= 1 (Figure 5.7). The distribution for α
2
= 0.01, despite having
a mean lower than x′ = 8, is more skewed toward higher values of x′ and places
more mass on the 10:0 production ratio than the distribution for α
2
= 1.
Figure 5.10 shows each model’s behavior in terms of the entropy change it
achieves, for five different values of α
2
(0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100). Here we see again that
all three models perform similarly for high-variability biases, but differ markedly
in terms of regularization capabilities. The maximizer is the only model that is
able to achieve entropy drops as strong as those achieved by participants. The
maximum entropy drop achievable by the maximizer is -0.30 bits when α
2
= 0,
whereas the sampler and averager can only achieve -0.12 and -0.07 bits, respec-
tively. For comparison, the largest entropy drop achieved by participants was in
the marbles6 condition of Experiment 2, at -0.36 bits.
The averager model regularizes little because it neither biases mean produc-
tions toward regular ratios, nor places probability on extremely regular ratios via
high variance in productions. Compare the three plots in Figure 5.7, 5.8, and
5.9 for the 9:1 observation ratio when α
2
= 0.01. Compared to the averagers,
samplers are much more likely to regularize a 9:1 ratio by producing at 10:0 ratio
because their variance is wider, and maximizers are much more likely to produce
a 10:0 because their mean is strongly biased toward that ratio. Here, averagers




In this chapter, I fit three Bayesian models of frequency learning and production
to a diverse set of human frequency learning data in a linguistic and non-linguistic
domain, under different levels of cognitive load, and in contexts that modulate
participants’ frequency production strategies. These data sets came from each of
the five experiments presented in this thesis. A variety of cognitive biases operate
in individuals as they are learning about the frequencies of events in their envi-
ronment and each of these experiments was designed to engage a particular subset
of these biases. The three main bias types explored with these experiments were
biases on participants estimates of frequencies, biases due to memory encoding
and recall under different levels of cognitive load, and production biases.
Because many biases are involved in perception, processing, and production,
the inductive loop that turns observations into productions can be carved up
in many ways. The model applied in this chapter, the beta-binomial Bayesian
model of frequency estimation, defines the inductive bias as a bias on frequency
estimation. Therefore, the model fits should be more intuitive for the experiments
that were more likely to engage frequency estimate biases. However, these models
will respond to an inductive bias no matter its source and thus, will pick up on
any biases in frequency learning behavior and report it as if it were a bias on
frequency estimation. This means that we can still use this Bayesian model as
an indicator of participants’ inductive biases, but I want to point out that the
envelope is being pushed in some cases.
Table 5.12 provides a summary of the main model fitting results presented
in this chapter. The first column specifies the data set the model was fit to
and the second column gives the predominant bias that each experiment was
designed to engage. The third column shows which model (sampler, averager,
or maximizer) returned the best fit and the fourth column coarsely codes each
model’s best-fit prior by whether it was a biased toward regularity (+) or biased
toward variability (−). The first thing to notice in this table is that the sampler
model is consistently the best fit to all of the data sets that elicit regularization
behavior (Experiments 2 through 5). Only in Experiment 1, when participants
are probability matching, do the averager and maximizer models do best. This
is because the averager and maximizers have a more restricted variance than the
sampler model and this allows them to fit the low-variance probability matching
behavior of humans better. As for the regularization behavior, why is the sampler
the best fit? In the previous section, we saw that the maximizer model was the
only model capable of regularizing as much as participants do (refer back to Table
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data set participant bias type best-fit model sam. avg. max.
Experiment 1 estimate avg. & max. − + −
Experiment 2 marbles1 estimate sampler − − −
words1 estimate sampler + − −
marbles6 memory sampler + + +
words6 memory sampler + + +
Experiment 3 memory sampler + + +
Experiment 4
observation in blocks estimate & memory sampler + − −
production in blocks estimate & memory sampler + + −
Experiment 5 production sampler + − −
Table 5.12: Summary table of the main model fitting results from this chapter.
The last three columns code the best-fit prior of each model (sampler, averager,
maximizer) with a “+” for a regularity bias and a “−” for a variability bias.
5.10) and additionally was the only model capable of regularizing via a bias in
mean behavior.
The sampler, on the other hand, is capable of regularizing by assigning more
mass to the fully-regular production ratios (10:0 and 0:10) than the averager and
maximizer do. Therefore, it provides a better fit to all of the data sets that elicit
regularization behavior.9 It appears that, in general, averagers and maximizers
will always provide better fits to probability matching data and samplers will
always provide better fits to regularization behavior and probably to all noisy
behaviors with fairly uniform distributions over outcomes as well.
As for the types of priors each model returned, the sampler results matched
up best with the data: when participants probability matched, the sampler re-
turned a bias toward variability and when participants regularized, it returned
a bias toward regularity. Overall, however, the sampler showed little sensitivity
to the different amounts of regularization behavior elicited by each experiment
and thus, little sensitivity to the different strengths of the biases that may have
been engaged. The averager and maximizer show more sensitivity and this paid
off in Experiment 4, where they were able to detect a difference in priors that
corresponded to participants’ self-reported estimates of the marbles in the con-
tainers. Participants reported more variable ratios in the observation in blocks
condition and both models fit a more variable prior to this condition than the
9It also provides a better fit to the probability matching behavior in marbles1, but only
by a hair. The sampler’s prediction rate for marbles1 was 14% whereas the averager’s and
maximizer’s were each 13%.
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other (refer back to Table 5.8 for the exact bias strengths). The sampler, on
the other hand, returned a maximally strong prior for both of these data sets.
Although the averager and maximizer show more sensitivity, they sometimes re-
turned counter-intuitive priors. For example they both fit a variability prior to
words1, which elicited regularization behavior. This data set was composed of
fairly bimodal data in which some participants regularized and others probability
matched. Because the averager and maximizer assign likelihood better to prob-
ability matching behavior, this probably drove the overall model fit, such that
a variability prior won out in this data set. And in Experiment 4 and 5, par-
ticipants clearly regularized, but the averager and maximizer returned variable
priors.
As shown in Section 5.9, none of these models do a particularly good job
at capturing truly human-like probability matching and regularization behavior.
When the models are probability matching, the peaks on their distributions are
too flat. Human participants are remarkably good at reproducing the frequen-
cies they observe, but the Bayesian models perform with much more error. The
averager and maximizer models probability match with binomial error and the
sampler model probability matches with even more error. The analyses in Chap-
ter 2 showed that human probability matching behavior is significantly better
than binomial probability matching. However, the models do much worse at
capturing human regularization behavior than they do for probability matching
behavior. Humans often regularize by exclusively producing either the majority
variant or the minority variant. This yields U-shaped distributions over produc-
tion ratios with most mass on the fully-regular (10:0 and 0:10) ratios. All of
these models are incapable of producing U-shaped distributions over production
ratios. Model regularization behavior is unimodal and places most mass near the
observation frequency. When the models do place a lot of mass on a fully-regular
ratio, it is always that of the majority variant. The poor fit of model to human
regularization behavior is exemplified by the 5:5 observation ratios. Human regu-
larization of 5:5 ratios is U-shaped whereas the model’s never is. The models only
seem to produce human regularization-like behavior for observation ratios that
are already fairly regular (i.e. the 8:2, 9:1 ratios) whereas for the variable ratios
(i.e. 5:5, 6:4), model behavior always looks more like probability matching. This
indicates that there may be something about human regularization behavior that
can not be completely accounted for in terms of a bias on frequency estimates
alone.
On the basis of this, I would like to suggest some avenues for future research
with this particular Bayesian model. There are other places in this model where
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inductive biases, in addition to one on frequency estimation, could occur. The
replication of cultural variants occurs over an inductive loop that creates a set of
productions from a set of observations and this model bridges observations and
productions with four components: the prior bias, the likelihood, the hypothe-
sis selection strategy, and the data production algorithm. Three of these four
components are hard-coded, but could conceivably contain biases as well. There
already exist three commonly-implemented versions of the hypothesis selection
strategy: the sampler, averager and maximizer models (e.g. Griffiths and Kalish,
2007). The maximizer model biases learners toward choosing the most probable
hypothesis. Kirby et al. (2007); Smith and Kirby (2008); Thompson et al. (2012)
show that when learners are trying to communicate or coordinate with one an-
other, such a bias makes sense because it enables learners to choose the same
hypothesis (i.e. arrive at the same conclusion about a given set of data) as one
another. As discussed and demonstrated empirically in Chapter 4, maximizing
on the basis of frequency information enables participants to solve a coordination
task.
However, yet another form of maximizing can occur when learners generate
data. This relates to representativeness and is already being addressed in the
Bayesian modeling literature (e.g Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001; Rafferty and
Griffiths, 2010). A Bayesian learner who is trying to be representative could bias
their productions toward those that are most likely under the chosen hypothesis.
This would improve the ability of any student agent to arrive at the same hypoth-
esis as their teacher. This could be achieved by raising the distribution over data
production probabilities to a power. If this were done for the averager and max-
imizer models presented in this chapter, then the variance on the distribution of
production ratios would be lower and would better-approximate human probabil-
ity matching behavior. Likewise, if a Bayesian rational learner were learning from
a representative teacher, they would need to know this (in order to be rational)
and have a data likelihood function that is identical to the data production prob-
abilities of the agents’ its learning from. Thus, the likelihood could be raised to
a power to reflect a learner’s knowledge that teacher agents are trying to be rep-
resentative. However, breaking this strict criteria that the data likelihoods equal
the veridical data production probabilities would break the rationality assump-
tion of agents, but may better approximate human behavior during frequency
learning.
Additionally, these models could be improved by adding a component that
captures constraints on memory encoding and recall. An example along this line
has been developed by Perfors (2012) which models memory limitations by dis-
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torting or changing the quantity of observations in four different ways: dropping
data at random, reconstructing data randomly, reconstructing data according to
the prior bias, and multiplying the data distribution by an amount of decay. This
model shows that memory limitations that do not distort the data in a biased
way will not lead to regularization behavior unless the learner possesses a prior
bias for regularization.
Finally, these models of the inductive process tell us something very important
about cultural evolution: that the dynamics associated with inductive evolution
may constitute a much wider class of evolutionary processes than those formu-
lated for the biological evolution of organisms. Reali and Griffiths (2010) provide
an equivalence proof between the Wright-Fisher model of genetic drift with mu-
tation and Bayesian learners that, when the number of cultural variants is two,
correspond to the beta-binomial averager model presented in this chapter. This
equivalence relies on the fact that the averager produces data distributions that
follow a binomial distribution, just as the Wright-Fisher model does. This equiv-
alence can clearly be seen in my report of this model’s behavior in Figure 5.8
for the case of Wright-Fisher drift without mutation. Here, when α
2
tends to-
ward 0, the model’s distributions over production ratios tend toward binomial
distributions with means on the input frequency and thus, define binomial drift
(refer back to Section 1.5.1). Additionally, we can see that this equivalence also
holds for the maximizer model, but in a more intuitive way than shown by Reali
and Griffiths (2010). Whereas the averager model is equivalent to Wright-Fisher
drift without mutation for a maximally-regular prior, the maximizer model is
equivalent to Wright-Fisher drift without mutation for the unbiased prior, α
2
= 1.
Because drift is a form of neutral evolution, we should expect it to occur via
an unbiased inductive process. Therefore, the maximizer model appears to be
a better choice of model to use for the further development of equivalences to
Wright-Fisher models, such as that with selection. The sampler model, on the
other hand, does not produce binomially-distributed data and therefore can not
conform to Wright-Fisher models. This sampler model’s dynamics are part of a
larger class of evolutionary dynamics and it would be interesting to determine
whether or not this model, or other models of evolution by induction have equiv-
alences with any known forms of biological evolution.
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Chapter 6
The cultural evolution of
regularity
Up until this point, we have been detailing the cultural evolutionary forces that
operate on language by an in-depth analysis of a single generation of learners via
psychological experimentation. This enabled me to build a detailed description
of the cognitive biases at play in frequency learning and how they shape the
distribution of behavior in one generation of learning. This chapter adds cultural
transmission to the story. What do cognitive biases tell us about the distribution
of cultural variants after several generations of learners (the synchronic variation)?
How does this distribution change over time (the diachronic variation)? And how
much information does the behavior of one generation of learners carry about the
behavior after many generations?
These questions are of great concern to those who research the cultural evo-
lution of various human behaviors and are currently being addressed, perhaps
most rigorously, within the language evolution literature. Here, the question of
how cognitive biases map on to the distribution of linguistic features (within a
language, or across the world’s languages) is known as the problem of linkage
(Kirby, 1999):
The problem of linkage. Given a set of observed constraints on
cross-linguistic variation, and a corresponding pattern of functional
preference, an explanation of this fit will solve the problem: how does
the latter give rise to the former? (p. 20)
There are three main avenues of linguistics research that address this problem:
nativism (e.g. Chomsky, 1965, 1982; Marantz, 1995; Grimshaw, 1997), functional-
ism (e.g. Greenberg, 1963; Bybee, 1985; Cutler et al., 1985; Du Bois, 1987; Comrie,
1989; Croft, 2003), and cultural evolution via iterated learning (e.g. Kirby, 2001,
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2013; Hurford, 2011; Kalish et al., 2007; Griffiths et al., 2008). Kirby (1999)
argues that the nativist approach specifies a mechanism linking universals to ac-
quisition, where constraints on cross-linguistic variation are a direct consequence
of innate constraints on the acquisition and mental representation of language,
but that this approach does not account for the appearance of design in the good-
ness of fit between form and function in language. The functionalist approach
focuses primarily on this goodness of fit, by stating that universals should fit the
pressures imposed by language use, but does not specify the mechanism by which
this fit should come about. However, when we recognize that languages evolve
culturally and in doing so, adapt to the minds of learners, this provides both the
mechanism that links constraints on acquisition to universals and the explanation
for the goodness of fit between form and function. Here, the mechanism is the
cultural transmission process and the explanation is the evolutionary forces that
lead languages to adapt to learners.
Griffiths and Kalish (2007) address the problem of linkage by characterizing
the mapping between cognitive biases and typological distribution in an iterated
learning modeling framework with Bayesian agents. In this framework, typo-
logical distribution is understood as the distribution over linguistic features (or
more broadly, cultural variants) after many generations of learners1. The use of
Bayesian agents makes the cognitive biases of the learners explicit (as the prior
distribution over hypotheses) so that this prior can be directly compared to the
distribution over cultural variants after several generations of learners. Results
are provided for samplers and MAP learners (refer back to Chapter 5). When
learners are samplers, the distribution over variants comes to mirror the prior
distribution over hypotheses exactly, such that the prior fully predicts long-term
behavior, and vice versa. This result suggests that the cultural transmission
mechanism merely enables an inevitable one-to-one correspondence between ty-
pological distribution and learning biases. If the agents’ prior is interpreted as an
innate bias, then this means that the parameters of the nativists’ language ac-
quisition device can be directly read off from the typology of the languages of the
world (although see Dunn et al. (2011) for a phylolinguistic account of why histor-
ical dependencies among the world’s languages confound this conclusion). And
if the agents’ prior is interpreted as a functional preference for certain variants,
then the functionalist account of goodness of fit is complete, for all intents and
purposes, because the cultural transmission mechanism does not add anything to
the account of this fit. However, this convergence to the prior result seems to be a
1more precisely, as the number of generations approaches infinity.
186
special case, and does not hold when different assumptions of this sampler model
are relaxed. Griffiths and Kalish (2007) also show that for MAP learners, this
relationship is not one-to-one and tends to over-represent variants corresponding
to hypotheses that have higher prior probability. Kirby et al. (2007) detail the
non-convergence result of the MAP learner further. Additionally, Ferdinand and
Zuidema (2009), Smith (2009), and Dediu (2009) show that the behavior of sam-
plers that learn from multiple teachers do not converge to the prior (however, see
Burkett and Griffiths (2010) for a treatment of iterated learning from multiple
teachers that does yield convergence to the prior).
In addition to the computational modeling approaches described above, there
have been empirical investigations into the problem of linkage (Kalish et al., 2007;
Griffiths et al., 2008; Culbertson et al., 2012; Reali and Griffiths, 2009). All of
these studies argue that the outcome of iterated learning reflects cognitive bi-
ases and they do so from three different approaches. The first approach, taken
by Kalish et al. (2007) and Griffiths et al. (2008) shows that iterated learning
“reveals inductive biases” by converging on a distribution over behaviors that
mirrors known inductive biases. Previous psychological research has shown that
people have an inductive bias favoring positive linear functions, because people
tend to guess this relationship when exposed to little data and also learn this
function faster than others (Busemeyer et al., 1997). Kalish et al. (2007) in-
vestigated this particular bias in iterated function learning experiment, in which
participants were trained on two stimuli with lengths that were related to one
another by a particular function: positive linear, negative linear, parabolic, or
random. Participants were tested on the functional relationship they had learned
and these testing responses were used as the training set for the next generation
of learners. 32 iterated learning chains were initialized on one of these four func-
tions (8 chains per function) and the data were passed down for 9 generations
of learners. Behavior converged to a positive linear function in 28 out of the 32
chains, showing a strong bias for this function. Three chains (two in the negative
linear condition and one in the parabolic condition) converged on a negative linear
function, showing a weak bias for this function. The final chain did not converge.
This finding of high rates of convergence upon the function that learners possess
a bias for demonstrates the use of iterated learning as a tool for revealing such
biases. Likewise, Griffiths et al. (2008) conducted an iterated category learning
experiment on six types of category structures with known biases. Previous work
by Shepard et al. (1961), corroborated by Nosofsky et al. (1994) and Feldman
(2000), showed that Type 1 categories, where membership is defined along one
dimension, is easiest for people to learn. Type 2 categories, where membership
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is defined along two dimensions, is next easiest to learn. Type 3, 4, and 5, which
have a single rule plus one exception proved harder, and equally difficult to learn.
And Type 6, where no more than two members can share any given dimension is
the most difficult to learn. Across 12 iterated learning chains, behavior converged
to Type 1 and Type 2 categories, with Type 1 being more prevalent. These two
experiments showed that the prevalence of behaviors that result from iterated
learning conform with known inductive biases. This first approach, therefore,
takes for granted that iterated learning is necessary to link biases to typologi-
cal distribution, and treats convergence as an open empirical question: cultural
transmission changes behavior over time, but do these changes converge upon
cognitive biases or not?
A second approach treats the problem of linkage itself as an open empirical
question and tests whether the biases evident in a single generation of learners are
enough to mirror the known typological patterns in language. Culbertson et al.
(2012) addressed this question by investigating four different word ordering pat-
terns in nominals. Pattern 1 places adjectives and numerals before nouns, Pattern
2 places them after nouns, Pattern 3 is noun-adjective, numeral-noun and Pattern
4 is adjective-noun, noun-numeral. These four typological patterns are described
in Greenberg (1963) as Universal 18 and have different prevalence in the world’s
languages. Pattern 2 is the most common (at 52%) , followed by 1 (at 27%), 3
(at 17%), and then 4 (at 4%). Culbertson et al. (2012) trained participants on an
artificial language consisting of a mixture of these four possible orderings in four
conditions plus one control condition. In the control condition, participants were
trained on each ordering (adj-noun, num-noun, noun-adj, noun-num) in equal
frequencies (25%, 25%, 25%, 25%), In condition 1, the two orderings consistent
with Pattern 1 occurred 70% each, and the other two occurred 30% each (i.e.
adj-noun, num-noun, noun-adj, noun-num: 70%, 70%, 30%, 30%, respectively).
These same relative frequencies were used in the four conditions, but where con-
dition 2 was compatible with Pattern 2, condition 3 compatible with Pattern
3, and condition 4 compatible with Pattern 4. In a testing phase, participants
produced these orderings and the relative frequencies of their observed and pro-
duced orderings were compared. Participants did not reproduce the frequencies
perfectly, showing evidence of a regularization bias (a bias toward over-producing
one of the patterns, usually the most frequent one) and a substantive bias (a bias
toward producing orderings that followed a particular pattern. The main result
was that participants’ substantive bias was ranked in rough conformance with
the typological pattern: productions were biased most strongly toward Pattern
1 and Pattern 2, less strongly toward Pattern 3, and there was no evidence for a
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bias toward Pattern 4. The authors state that the Pattern 1 bias may be over-
represented in their data set because all of their participants spoke a Pattern
1 language, but overall they conclude that the biases of a single generation of
learners mirror that of the typological pattern and thus, are a likely cause of this
aspect of typology in the world’s languages.
The third approach rests on the observation that Bayesian samplers’ biases
mirror typological distribution, whereas MAP learners do not, and address an
open empirical question as to whether human learners are better approximated
by samplers or MAP learners. As described in the beginning of Chapter 3, Reali
and Griffiths (2009) conducted an iterated artificial language learning experi-
ment where participants learned two names for six objects with different relative
frequencies. After a few generations, learners regularized the language by elimi-
nating one of the synonyms to create deterministic mappings between each object
and its name. The intergenerational transitions among the relative frequencies of
these words served as the data of interest and sampler and MAP models were fit
to each data set. The sampler model provided a better fit than the MAP learner
and this provides some support for claims that the mapping between cognitive
biases and typological distribution is one-to-one.
In this chapter, I take a new approach to the problem of linkage, by focusing
on the mapping between the biased behavior of a single generation of learn-
ers and the analytically-determined typological distribution of single generation
data. Previous experiments have used experimental iterated learning chains to
estimate the typological distribution, whereas I have used single-generation psy-
chology experiments to estimate the Markov process that ultimately specifies the
typological distribution. The following sections will provide an introduction to
iterated learning as a Markov process and explain how the stationary distribu-
tion of this process relates to typological distribution. Then, I walk through the
Markov process estimation procedure for the frequency learning data in Exper-
iments 1 and 2 and show how these data can be represented as an empirical
transition matrix. From each estimated transition matrix, both single-generation
behavior (from any combination of observation ratios) and stationary behavior
can be analytically determined and compared, without intervening sampling error
obscuring their relationship. Finally, I will detail the nature of the mappings and
discuss their implications for the predictability of culturally transmitted behavior
on the basis of cognitive biases.
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6.1 Extrapolation of data forward through cul-
tural evolutionary time
6.1.1 Markov processes
In Chapter 1, cultural transmission was described in terms of iterated learning:
a process in which the behavior produced by some individuals in the population
serves as the input for other individuals. As individuals learn from one another,
the behavioral repertoire of the population may change in response to the con-
straints that each learner imposes on their own productions. Simulations and
experiments in iterated learning are often conducted on population structures
in which each generation consists of one learner, and learners only receive input
from the learner in the previous generation (Kirby, 2001; Brighton, 2002; Smith
et al., 2003; Kirby et al., 2008; Smith and Wonnacott, 2010; Reali and Griffiths,
2009). This form of iterated learning is equivalent to a Markov process, and this
equivalence provides a useful formal framework for the analysis of the dynamics
of iterated learning (Griffiths and Kalish, 2007).
A Markov process is a discrete-time random process over a sequence of val-
ues of a random variable, vt=1, vt=2, ..., vt=n, such that the random variable is
determined only by its most recent value (Papoulis, 1984, p.535):
P (vt|vt=1, vt=2, ..., vt−1) = P (vt|vt−1) (6.1)
This describes a memoryless, time-invariant, process in which the past values
(vt−2, vt−3, ..., vt=1) of the variable have no direct influence on the current value.
This is the case for iterated learning chains when learners only observe the behav-
iors of their teacher, but not the behavior of their teacher’s teacher, and so on.
All of the possible values of the random variable constitute the state space of this
system. A Markov process is fully specified by the probabilities with which each
state will lead to every other state in the system and these probabilities between
states can be represented as a transition matrix, Q (Norris, 2008, p.3).
Figure 6.1 shows an example transition matrix for a system with 11 states,
s0, s1, ..., s11, corresponding to different values of the random variable v1, v2, ..., v11.
Each cell in the matrix, Qij, gives the transition probability from state si=t−1 to
state sj=t. The shading of the cells denote the transition probabilities between
states. In an iterated learning process, a learner receives input that corresponds
to a particular state (at time t − 1), produces an output that corresponds to a




state at time t
transition probability:
Figure 6.1: An example transition matrix for a system that has 11 states. Each
state at time t-1 leads to each state at time t with a particular transition prob-
ability, coded in greyscale. White indicates a transition probability of zero and
black indicates a transition probability of 1. For example, state zero (s0) leads
to s0 52% of the time, s1 26% of the time, s2 12% of the time, and so on. Each
row sums to one.
for the next learner. So not only does the transition matrix describe the behav-
ior of individuals given every possible input, it also describes the behavior of an
iterated learning chain across many generations of learners.
A transition matrix is the fingerprint of a system’s dynamics and summarizes,
in a sense, all of the forces that direct the evolution of the system. The particu-
lar transition matrix shown in Figure 6.1 is that of a Bayesian sampler with an
unbiased prior (refer back to Chapter 5). Each component of the Bayesian model
(the prior, the likelihood function, the hypothesis selection strategy, and the data
production function) all contribute to the specific pattern of transition proba-
bilities in the matrix. Likewise, if the learners here were human, the transition
probabilities describing their behavior would be a summary of all of the cognitive
biases at play in the inductive loop that links observations to their productions.
A transition matrix can also be used to address the problem of linkage for
a particular system by determining the asymptotic behavior that the particular
pattern of transitions give rise to. The asymptotic behavior is given by the
stationary distribution over states and defines the amount of time that the system
will spend in every state. This is the analogy to typological distribution that the
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Bayesian iterated learning literature makes: typology is the distribution over
cultural variants (i.e. states) after many generations of learners. The stationary
distribution can be obtained from the transition matrix by different analytical
and numerical methods (Stewart, 1994). One analytical solution is obtained by
performing an eigen decomposition on the transition matrix. Here, the stationary
distribution is proportional to the first eigenvector. A transition matrix will have
one stationary distribution if it is ergodic, meaning that it is both irreducible
(every state can be reached by every other state) and aperiodic (Griffiths and
Kalish, 2007). Ergodicity is most often violated by the existence of sinks. For
example, drift without mutation defines a transition matrix with sinks: once a
variant is lost, it can never re-enter the population. In a population with only two
variants, x and y, the system will either converge to a population state composed
entirely of variant x or entirely of variant y.
One objective of cultural evolution experiments are to probe the veridical
transition matrix in attempt to estimate the stationary distribution. If an iterated
learning chain is initialized in an arbitrary state, and run for a long enough
time, the frequency with which it passes through each state will converge toward
the stationary distribution. The proportion of time the chain spends in each
state will provide an estimate of the stationary distribution. Additionally, the
transition matrix itself can be estimated by traditional experimental paradigms
in which the different input states serve as different training conditions, and the
distribution of participant responses provides an estimate of the corresponding
row in the transition matrix. When the state space of the system is enumerable
and small, estimating the transition matrix in this way may be a more efficient
use of participants, but when the state space it large, iterated learning may be
better. However, the relative efficacy of each of these estimation techniques is an
open empirical question awaiting a solution.
6.1.2 Empirical transition matrices
Experiments 1 and 2 in this thesis were designed so that the data collected would
constitute an estimate of the veridical transition matrix. In this section, I walk
through the transition matrix representation of the data from these experiments.
Figure 6.2 provides the raw data from Experiment 1 in transition matrix
format. Recall that in this experiment, participants observed blue and orange
marbles being drawn from a bag in a particular ratio. Because participants
observed 10 draws, there are 11 possible ratios of blue to orange marbles: 0:10,




state at time t
transition probability:
Figure 6.2: The data from Experiment 1, represented as an empirical transition
matrix. Each state is defined by the number of blue marbles in the observation
phase (at time t − 1) or the production phase (at time t). Each state at time
t− 1 leads to each state at time t with a particular transition probability, coded
in greyscale. Each row corresponds to one observation ratio. The transition
probability equals the percentage of participants that responded with a particular
production count of the blue marble (st), given a particular observation count
(st−1). White indicates a transition probability of zero and black indicates a
transition probability of 1. For example, state one (s1) leads to s0 13% of the
time, s1 69% of the time, s2 13% of the time, and so on. This means that
participants who observed 1 blue marble and 9 orange marbles produced no blue
marbles 13% of the time, one blue marble 69% of the time, and 2 blue marbles
13% of the time. Each row sums to one.
possible states that this system can be in and are represented in Figure 6.2 by
the count of the blue marble draws. States at time t−1 give the blue marble count
in a participant’s observations, and states at time t give the blue marble count
in a participant’s productions. Each row gives the distribution of participant
responses per observation ratio condition. The rows labelled 0 to 4 and 6 to
10 each contain data from 16 participants, and the row labelled 5 contains 32
participants. The transition probabilities are taken directly from the proportion
of participants in each condition that responded with each blue marble count.
Assuming that these raw data are a good estimate of the transition matrix,
we can work out the distribution of responses that would be obtained from this
experiment given any combination of training ratios. This is because the tran-
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Figure 6.3: Top row) three hypothetical distributions over observation ratios.
Each observation ratio is shown on the x-axis in terms of the count of the blue
marble variant. Bottom row) the distribution over production ratios for Exper-
iment 1, that would be obtained from each input distributions above. The top
right pane shows an input distribution of a typical psychology experiment. Here,
only three input states are tested with, for example, 32 participants trained on
a 2:8 ratio, 32 participants trained on a 5:5 ratio, and 32 participants trained on
an 8:2 ratio. The bottom left pane shows what the results of that experiment
would look like. This distribution provides the worst estimate of the stationary
distribution for Experiment 1.
participants were given a uniform distribution of observation ratios, then the dis-
tribution of over all participant responses are given by the marginal distribution
(summing over columns). But if a non-uniform set of input states are used, then
the marginal distribution weighted by this input distribution yields the distribu-
tion of participant responses. Figure 6.3 shows some example input distributions
(top) and their resulting output distributions (bottom). The two middle pan-
els show the actual input distribution used for Experiment 1 and the resulting
distribution of participant responses.
This empirical transition matrix provides all of the information needed to
predict the cultural evolution of this system. The idea of culturally transmitting
marbles in bags seems odd if taken literally, but it provides a good example of how
probability matching behavior leads data sets to evolve over time. If Experiment
1 were an iterated learning experiment, the first participant (g0) in the chain
would be shown a particular observation ratio, say 5:5 (corresponding to s5). If
g0 produced a 6:4 ratio (s6), then the next participant (g1) would be shown a 6:4
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Figure 6.4: a) A simulated iterated learning chain using the transition proba-
bilities between the raw data in Experiment 1 (i.e. the raw empirical transition
matrix in Figure 6.2). b) Probability distribution over the amount of time (in gen-
erations) that the simulated chain spent in each state. This provides an estimate
of the stationary distribution. c) The analytical solution to the stationary distri-
bution, calculated by eigen decomposition from the raw transition probabilities
in Experiment 1. The variant being tracked throughout is the blue marble.
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on this raw empirical transition matrix, initialized at s5, for 1000 generations.
Figure 6.4b shows the distribution of states that this chain visited, which should
approximate the stationary distribution of this system. Figure 6.4c shows the
analytical solution of this system’s stationary distribution, calculated via eigen
decomposition of the raw empirical transition matrix. This 1000-generation chain
provides a good approximation of this matrix’s stationary distribution. What we
learn from the stationary distribution, is that the system is biased toward 5:5
ratios, because it spends most of its time in this state. This corroborates the
Bayesian model fitting results in Chapter 5 that returned a best-fit prior bias to-
ward variability in Experiment 1. If the system were unbiased, and participants
were probability matching in a stricter sense, the stationary distribution would be
uniform. And if the system were regularizing, the stationary distribution would
place most mass on the outer edges (ratios 0:10 and 10:0). The stationary distri-
bution provides us with a different understanding of the data at hand. Although
participants in Experiment 1 were probability matching (the mean of responses
was not significantly different from each input frequency) the pathways formed
by the transition probabilities funnel the system toward the 5:5 state. This repre-
sents a bias in participant behavior that is more subtle than the one understood
by analyzing the distribution of responses per input ratio in isolation from one
another, and exemplifies what is meant in the literature by “iterated learning
reveals inductive biases” (e.g. Kalish et al., 2007; Griffiths et al., 2008).
The analyses presented above dealt with raw data, but there are a variety of
ways that the estimate of the transition matrix can be improved. The first one
involves smoothing the data. This adds a small, uniform level of noise to the
matrix and renormalizes it. In the remaining analyses in this chapter, I will use
a Grassberger prior in which a pseudo count of 1
length(row)2
is added to each cell in
the matrix (Grassberger, 2003; Wolpert and DeDeo, 2013). Second, because reg-
ularization concerns biases that operate on relative frequencies, and the analyses
have shown no significant effect of the specific stimuli on production ratios, we
can use the data from all stimuli to estimate how participants produce the ma-
jority marble across the different observation ratios. This is exactly analogous to
what would be done in a typical iterated learning experiment, where stimuli are
randomized between generations and only the evolving property of interest (i.e.
the relative frequency of the variants) is preserved and passed between partici-
pants (e.g. Kirby et al., 2008; Reali and Griffiths, 2009; Smith and Wonnacott,
2010). Therefore, I will collapse the data over marble colors and word types
as done in the previous chapters. This yields a 6×11 matrix covering states s6
through s10 only. Because transition matrices need to be square for most matrix
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operations, including eigen decomposition, these data will be copied into states
s0 through s4 to yield an 11×11 matrix. The states will now be defined by the
count of an arbitrary marble or word, where s0 through s4 shows what happens
to minority variants and s6 through s10 shows what happens to majority variants.
Figure 6.5 and 6.6 shows the empirical transition matrices, estimated in this way,
for the four conditions in Experiment 2. Each matrix’s marginal and stationary
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frequency of variant
(state)
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10
transition probability:
Figure 6.5: Empirical transition matrices (top) for the one-item conditions in
Experiment 2 (marbles1 and words1 ) and the marginal (middle) and stationary
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marbles6 words6
transition probability:
Figure 6.6: Empirical transition matrices (top) for the six-item conditions in
Experiment 2 (marbles6 and words6 ) and the marginal (middle) and stationary
(bottom) distributions calculated from each matrix.
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6.1.3 Eigen decomposition of participant behavior
In this section, I investigate how the distribution of participant behavior will
evolve over several generations of learners. More precisely, what are the paths of
change that connect any given input distribution to the stationary distribution?
Let us begin by focusing on the marbles1 and words1 data sets. In both of
these conditions, the population of participants were trained on a uniform distri-
bution over input ratios {5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:2, 9:1, 10:0} and the resulting distribution
differed markedly as a result of participants’ biases (refer back to Figure 3.12).
The marginal distributions in Figure 6.5 tell us what participant behavior will
look like after one generation of learners. But how will this distribution develop
after a second generation of learners? This question could be answered with an
experimental iterated learning approach where we train another population of 192
participants on the distribution produced by generation 1. However, we already
have a good estimate on how participants will respond to each observation ratio
in the state space, so there is no need to run this experiment again.
One way to get an idea of what this second generation distribution will look
like is by sampling it from the new input distribution, with the probabilities
given in the transition matrix. To improve the picture, these resamplings can be
averaged. However, the veridical average of these resamplings can be obtained
analytically via some basic matrix algebra, by multiplying g1’s output distribution
by the transition matrix to yield g2’s output distribution. This process can be
repeated to obtain g3’s distribution on the basis of g2’s output distribution, and
so on. It can also be solved for an arbitrary pair of generations. Let the output
distribution of gn be gn+1 = ~vn+1. Then, ~vn+1 = ~v0Q
n, where ~v0 is the initial
distribution over observation ratios. It is also worth mentioning here that the
defining feature of the stationary distribution, which is the vector that yields
itself when multiplied by the transition matrix: ~sQ= ~s, where ~s is the stationary
distribution.
Figure 6.7 shows how a uniform initial distribution will develop over several
generations of learners in the linguistic and non-linguistic domains during single
frequency learning. In generation 1, we see the uniform distribution characteristic
of unbiased probability matching behavior in the non-linguistic domain, and a
clear bias for fully-regular mappings in the linguistic domain. Over time, the
linguistic regularization bias leads to more and more regularity in the system,
leveling off at 40% 0:10 ratios and 40% 10:0 ratios. Strikingly, the marbles1 data
gradually develops some regularity over time. This stationary distribution is quite
































































































Figure 6.7: The evolution of a population of participants’ behavior during non-
linguistic (marbles1 ) and linguistic (words1 ) frequency learning, as calculated
from empirical transition matrices.
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experimental design.2 Although both of these experiments elicited probability
matching behavior, the specific pattern of transition probabilities funnels behavior
in Experiment 1 toward 5:5 ratios and funnels behavior in marbles1 toward 0:10
and 10:0 ratios. This exemplifies the fact that apparently similar behaviors can
have very different evolutionary consequences.
Figure 6.6 shows the marginal and stationary distributions for marbles6 and
words6. It is important to note here that in order to describe the six-item data
with an 11-state Markov process, the transition probabilities associated with each
input state must be independent of the other input states. However, this was not
the case for the two six-item conditions because each ratio was learned in the
context of five other ratios. In an iterated version of the six-item conditions, the
set of six observation ratios would change each generation. The data collected in
marbles6 and words6 only tested 3 of the 66 = 46656 possible observation ratio
sets (refer back to Experiment 3). However, on the basis of the data from these
three observation ratio sets, I have reason to believe that the these estimates
are adequate, because the distributions of the all 5:5 observation set was not
significantly different from that of the 5:5 ratio when learned in the context
of other ratios. However, the distributions of the all 10:0 observation set was
significantly different than the 10:0 ratio when learned in the context of other
ratios. So perhaps the transition probability estimates for the {5:5, 6:4, 7:3, 8:2,
9:1} ratios are fair, but the 10:0 ratio underestimates the extent to which this
area of the transition matrix forms a sink. One way to validate these stationary
distribution estimates would be to re-run the experiment with a distribution
of observation ratios that equals the estimated stationary distribution. If the
resulting distribution is the same, then this would be evidence that this is the
stationary distribution (based on the definition of the stationary distribution as
the vector that yields itself when multiplied by the transition matrix).
Compared to the one-item tasks (Figure 6.5), the marginal distributions of
the six-item tasks are much more similar to the corresponding stationary dis-
tributions (Figure 6.6). This means that behavior due to concurrent frequency
learning biases converge to the stationary distribution in fewer generations than
the domain-specific biases alone. This convergence rate can also be obtained from
the eigen decomposition of the transition matrix. When the second eigenvalue,
λ2, is closer to 1, the influence of the start state remains longer, meaning that
2The only differences were: 1) Experiment 1 only used orange and blue marbles, whereas
marbles1 tested one of the 6 color pairs (used in marbles6 ) at random. 2) Experiment 1 coun-
terbalanced the test side location of the marble colors between participants, whereas marbles1
randomized the test side location of the marble colors per test trial.
202
it will take more generations for an iterated learning chain to approximate the
stationary distribution (Rosenthal, 1995). Of the four experimental conditions,
marbles6 will converge to the stationary distribution fastest, with λ2 = 0.7, then
marbles1 with λ2 = 0.81, then words6 with λ2 = 0.84, and finally words1 with
λ2 = 0.92.
This means that the behavior of a single generation in the non-linguistic con-
ditions carries more information about the stationary distribution than those of
the linguistic conditions. Another way of making this point is by looking directly
at the amount of information each marginal distribution carries about the sta-
tionary distribution. Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence is one such information-
theoretic distance measure and can be used to quantify the additional amount of
information needed to specify the marginal distribution, above and beyond the
information provided by the stationary distribution. If zero additional bits are
needed, then this means that the marginal distribution carries full information
about the stationary distribution (i.e. the typological distribution of the sys-
tem can be perfectly predicted from the behavior of one generation of learners).
So, the lower the KL divergence, the more information the marginal distribution
carries about the stationary distribution. KL divergence scores mirror the con-
vergence rates for the four conditions, with the marginal distribution of marbles6
carrying the most information about its stationary distribution at 0.014 bits, then
marbles1 at 0.018 bits, words6 at 0.053 bits, and words1 at 0.566 bits.
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6.2 The obscure mapping of biases to behavior
When we ask how cognitive biases map onto the typological distribution of lan-
guages in the world, we are asking about two types of mappings: 1) how do
cognitive biases map on to individual behavior and 2) how do individual be-
haviors map onto the structure of languages. In the previous chapters, I have
addressed the first question and shown that three different kinds of biases regard-
ing linguistic stimuli, concurrency, and coordination, all lead to similar amounts
of regularization in a basic frequency learning task. This demonstrates that the
behavioral profiles of individuals can underspecify the particular cognitive biases
at play: regularization behavior is multiply realizable. This obscures the mapping
of cognitive biases to single generation behavior.
This chapter has focused on the second question. First we have seen that the
biases of one generation of learners does not yield a distribution over behavior that
mirrors the stationary distribution. This proves that the cultural transmission
process is an integral part of the problem of linkage: it is the mechanism that
links individual behavior to typological patterns. The functionalist interpretation
exemplified by Culbertson et al. (2012) may hold for certain combinations of
biases and typological patterns. However, it should not be taken as supporting
evidence that biases will necessarily mirror typological patterns.
In addition to not finding a one-to-one correspondence between distributions,
the coarser-grained characterization of bias to typological distribution mirroring
in terms of ranking preservation does not seem to hold either. For each condition
in Experiment 2, I calculated the regularity of participant behavior (on the basis of
a uniform input distribution to the estimated transition matrix) for one generation
of learners and compared this to the regularity level achieved in the stationary
distribution of that matrix. Figure 6.8a shows these regularity levels, given on the
y-axis in terms of entropy, according to the measure of regularization described in
Section 3.1.3. The regularity of participant productions are, in order of increasing
regularity: 0.64 bits for marbles1, 0.50 bits for marbles6, 0.47 bits for words1, and
0.34 bits for words6. The regularity levels of the stationary behavior were also
calculated by the same measure and are, in order of increasing regularity: 0.61 bits
for marbles1, 0.44 bits for marbles6, 0.24 bits for words6, and 0.15 bits for words1.
Here we see that the ranking is not preserved. The cognitive biases associated
with particular levels of regularity in a single generation of learners do not map
on to the levels of regularity after cultural evolution takes place. Therefore, the
3Recall that this calculation of entropy is identical to both the average entropy of each
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Figure 6.8: a) Regularity of single-generation and stationary behavior in the four
conditions of Experiment 2. b) KL divergence of participant behavior in marbles1,
marbles6, and words1 from participant behavior in marbles6.
mapping between single generation and stationary behavior is obscure as well.
Finally, to return to one of the main questions explored in Experiment 2:
what are the relative contributions of domain-specific and domain-general biases
to the linguistic regularization bias? In Chapter 3, this question was addressed by
taking a detailed look at the predictors of regularization behavior within a single
generation of learners. Now that we have access to the stationary distribution,
we can ask how much information participant behavior in each condition carries
about participant behavior in the full artificial language learning task words6,
and whether one of the factors becomes more predictive over several generations
of learners. Again, information distance is calculated using Kullbach-Liebler di-
vergence. Figure 6.8b shows the distance of each condition (marbles1, marbles6,
and words1 ) from words6 among the marginal distributions, and among the sta-
tionary distributions. As expected, marbles1 behavior carries the least amount of
information about words6 behavior. What is of interest here is whether multiple-
frequency learning or linguistic domain carries more information about the reg-
ularity of language. This proves to be the linguistic domain, both when com-
paring single-generation behavior, and even more so when comparing stationary
behavior. On the basis of these estimated transition matrices, multiple-frequency
learning and linguistic domain carry information about linguistic regularity, but
domain-specific biases seem to be more predictive of the level or regularity in
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language.4
This kind of directional change over time was also exemplified by the striking
difference between stationary distributions in the two probability matching pro-
files of Experiment 1 and marbles1. Neither of these experiments elicited a change
in entropy that was significantly different from zero, with marginal distribution
entropy of 0.68 bits for Experiment 1 and 0.64 bits for marbles1 (input entropy
was 0.64 bits in both cases). However, their stationary levels or regularity differ
markedly: 0.83 bits for Experiment 1, representing a strong increase in variability
over time, and 0.61 bits for marbles1, representing a slight increase in regularity
over time.
In summary, cultural transmission is an integral part of the problem of linkage.
In none of these experiments did the distribution of single-generation behavior
mirror that of the stationary behavior. In all cases, the distribution of behav-
ior changed over generations, becoming more regular over time. Furthermore,
the relative gains in regularity differed between conditions and lead to different
rankings of regularity within the marginal and stationary distributions. Differ-
ences in the pattern of transition probabilities lead to different stationary levels
of regularity and nuanced biases not readily seen in single generation behavior.
Therefore, these stationary levels of regularity would be difficult to predict on the
basis of single-generation behavior that only experimentally tests a small subset
of the input states. Such results would necessarily be over-fit to participants’
behavior given those particular inputs and contain very little information about
the likelihood that those behaviors would lead to other behaviors for any scale of
time greater than one generation. This is because intermediate, untested, input
states may provide unexpectedly high-probability or unexpectedly low-probability
transitions to other states that were tested. Information about these probabilities
simply can not be ascertained from investigating a sparse sample of all possible
input states. One piece of advice to experimentalists who are attempting to ob-
tain the stationary distribution from a single generation of learners would be,
once you think you have found the stationary distribution, train another popu-
lation of participants on that distribution and see if the population returns the
same distribution. If so, then this is probably the stationary distribution. How-
4From personal communication with Tom Griffiths, there do not seem to be any existing
methods for obtaining confidence intervals on stationary distributions derived from estimated
transition matrices. It is unknown how the error associated with an estimated transition ma-
trix is related to the error on the stationary distribution when calculated from that matrix.
This same problem also holds for iterated learning experiments which estimate the stationary
distribution on the basis of several trajectories through the veridical transition matrix. This is
an important area for future methodological development, but for now I will have to discuss
these results without confidence intervals.
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ever, if the state space is large, this type of verification will be difficult and an
iterated-learning based design that initializes chains on a broad sample of start
states may be the next best method. In short, psychological experimentation is a
powerful way to relate cognitive biases to behavioral biases, but requires special
attention to experimental design when the object of inquiry is the structure of
behaviors that emerge as the result of cultural evolution.
6.3 Cognitive biases as selection pressures
This thesis has explored how the human mind alters the distribution of variation
in culturally transmitted data sets. The story line I have put forward has framed
cognitive biases as analogical to selection pressures on culture as it evolves. In
particular, I have explored a variety of basic biases in frequency learning and
production and in this section I would like to clarify the relationship between
these biases and certain selection functions in the genetic and cultural selection
literature.
In Chapter 1, I reviewed two genetic models of selection and frequency-
dependent selection and two cultural models of direct bias and frequency-dependent
copying. Then, I presented several experiments that targeted cognitive biases dur-
ing frequency learning and therefore, the cognitive basis of frequency-dependent
copying. By design, these experiments utilized stimuli that were not likely to be
selectively copied on the basis of their intrinsic properties (such as a color of the
marbles stimuli or the phonetic or orthographic realization of the word stimuli)
and the data analyses verified that these properties did not effect participants’
regularization behavior. The only exception was in Experiment 5 on tacit coor-
dination, where participants successfully coordinated on marble color, but only
in the 5:5 condition where the marbles could not be distinguished in terms of
relative frequency to one another. In the 7:3 condition, participants coordinated
on the majority marble instead of a particular marble color. Overall, it appears
that these weak but potential sources of direct bias are either washed out by
frequency-based selection pressures, or completely ignored when frequency-based
copying is possible. This suggests that frequency-based selection pressures may
be more common in cultural evolution than genetic evolution, but this is only a
tentative suggestion which implies a variety of interesting follow-up experiments.
Additionally, the Bayesian models of frequency learning should constitute a form
of frequency-dependent selection. Because there was no evidence for direct bias
in the experimental data to which these models were fit, the set of models were
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decidedly restricted to those which are incapable of producing direct bias: those
with symmetrical priors (refer back to Section 5.1 and Figures 5.1 and 5.2 for
the explanation of this). Therefore, in the remainder of this section, I will dis-
cuss the similarities and differences between 1) the selection functions defined by
the human frequency learning data and the Bayesian models of frequency esti-
mation and production and 2) the models of frequency-dependent selection and
frequency-dependent copying described in Chapter 1.
Figure 6.9 plots some example behavior of the Bayesian models in the format
of a selection function (refer back to the plots in Section 1.6). All of the functions
defined by this model can be understood as forms of frequency-dependent se-
lection, because they define values of θ′ as a function of the frequency of θ.5
Although, none of these Bayesian models map on directly to the frequency-
dependent models of Felsenstein (Figure 1.9) and Boyd and Richerson (Figure
1.12) described in Section 1.6. In Boyd and Richerson’s terms, the maximizer
model can produce both conformity and anti-conformity copying, however the
sampler and averager models can only produce anti-conformity copying. The top
left pane of Figure 6.9 constitutes a conformity copying function for maximizer
with a regular prior of α
2
= 0.1. Here we see that the more frequent a variant
is, the more likely it is to be copied. This leads to the selective elimination of
variation which would cause the entropy of agent productions to drop each gen-
eration (on average), and constitutes regularization. For all values of α
2
< 1, the
maximizer model constitutes conformity copying. As expected, when the prior
is unbiased (α
2
= 1) the maximizer model achieves drift and is identical to Boyd
and Richerson’s frequency-dependent copying model when D = 0. And for all
priors that bias agents toward variability (α
2
> 1), the maximizer model defines
anti-conformity copying. This leads to the selective maintenance of rare variants
in the population and does not constitute a regularization process. The second
row of Figure 6.9 shows some selection functions from the sampler and averager
models. When α
2
= 0, these models define drift and are identical to Boyd and
Richerson’s frequency-dependent copying model when D = 0. For all other values
of α
2
, these models define anti-conformity copying. One of the main mechanisms
behind a class of selection known as balancing selection is frequency-dependent
selection for rare variants (e.g. Clarke, 1979; Maynard Smith, 1989; Mokkonen
et al., 2011). Balancing selection is any form of selection that maintains variation
in a population and was originally conceived to account for balanced polymor-
phism in the population genetics literature (e.g. Dobzhansky, 1951; Wright, 1969)
5but see Reali and Griffiths (2010) for a proof that the averager model can be described as
Wright-Fisher drift with mutation.
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Figure 6.9: Some example selection functions as defined by the Bayesian models
for different values of the prior parameter α
2
, where N = 10. This function maps
θ (the input proportion of variant x at generation t − 1) to θ′ (the expected
proportion of variant x at generation t). θ′ is simply the mean of the model’s
behavior for a given input proportion (i.e. the mean of each distribution as shown
in Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9). The sampling error about the mean, which differs
between the models, is not depicted in this plot. The sampler and averager
models are identical in terms of the means they produce per α
2
, but they differ
in terms of the sampling error about this mean. The maximizer model achieves
frequency-dependent selection for the common variant when α
2
< 1, it is neutral
and defines drift when α
2
= 1, and it achieves frequency-dependent selection for
the rare variant when α
2
> 1. The sampler and averager models are only capable
of frequency-dependent selection for the rare variant, except when α
2
= 0 and
these models define drift.
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In extreme cases, balancing selection achieves a uniform distribution over variants
in a population, and this relates closely to the variability bias in these Bayesian
models. As α
2
approaches infinity, model behavior is increasingly biased toward a
50/50 production of the two variant types. In the Dirichlet-multinomial version
of this beta-binomial Bayesian model, a uniform distribution over all variants is
achieved when α
2
goes to infinity. Balancing selection can not, however, stabilize
variants at non-50/50 ratios in the way that probability matching behavior can:
it only relates to the variability bias and not to any cognitive mechanisms that
lead to probability matching and the high transmission fidelity of particular ra-
tios of variants. As models of regularization, however, the sampler and averager
are unsatisfactory (at best) and confusing (at worst). These models do possess
a prior that can be biased toward regularity, but they are incapable of produc-
ing regularization via conformity copying behavior (refer back to p. 179 for a
discussion of how the sampler achieves a limited amount regularization behavior
by way of its broad sampling error). Although these models seem inadequate for
describing human regularization behavior, they do constitute two types of the
many theoretically possible models of inductive evolution.
Figure 6.10 plots the selection functions defined by the raw data in Experiment
2. Here, θ is the observed proportion of variant x and θ′ is the mean proportion
of variant x that participants produce. Compare these plots to the transition
matrices in Figures 6.5 and 6.6: the selection function connects the means of
each transition matrix row6 and omits the sampling error. Strikingly, all of the
plots in Figure 6.10 appear to define noisy renditions of drift7, but we know from
the detailed analysis of the complete distribution of responses, that participants
are most certainly regularizing in marbles6, words1, and words6. This difference
is due to the unique spread of error about the mean. Participants regularize
by overproducing one of the two variants, yielding a bimodal distribution with
a mean that tends to equal the observation proportion. This achieves regular-
ization in a very different way than Felsenstein or Boyd and Richerson’s models
of frequency-dependent selection do: these models assume binomial error about
the mean, but participant responses do not conform to this, and this leads to
different evolutionary dynamics. If participants only regularized by overproduc-
ing the majority variant, then the resulting selection function would look much
more like these basic models of frequency-dependent selection. However, some
participants regularize by overproducing the minority variant, in such a way that
6please pardon the inverted y-axis...
7though marbles1 and marbles6 could be a frequency-dependent copying function that favors
the minority variant.
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Figure 6.10: Participant data from Experiment 2, plotted as a selection function
which maps θ (the observed proportion of variant x ) to θ′ (the mean production
proportion of variant x. The sampling error about the mean is not depicted in
this plot.
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the population mean falls on input frequency, even though all participants were
regularizing. Whereas the Felsenstein or Boyd and Richerson models achieve
regularization through a bias in mean behavior at the population level, actual
human regularization behavior occurs via changes to the sampling error in the
population’s responses. Participant behavior also departs from the basic model
in the 5:5 condition. Here, frequency-dependent selection models would predict
no change: the variants do not differ in terms of relative frequency and there-
fore can not be differentially copied on the basis of their frequency. However,
many participants regularized a 5:5 observation ratio by overproducing one of
the variants, seemingly at random (refer back to Figure 3.12). This means that
the regularization behavior can not be modeled in terms of a basic frequency-
dependent selection or copying model in which no bias acts to change or distort
the relative frequency of variants when they occur in equal proportions, because
human regularization biases certainly do change the relative frequency of variants





If you are arriving here from the previous chapters, and especially the previous
one, this conclusion will hopefully explain what just happened to you and tell you
that everything is going to be ok. And to the dear and mysterious reader, who is
not one of my two supervisors or one of my two examiners, I have fashioned the
conclusion to serve as a stand-alone recapitulation of this anthropologist-born-
again-cognitive-scientist’s take on cultural evolution. This thesis, as many theses
are, is a roadmap of a research agenda. So now I will tell you where we have
been, what places are worth returning to with the family (I mean your lab), and
where I think we should go from here.
The main point of this thesis is that cultural evolution is unique. It encom-
passes a range of evolutionary dynamics that can be adequately-described by
different models of biological evolution, but it also encompasses processes that
have no clear analogue in biological evolution. All research that focuses on the
forces of evolutionary change that are unique to culture, inevitably adds to the
general theory on evolution and broadens scientific knowledge of the possible
forms of evolution that exist.
Through five experiments, I targeted the methodological interface of popu-
lation genetics and experimental psychology to understand how cognitive biases
shape the evolution of culturally transmitted data sets. To cut close to this in-
terface, I investigated inductive biases on frequency learning and production to
understand why language, humanity’s premier product of cultural transmission,
contains so little unpredictable variation. Language learners possess a regulariza-
tion bias, which leads them to eliminate variation in language, and a variety of
cognitive mechanisms feed into this bias.
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Experiment 1 established a baseline for unbiased frequency learning behavior
and in doing so, identified probability matching as a cognitive basis for cultural
drift. The result of this experiment showed that neutral copying obtained from
an inductive process can be much more accurate (in the sense of preserving the
relative frequencies of variants in the population) than a genetic process of ran-
domly sampling alleles from a population. This is because an inductive process is
affected by the amount of data it sees, whereas a genetic process is only affected
by the proportion of alleles in the previous generation. If a person views one
red and two blue marbles being drawn from a bag, they may be less certain of
the proportion of marbles in the bag than if they had seen 100 red and 200 blue
marbles drawn. If you ask a person to tell you 10 more draws that are likely
to come from that bag, then you will get different kinds of responses depending
on how much data you let the person see. However, if a random mating process
samples 10 alleles from a population of 1:2 or 100:200 allele types, the results will
be identical. Therefore, inductive evolution defines a type of cultural drift which
can neutrally maintain variation in the population longer than models of genetic
drift can, especially if large data sets are seen. This suggests that importing pop-
ulation genetics models of sampling processes as a baseline for cultural evolution
is inappropriate. Instead, better baselines can be informed by understanding the
sampling error associated with a wide variety of cognitive models and models of
inductive inference.
Experiment 2 built upon the basic frequency learning design of Experiment
1 to engage different sources of regularization biases in adult learners. Domain-
general drivers of regularization were investigated by having participants learn
about marbles being drawn from one container, or marbles being drawn from
several containers concurrently. In the one-item task participants probability
matched, as in Experiment 1, whereas in the six-item task they regularized (i.e.
they tended to indicate that only the more common marble color would come out
of each container). This behavior may be rooted in memory constraints, such as
forgetting about low-frequency variants when cognitive load is high. Language
learners are constantly tracking the statistics of linguistic variants at all levels
of language (its phonology, lexicon, and syntactic structures) and this kind of
domain-general constraint on frequency learning may be part of the reason why
language learners regularize. However, language learners also regularize when
they are only learning about one linguistic item at a time. This domain-specific
driver of regularization was investigated by reframing the basic frequency learning
task from Experiment 1 in the linguistic domain. Although concurrent frequency
learning and linguistic frequency learning both elicit regularization behavior, nei-
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ther one on its own accounts for the full amount of regularization behavior ob-
tained when participants learn about multiple linguistic frequencies concurrently.
Therefore, both domain-general and domain-specific aspects of language learn-
ing have a role in explaining regularization in language. Cultural data sets are
shaped as they pass through cognition, which is an integrated system forged by
our genes, individual experience with the world, and social experience with oth-
ers. All three of these sources will contribute to the overall form that any product
of cultural transmission takes and thus, none of these on their own can predict
the evolutionary trajectories that something such as language will follow. Any
attempt to understand the cultural evolution of behavior by restricting our ex-
planation to the subset of cognition that processes socially-acquired information
will necessarily be an incomplete story.
Experiment 3 and 4 took a closer look at memory constraints involved in
concurrent frequency learning. These experiments showed that the level of reg-
ularization behavior that participants produced was robust, across training sets
that differed markedly in the amount of variation they contained, and across dif-
ferent training and testing regimes that modulated the cognitive load of the task.
Although these manipulations did affect the kind of frequency information that
participants encoded, regularization behavior seems to be heavily modulated by
what participants decide to do with this frequency information when it comes
to the production of linguistic utterances. This raises the point that the results
of artificial language learning experiments may be sensitive to aspects of task
framing, pragmatic factors, and participants’ perceived goal of the experiment.
Experiment 5 addressed the pragmatic factors underlying linguistic regular-
ization by investigating how two individuals utilize shared frequency information
to coordinate in a non-linguistic task. This functional use of frequency informa-
tion also led to regularization behavior. In this experiment, a pair of participants
each drew several marbles from the same bag, but they could not see what their
partner had drawn. Then in an implicit coordination game, they were both asked
to write down the same color without communicating with one another. When
participants made draws of five blue marbles and five red marbles, they achieved
coordination on the blue marble better than chance. However, when participants
drew three of one color and seven of the other color, they ignored the color identity
of the marbles and successfully coordinated on the one they had observed in the
higher frequency. This implicit coordination game was repeated ten times with-
out feedback. In both conditions, many participants maximized by consistently
choosing one color in each of the ten coordination games. Participant behavior in
this task led to the same amount of regularization as in Experiment 2, when par-
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ticipants had to name one object ten times in the absence of an explicit pressure
to coordinate with a partner. This suggests that artificial language learning tasks
may elicit coordination-based regularization strategies from learners as they try
to provide the “best” answers in test trials. If this is a maximization strategy, it
will follow a simple rule: “always choose the most frequent variant”, and there-
fore ignore the nuanced differences in the statistical information that participants
have encoded.
Several important methodological points were raised in this thesis. First,
I proposed an information-theoretic definition of regularization behavior as a
drop in the conditional entropy of linguistic variants on contexts (Section 3.1).
Although this is an obvious measurement of linguistic structure such as words
conditioned on meanings, or determiners conditioned on noun classes, it can
also be seamlessly used to quantify the variation in a distribution of linguistic
variants irrespective of their contexts. Most linguistic regularization experiments
collect data of this latter type and discuss distributional variation in terms of
“scatter” and “learning context variability” and report statistics for the highest-
frequency variant. All distributions over linguistic variants can be quantified in
terms of entropy, which could be a powerful universal measure from comparing
the amount of regularization elicited in different experiments, and across different
linguistic units at all levels of language (such as phonological forms, the lexicon,
morphosyntactic markers, syntactic structures, and word orders).
Second, in Chapter 5, an analysis of some Bayesian models of inductive infer-
ence showed that two types of beta-binomial models (the averager and maximizer)
are equivalent to the Wright-Fisher model of genetic drift, without mutation,
when the averager’s inductive bias favors complete regularity, and when the max-
imizer’s inductive bias is unbiased. Because the Wright-Fisher model of genetic
drift defines neutral evolution, the cognitive equivalent, intuitively, should occur
in the absence of an inductive bias. Because only the maximizer produces unbi-
ased behavior for an unbiased prior, the maximizer seems to be the appropriate
model for relating inductive biases to behavioral biases, especially when those be-
haviors evolve over time. Reali and Griffiths (2010) have shown that the averager
model is equivalent to the Wright-Fisher model of genetic drift with mutation
for all possible values of its bias (because every bias value can be matched with
a mutational value). This result implies that cognitive biases are equivalent to
mutational pressures on culturally evolving data sets. This makes sense for the
averager model, because all values of its inductive bias (besides maximum regu-
larity) lead to behavior that is biased toward variability. But it makes less sense
for the maximizer model, which produces both variability-biased behavior (i.e.
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anti-conformity copying) and regularity-biased behavior (i.e. conformity-copying)
because conformity-copying mutation is an odd concept (though it may be a new
concept unique to inductive evolution). Since the maximizer is the only one of
these three models that can actively eliminate variation from a pool of cultural
variation (via conformity copying), the maximizer model may be a more promis-
ing avenue for future equivalence results, such as those for Wright-Fisher models
with selection. Finally, we saw that neither of these three Bayesian models of fre-
quency learning were capable of regularizing in the way that human learners do.
Despite this shortcoming, all of these models are still models of inductive evolution
and therefore, do constitute theoretically possible models of cultural evolution.
With regard to unique aspects of cultural evolution, the sampler model reiterates
a point made in Experiment 1, which demonstrated that cultural evolution can
follow non-binomial sampling processes. Whereas probability matching defines
cultural drift with lower sampling error than binomial drift, the sampler model
defines cultural drift with higher sampling error than binomial drift. This would
lead to faster elimination of neutral variation than models of genetic drift would
predict and demonstrates yet another way in which cultural evolution breaks the
binomial sampling assumption so common in descriptions of genetic evolution.
Third, in Chapter 6, I addressed the problem of linkage with estimates of
empirical transition matrices derived from the experimental data gathered in Ex-
periments 1 and 2. From these estimated transition matrices, the outcome of
cultural evolution can be estimated in terms of the stationary distribution over
all behaviors after an infinite number of generations of learners. Here, we saw
that the behavior of a single generation of learners does not necessarily provide
a good estimate of the ultimate form, or typological distribution, that cultur-
ally transmitted behavior takes. This is because culturally transmitted behav-
iors move through a complex space of transition probabilities and experimentally
determining what one slice of this space looks like can be undermined by un-
usually high-probability transitions via states which have not been investigated.
Therefore, we should not, by default, expect that the distribution over individual
behaviors in one generation will carry complete information about the distribu-
tion over behaviors after cultural transmission has taken place. Certainly, this
end-state distribution is completely determined by individuals’ biases and the
behavior they produce, but the pathways that form when behaviors are linked up
via cultural transmission are the ultimate determiner of typological distribution.
Inductive evolution is the unification of cultural evolution and cognitive sci-
ence. It defines a unique force of evolution that operates in cultural transmission
systems and is necessarily cognitive. Behaviors are never directly copied, but
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always reverse engineered in a cycle of perception, processing, and production.
Higher-level descriptions of behaviors in terms of direct copying mechanisms are
indispensable for generating and culling hypotheses about the forces of evolution
at play in any particular cultural data set, such as Paleo-Indian projectile points,
West German pottery shards, first names in the U.S. census, and lexical items in
particular genres of literature. However, macro-level analyses of cultural change
will always underspecify the mechanism because macro-level patterns are multi-
ply realizable. Because the locus of cultural change is cognition, this is the most





Figure A.1: Screen shots of the observation phase instructions (top) and the




Part 1 You will observe several marbles
being drawn from a bag at
random. Just sit back and
watch.
You will observe one object
being named several times. Just
sit back and watch.
(10 observation trials) (10 observation trials)
Part 2 Next, please tell us what another
several draws from this bag are
likely to look like. Make your
choice by clicking on one of the
marbles below. This will repeat
several times.
Next, you will be shown the
same object again. Please name
this object like you saw in Part
1. This will repeat several times.
(10 production trials) (10 production trials)
Part 3 The container you saw had 100
marbles inside. This container
could have one or two different
colors of marbles in it. For this
container, please tell us how
many marbles of each color were
in it. Please make your best
guess.
The words you saw come from
another language than English.
The object you saw can be
named with one or two words in
this language. For this object,
please tell us what percent of the
time it is named with each word
in this language. Please make
your best guess.
Part 4 In Part 1, you saw 10 marble
draws. How many times did you
see each color? Please make your
best guess.
In Part 2, you made 10 marble
draws. How many times did you
choose each color? Please make
you best guess.
In Part 1, you saw the object
being named 10 times. How
many times did you see each
word? Please make your best
guess.
In Part 2, you named the object
10 times. How many times did
you choose each word? Please
make your best guess.
Part 5 (Exit questionnaire) (Exit questionnaire)
Part 6 Thank you for participating.
Please write down this
completion code and enter it on
the HIT page so that we know




Part 1 You will see 6 different
containers. Each container is
filled with lots of marbles. We
will randomly draw marbles out
of each container and show them
to you. Try to get a feel for what
the draws from each container
look like. This part takes about
3 minutes. Please pay attention.
You will observe six different
objects being named several
times. Just sit back and watch.
This part takes about 3 minutes.
Please pay attention.
(60 observation trials) (60 observation trials)
Part 2 Next, please tell us what some
more random draws from the
containers are likely to look like.
Each time we show you a
container, make your choice by
clicking on one of the marbles
below. This will repeat several
times. This part takes about 3
minutes.
Next, you will be shown the
same objects again. Please name
the objects like you saw in Part
1. This part takes about 3
minutes.
(60 production trials) (60 production trials)
Part 3 Each container had 100 marbles
inside. And each container could
have one or two different colors
of marbles in it. For each
container, please tell us how
many marbles of each color were
in it. Please make your best
guess.
The words you saw come from
another language than English.
Each object you saw can be
named with one or two words in
this language. For each object,
please tell us what percent of the
time it is named with each word
in this language. Please make
your best guess.
Part 4 (none) (none)
Part 5 (Exit questionnaire) (Exit questionnaire)
Part 6 Thank you for participating.
Please write down this
completion code and enter it on
the HIT page so that we know
you have completed the task.
(same)
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Part 3 instruction screen shots
Figure A.2: Part 3 instruction screen shot for marbles1 with answers selected.
Figure A.3: Part 3 instruction screen shot for words1 with answers selected.
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Figure A.4: Part 3 instruction screen shot for marbles6 with answers selected.
Figure A.5: Part 3 instruction screen shot for words6 with no selections.
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Part 4 instruction screen shots
Figure A.6: Part 4 instruction screen shot for marbles1 with answers selected.
Figure A.7: Part 4 instruction screen shot for words1 with answers selected.
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A.2.1 Exit questionnaires
Participants answered each question by selecting “Yes” or “No”.
marbles1 and marbles6
People complete this task in different ways, please tell us what you did:
1) I used a pen or pencil during the task.
2) I tried to count the number of marbles of each color.
3) I thought the marble draws were random.
4) I thought the marble draws followed a predictable sequence.
5) I tried to memorize the exact sequence of marbles I saw.
6) In Part 2, I tried to produce the same sequence of marbles I saw.
7) In Part 2, I tried to produce a random sequence of marble draws.
words1 and words6
People complete this task in different ways, please tell us what you did:
1) I used a pen or pencil during the task.
2) I tried to count the number of times I saw each word.
3) I thought the two words appeared randomly.
4) I thought the words appeared in a predictable sequence.
5) I tried to memorize the exact sequence of words I saw.
6) In Part 2, I tried to name the object with just one of the words.
7) In Part 2, I tried to name the object with both words.
Figure A.8: A screen shot of the exit questionnaire with answers selected.
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Figure A.9: The MTurk HIT page as seen by participants in condition marbles1.
226
Figure A.10: The MTurk HIT page as seen by participants in condition marbles6.
227
Figure A.11: The MTurk HIT page as seen by participants in condition words1.
228






Welcome,	  I’m	  Caroline	  and	  this	  is	  Vanessa,	  and	  thank	  you	  for	  participating	  in	  our	  
research.	  Before	  we	  begin,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  read	  through	  this	  consent	  
form	  and,	  if	  you	  accept,	  please	  sign	  it.	  	  
[CONSENT	  FORM]	  
	  
Then,	  before	  we	  start,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  do	  a	  little	  color	  vision	  test,	  since	  the	  
experiment	  involves	  differently	  colored	  marbles,	  and	  we	  want	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  
you	  can	  distinguish	  these.	  
[VISION	  TEST]	  
	  
The	  experiment	  consists	  of	  two	  parts.	  We	  will	  now	  give	  you	  the	  instructions	  for	  




As	  you	  have	  read,	  for	  this	  experiment	  you	  will	  be	  working	  together	  as	  a	  pair.	  You	  
will	  both	  draw	  a	  set	  of	  marbles	  from	  a	  bag.	  We	  will	  alternate	  between	  you	  two	  to	  
draw	  marbles.	  So	  first	  you	  draw	  one,	  look	  at	  it,	  put	  it	  back,	  then	  you	  draw	  one,	  
look	  at	  it,	  put	  it	  back,	  and	  then	  you	  again	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
	  
When	  doing	  this	  experiment,	  we	  would	  normally	  use	  a	  soundproof	  booth,	  
however	  since	  we	  do	  not	  have	  the	  means	  for	  that	  we	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  stay	  
silent	  during	  the	  experiment.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  you	  do	  not	  engage	  in	  verbal	  or	  
other	  communication	  with	  your	  partner.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  will	  position	  you	  with	  
your	  backs	  to	  each	  other,	  so	  that	  you	  cannot	  see	  your	  partner,	  or	  their	  marble	  
draws.	  	  [REPOSITION	  CHAIRS]	  
	  
I	  will	  hold	  the	  bag,	  and	  Vanessa	  will	  record	  the	  sequences	  you	  draw	  from	  it.	  	  If	  





Now	  we	  will	  give	  both	  of	  you	  a	  card.	  On	  this	  card	  please	  write	  down	  a	  marble	  
color.	  The	  only	  goal	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  is	  to	  write	  down	  the	  same	  color	  
on	  the	  paper	  as	  your	  partner	  does	  on	  their	  paper.	  If	  you	  succeed,	  you	  will	  receive	  a	  
small	  reward.	  
	  
Good.	  Now	  we	  will	  give	  both	  of	  you	  another	  card.	  On	  this	  card	  please	  write	  down	  
a	  marble	  color.	  The	  only	  goal	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  is	  to	  write	  down	  the	  
same	  color	  on	  the	  paper	  as	  your	  partner	  does	  on	  their	  paper.	  If	  you	  succeed,	  you	  
will	  receive	  a	  small	  reward.	  	  
	  
[repeat	  instruction	  verbatim	  until	  10	  responses	  are	  collected]	  
Figure A.13: Complete verbal instructions for Experiment 5. The experimenter
had this script on her clipboard and delivered it identically to all participants.
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A.3.2 Written instructions
Figure A.14: The written instructions for Experiment 5. A sheet with these
instructions was handed to each participant to read at the “written instructions”
cue in the verbal script (shown above in A.3.1).
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A.3.3 Informed consent form
Participant Identification Number:
Informed Consent Form 
Name of researchers: Vanessa Ferdinand and Caroline Kamps 
Your participation is valuable to us and very much appreciated.  However, your participation 
is entirely voluntary. 
Please check box 
1. I agree to take part in the study carried out by Vanessa Ferdinand and 
Caroline Kamps.  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, including after 
consenting to participate. 
3.  I understand that any information given by me may be used in future 
reports, articles or presentations by the research team. 
4.  I understand that my participation and the data that I provide with my 
responses will be kept confidential.  My name will not be recorded 
anywhere in the database or appear in any reports, articles or presentations. 
I understand that individual participants will not be identified (or will be 
identified only by codes). 
 
5.  I have been given a copy of this consent form 
Signature of the participant 
I understand what is involved in this research and I agree to participate in the study. 
________________________ ________________ ________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
Signature of the researcher 
I believe the participant is giving informed consent to participate in this study 
_________________________ ________________ ________________ 
Researcher Date  Signature 
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Abstract
Language learners tend to regularize unpredictable variation
and some claim that is due to a language-specific regularization
bias. We investigate the role of task difficulty on regularization
behavior in a non-linguistic frequency learning task and show
that adults regularize variable input when tracking multiple fre-
quencies concurrently, but reliably reproduce the variation they
have observed when tracking one frequency. These results sug-
gest that regularization behavior may be due to domain-general
factors, such as memory limitations.
Keywords: frequency learning; regularization; probability
matching; Bayesian models;
Introduction
Languages contain very little unpredictable variation (Cham-
bers et al., 2003) and language learners tend to regularize the
inconsistent input they encounter (Reali & Griffiths, 2009;
Hudson Kam & Newport, 2009, Smith & Wonnacott, 2010).
For example, English contains two forms of the indefinite ar-
ticle a and an, but a deterministic rule (based on the initial
phoneme of the following noun) governs the use of these two
variants. Why are languages regular, and what drives learn-
ers to eliminate free variation in language? Some have sug-
gested that we come to the task of language learning with the
expectation that languages are regular and that this expecta-
tion takes the form of a language-specific innate bias (Bicker-
ton, 1984; DeGraaff, 1999; Lumsden, 1999; Becker & Veen-
stra, 2003). Others claim that linguistic regularization can
be explained by domain-general learning mechanisms, such
as the effects of memory limitations on the type of variation
that learners produce (Hudson Kam & Newport, 2005, 2009;
Hudson Kam & Chang, 2009). Hudson Kam and Newport
(2005, 2009) have shown that children tend to regularize free
variation, whereas adults maintain it by probability matching,
and attribute this difference to children having lower work-
ing memory capacity than adults. Newport (1990) demon-
strated that children have more of a limited ability to learn
from inconsistent input and Hudson Kam and Chang (2009)
showed that adults probability matched more when word re-
trieval was made easier and regularized more when it was
difficult, further corroborating their claim that memory limi-
tations can lead to regularization, although see Perfors (2012)
for an account of restricted memory encoding that does not
lead to regularization.
A similar effect of memory limitations can be found in a
non-linguistic tasks. In a study with adults, Kareev et al.
(1997) reported an effect of individual differences in work-
ing memory capacity (as determined by a digit-span test) on
participants’ perception of the correlation of two probabilistic
variables. Participants with lower capacity overproduced the
most common variant, whereas participants with higher ca-
pacity did not. Regularization is also modulated by the num-
ber of variables in a task; adults regularized slightly more
when predicting which of three lights will flash next than
when predicting for two lights (Gardner, 1957).
In this paper, we explore the effect of tracking single versus
multiple frequencies on the regularization behavior of adults
in a non-linguistic task. We show that participants probabil-
ity match when tracking a single frequency, but regularize
when tracking six frequencies concurrently. Because con-
current frequency learning is a prominent aspect of language
learning (Saffran, Alin & Newport, 1996), and also elicits
regularization in a non-linguistic task, this is consistent with
a domain-general account of the observed regularization bias
in language, possibly attributable to limited working memory.
Frequency learning experiment
Participants 381 participants were recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform and completed our
experiment online. 37 participants were excluded on the ba-
sis of the following criteria: failing a color vision test (2),
self-reporting the use of a pen or pencil during the task (14),
not reporting their sex or age (2), or having previously partic-
ipated in any of our experiments, as determined by their user
ID with MTurk (19). More participants were recruited than
necessary with the expectation that many would be excluded
by these criteria. Once the predetermined number of partic-
ipants per condition was met, data from the last participants
was excluded, totaling 24 participants across all conditions
and tasks. All excluded participants received the full mone-
tary reward for the task. The average monetary reward per
participant, converted to an hourly rate, was $2.64. Of the
final 320 participants, 184 are female, and the mean age is 36
(min = 18, max = 69), with a standard deviation of 12 years.
Materials The experiment was coded up as a java applet
that ran in the participant’s web browser in a 600x800-pixel
field. Photographs of 6 different containers (a box, pouch, jar,
bowl, bucket, and basket) and graphically generated images
of marbles in 12 different colors (blue, orange, brown, grey,
black, yellow, red, teal, olive, pink, purple, and lime) served
as stimuli.
One-item task This experiment consisted of a training
phase in which participants observed a series of 10 marble
draws from a bag, and a testing phase in which participants
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output frequency
Figure 1: Each pane displays the percentage of participants that responded with a given output frequency of the minority marble
(m) during testing. Columns are the input ratio of m:M during training. Dashed lines mark the input frequency of m. In the
one-item task, participants probability matched, reproducing the input ratio with high fidelity. This task was between-subjects;
each participant was trained on one input ratio only. In the six-item task, participants were more likely to regularize than to































Figure 2: Training and testing trials for the six-item task.
same bag. In each training trial, a picture of the bag was
displayed for 1000 milliseconds and then a marble (blue or
orange) appeared over the bag for 2000 milliseconds. There
were 10 training trials, with no break between trials. In each
testing trial, the bag was displayed with the two marble colors
below. Participants mouse clicked on a marble to make their
choice of one draw from the bag. Their choice was displayed
above the bag for 2000 milliseconds and then the next testing
trial began. There were 10 testing trials with no breaks be-
tween trials. Locations (left or right) of the blue and orange
marbles were held constant across test trials for each partici-
pant, but counterbalanced across participants.
A fixed ratio of blue to orange marbles was shown in the
training phase. Each participant was randomly assigned to
one of 6 training conditions based on this ratio. The color of
the training ratio’s minority marble (m) and majority marble
(M) was counterbalanced across participants. All possible ra-
tios of m:M were tested and will be referred to as the 0:10,
1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6, and 5:5 conditions. 192 participants took
part in this task, with 32 in each condition.
Six-item task This task is based on the word frequency
learning task from Reali and Griffiths (2009). Participants
observed 10 marble draws each from six different containers,
totaling 60 marble draws (see Figure 2). Each container was
associated with 2 unique marble colors (12 unique marble
colors were therefore used). Training and testing trials were
identical to the one-item task. Each container was uniquely
associated with one of the possible ratios specified by condi-
tion 0:10, 1:9, 2:8, 3:7, 4:6, and 5:5 above. Thus, the six-item
task is a within-subject version of the one-item task, with the
addition that training and testing trials from all six conditions
are interleaved. Assignments of a ratio and marble colors (in
predefined color pairs) to each container was randomized per
participant. 64 participants took part in this task. Two ad-
ditional versions of this experiment were also run; one where
all 6 bags were in condition 0:10 (each container was mapped
to one color only) and one where all 6 containers were in con-
dition 5:5. Each of these versions was completed by 32 new
participants.
Experiment results
Participants in the six-item task were more likely to regular-
ize their responses per container than participants in the one-
item task. Here, we refer to regularization as the production
of a more extreme ratio than that observed during training,
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Figure 3: Difference in mean entropy scores between tasks,
for each input ratio. Each participant’s sequence of marble
draws during testing was converted into an entropy score.
Lower scores denote greater regularity within a response.
Participant responses were significantly more regular in the
six-item task than in the one-item task for input ratios 3:7,
4:6, and 5:5. Error bars show the standard error of the mean.
where 0:10 and 10:0 are the most extreme ratios and 5:5 is
the least extreme. The distributions of participant responses
are shown in Figure 1. Each pane displays the percentage of
participants that responded with a given output frequency of
m, per input frequency and per task. In the one-item task, par-
ticipants probability matched; the mode of the population is
on the input frequency of m, meaning that the most common
response was perfect reproduction of the ratio observed dur-
ing training. In the six-item task, visual inspection suggests
that participants did not reproduce the training ratios with as
high fidelity. Most participants regularized by overproducing
the majority marble (all mass in the bars to the left of the dot-
ted line) and a large number of responses are fully regular,
meaning the output frequency of m is 0 or 10.
To better assess the different degrees of regularization be-
tween tasks, we calculated the entropy of each participant’s
sequence of test choices. This quantifies the amount of vari-
ation (in bits) with a value between 0 and 1; where 0 denotes
a completely regular sequence (i.e. a series of all blue marble
draws) and 1 denotes a maximally variable sequence (i.e. a
series of 5 blue and 5 orange draws, in any order). This allows
us to refine our definition of regularization as the overproduc-
tion of one marble, such that the entropy of the participant’s
testing choices is lower than that of their training observa-
tions. The mean entropy scores of participant responses per
input frequency are shown in Figure 3.
A linear mixed effects regression analysis showed a signif-
icant effect of task on entropy scores, t(34) = −7.226, p <
.001, and a significant effect of input frequency on entropy
scores, t(34) = −10.832, p < .001. This means the two tasks
elicited different amounts of regularity within participants’
Figure 4: Distribution of participant responses for two addi-
tional versions of the six-item task, where all items contained
the same input ratio of m:M. One group of participants was
trained on all 0:10 ratios and another group was trained on all
5:5 ratios.
responses and that participants’ responses were modulated by
training frequencies; they noticed differences in the input fre-
quencies and this affected their responses. A significant inter-
action of task and input frequency on entropy scores was also
obtained, t(34) = 4.570, p < .001; participants responded dif-
ferently to different input frequencies, and this pattern of re-
sponses also differed by task.
There was a significant difference in mean entropy scores
between tasks for input frequencies 3:7, 4:6, and 5:5 (W =
1427.5, p = .001;W = 1714, p < .001;W = 1585.5, p <
.001), respectively.1 The difference in mean entropy be-
tween tasks was not significant for input frequencies 0:10,
1:9, and 2:8 (W = 894, p = .228;W = 1184.5, p = .192;W =
1264, p = .0542), respectively.
Two additional experiments were conducted to explore the
possibility that regularization in the six-item task is due to
interference between containers, such that ratios learned for
one container get confused with ratios learned for another
container. We eliminated this type of interference by train-
ing participants on 6 containers with identical ratios. Figure
4 shows participant responses when trained on all 0:10 ratios
(left) and all 5:5 ratios (right). The average entropy for the all
0:10 task is significantly lower than that of the 0:10 condition
in the six-item task (W = 5061, p = .004), but not signifi-
cantly different than the 0:10 condition in the one-item task
(W = 2900.5, p = .466). Tracking multiple 0:10 ratios is no
different than tracking one 0:10 ratio, but it is different from
tracking one 0:10 ratio concurrently with other ratios. This
means interference may account for the errors participants
make in the original six-item task when producing draws for
the container they observed as 0:10. However, for the all 5:5
task, the average entropy was not significantly different from
1These were determined with a non-parametric t-test, the
Whitney-Mann U-test, since the distributions of entropy scores are
non-normal.
2After correction for multiple comparisons, this is not approach-
ing significance.
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the 5:5 condition in the six-item task (W = 5892.5, p = .617).
Participants still produced 0:10 and 10:0 responses in the ab-
sence of observing these ratios during training. Therefore, in-
terference may account for some of the differences between
the one-item and six-item tasks, but this isn’t the sole cause
of the regularization behavior observed in the six-item task.
Frequency learning models
What cognitive processes cause regularization? So far our
analyses have quantified the difference in regularity between
participants’ training and testing responses. In this sec-
tion, we turn our focus to an internal force that can affect
a learner’s behavior; an inductive bias favoring certain ratios
of marbles.
Bayesian model
Bayesian models provide a way to quantify inductive bi-
ases and understand their effect on behavior. We fit a beta-
binomial Bayesian sampler model to participants’ responses,
following Reali and Griffiths (2009), and ask what prior ex-
pectation for regularity a Bayesian rational learner would
need to have in order to produce the data that our participants
produced.
A Bayesian rational learner uses Bayes’ rule, P(h|d) ∝
P(d|h)P(h), to infer what proportion of marbles generated
the draws that they observed. Here, each proportion is a hy-
pothesis and the observed draws are the data. Bayes rule
combines the prior probability of a hypothesis, P(h), with
the likelihood of the data under that hypothesis, P(d|h), to
arrive at a posterior probability of that hypothesis given the
data, P(h|d). The prior is a beta distribution over all hypothe-
ses, Beta(α2 ,
α
2 ), where the parameter α determines whether
the learner expects to see regular draws or variable draws. A
learner with α < 2 will tend to regularize their productions,
a learner with α = 2 is unbiased toward any particular pro-
portion of draws, and a learner with α > 2 is biased towards
variability in draws. The likelihood of drawing N marbles in
ratio k : (N − k) from a container of marbles in proportions







Once the posterior probability over all hypotheses has been
determined, the learner must choose a hypothesis to generate
testing responses from. We take the case where learners sam-
ple a hypothesis from the posterior distribution, and then sam-
ple data from this hypothesis according to its likelihood (as if
the learner were randomly drawing marbles from the hypoth-
esized proportion, with replacement, as in Equation 1).
This model defines the probability of generating all test-
ing proportions (output states) from all training proportions
(input states) and can be visualized as a transition matrix be-
tween all possible states in the system. Because our exper-
iment covers all possible training proportions for 10 draws
from a bag, we can also construct an empirical transition ma-
trix from participant responses in each task. From here on,
we switch to visualizing our data in terms of marble 1 (m1)
and marble 2 (m2)3. Figure 5 (top row) shows the two empir-
ical transition matrices and three model matrices for different
values of the prior parameter α. Each value of α defines a
unique transition matrix, and thus a unique pattern of behav-
ior. For example, if a Bayesian learner observes 1 draw of
m1 and 9 of m2, and if their prior is α = 0.01, they are most
likely to produce 0 draws of m1 and 10 of m2, regularizing
their productions. If their prior is α = 2, they are most likely
to produce 1 draw of m1 and 9 of m2, probability matching
their productions. And if their prior is α = 10, they are most
likely to produce 3 draws of m1 and 7 of m2, increasing varia-
tion in their productions. Thus, the prior used here intuitively
captures a range of human behaviors in frequency learning.
The model fitting task at hand is to determine which model
transition matrix most resembles the empirical transition ma-
trix, by assigning the most likelihood to the empirical data.
The prior associated with the best-fit model is the one that
best explains participant behavior and gives us an idea of what
biases our participants may have.
The best-fit bias in the one-item task is α = 1.55 with a
log likelihood of −413, which is equivalent to correctly pre-
dicting 20% of participant responses in this task 4. This prior
shows an expectation for a slight amount of regularity in the
data set. For the six-item task, the best-fit bias is α = 1.21
with a log likelihood of −1186, equivalent to 9% response
prediction. This prior shows a stronger bias toward regularity
in the six-item task than in the one-item task.
Prediction percentages are lower for the six-item task be-
cause participant responses are more variable in the this task
than in the one-item task. Only deterministic processes (with
one output per input) can be predicted with 100% accuracy.
The ceiling on model prediction for each task was determined
by fitting each data set to itself, yielding a maximum of 32%
accuracy for the one-item task and 16% accuracy for the six-
item task. Relative to these ceilings, the best-fit models ac-
count for 61% and 56% of participant responses in the one-
item and six-item tasks, respectively.
Bootstrap model
An input-based random sampling model was also fit to the
data. This model defines the transition matrix that would be
obtained if participants produced their testing responses by
randomly sampling 10 draws from their training observations,
with replacement. In this case, each row would be a binomial
where p equals the training proportion of m1. It is important
to note that this transition matrix defines the dynamics of drift
in one generation and may be used as a baseline for the loss of
variation that can occur in the absence of a regularization bias.
3marble 1 (m1) refers to the blue marble in the one-item task,
and to the blue, brown, black, red, olive, and purple marbles in the
six-item task.
4The raw log likelihoods should not be compared between tasks,
because there are a different number of observations per task. This
is corrected for in the prediction percentages, which are comparable
between tasks.
439
Figure 5: Transition matrices (top row) and their associated stationary distribution (bottom row) for the experimental results of
the two frequency learning tasks, and for the Bayesian model showing three example bias strengths (α = 0.01, 2, 10). Transition
matrices give the probability of moving from each input frequency (the number of training trials showing marble 1) to each
output frequency (the number of testing trials in which participants produced marble 1)3. The stationary distribution shows
how often the transition matrix will produce each output frequency of marble 1.
For this model, the log likelihood of the one-item task data is
−259, equivalent to 25% response prediction, and is a bet-
ter fit than the best-fit beta-binomial sampler model5. Thus,
of the models explored in this paper, drift provides the best
account of our participants’ probability matching behavior.
However, a repeated measures Monte Carlo test shows that
the standard deviation among participant output entropies in
the one-item task data are significantly lower than that obtain-
able by drift: p = .04, p = .03, p = .01, p = .003, for conditions
2:8, 3:7, 4:6, 5:5, respectively. Although these data are well-
accounted for by the drift model, they still show a quantitative
difference in standard deviation, meaning that the forces be-
hind probability matching are not truly isomorphic to drift.
As for the six-item task, the log likelihood is −1076, equiva-
lent to 6% response prediction. Here, the sampler model with
a bias toward regularization is still the better fit.
Null model
This model is the transition matrix that would be obtained
if participants were randomly sampling from the two testing
choices each trial (i.e. not engaging in the task). Here,
every row would be a binomial distribution where p = 0.5.
For this model, the log likelihood of the one-item task data
is −604, equivalent to 4% response prediction. For the
six-item task, the log likelihood is −1630, equivalent to
1% response prediction. Of all models considered, this is
the worst fit for both tasks, meaning that participants are
not likely to be randomly sampling from their testing choices.
5This bootstrap model, which defines the dynamics of evolution-
ary drift, is equivalent to a Bayesian MAP model with α = 0. See
Reali & Griffiths (2010) for the proof.
The results of these model fits strongly suggest that partici-
pants in the six-item condition are not just performing poorly
at reproducing their training proportion, but they are regular-
izing their responses in a way that can not be accounted for
by random errors.
Learning biases and long-term behavior
In addition to comparing the transition matrices, which de-
scribe the behavior of one generation of learners, we can also
look at the long-term behavior of the system, which is de-
scribed by the stationary distribution of the transition matrix
(Figure 5, bottom row). This distribution tells us what per-
cent of the population we would expect to see in each state,
after an arbitrarily large number of generations, if the output
state of one learner served as the input state to another. Grif-
fiths and Kalish (2007) have shown that the stationary distri-
bution mirrors the prior distribution over hypotheses for the
Bayesian sampler model utilized here. The stationary dis-
tributions of the empirical transition matrices are most in-
teresting because these would be an estimate of our partic-
ipants’ regularization bias (the prior) if they were Bayesian
sampler learners6. In line with this interpretation, the sta-
tionary distribution of the six-item task closely resembles
that of its best-fit Bayesian model, which has a beta distri-
bution Beta(0.605,0.605). However, the stationary distribu-
tion of the one-item task does not resemble that of its best-
fit Bayesian model, which has a u-shaped beta distribution
Beta(0.775,0.775). In general, the Bayesian model is a good
fit to participant behavior in the six-item task, but does not ac-
count very well for participant behavior in the one-item task.
6Both of the empirical transition matrices are ergodic.
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A close examination of the model’s transition matrices and
stationary distributions shows that probability matching be-
havior with a low standard deviation is not within this model’s
range of behavior.
Discussion
We have shown that learning a single versus multiple fre-
quencies modulates participants’ regularization behavior in a
non-linguistic task. When participants tracked the frequency
associated with a single item, they probability matched; re-
producing the variation they had observed with high fidelity.
However, when tracking multiple frequencies concurrently,
participants regularized their responses, usually by overpro-
ducing the most common variant.
A beta-binomial Bayesian sampler model was fit to the re-
sults of each task and showed a stronger prior bias toward
regularization in the six-item task than in the one-item task.
Strictly speaking, the prior represents the inductive bias of
the learner, and participants should come to a marble-drawing
task with a particular expectation about the ratios of marbles
in containers, regardless of the difficultly of the task. The
fact that we find different best-fit priors according to different
task demands means that we are not revealing the inductive
bias of our participants, per se, but a composite picture that
characterizes more than one cognitive constraint. At least one
constraint that is sensitive to task demands should be added
to the model, such as a memory constraint that disproportion-
ally forgets lower-frequency observations. Such an addition
could free up the prior to more accurately reflect participants’
inductive bias. This raises a point of caution in comparing
inductive biases across domains without controlling for task
demands, since task demands can modulate bias strengths.
Our modeling results also suggest that human probability
matching and regularization behavior do not lie on a simple
continuum that can be captured by the prior alone. Although
the Bayesian model accounted well for our participants’ regu-
larization behavior, it failed to account for the restricted vari-
ance of probability matching. Participants may be trying to
produce a representative sample of draws, where the most
likely response is the training ratio itself. Such a parameter
might lead to high-fidelity reproduction of the training pro-
portion under low memory constraints only.
If memory constraints are the cause of the regularization
bias revealed when learning the frequencies of marbles in sev-
eral containers, then this same domain-general factor may be
the cause of regularization in tasks naturally characterized by
concurrent frequency learning, such as language learning.
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